Burton v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. COA09-582.,COA09-582.
• Citation: 689 S.E.2d 174
• Parties: Luther G. BURTON, Administrator of the Estate of Walter Nicks Burton, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Tony A. WILLIAMS, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

689 S.E.2d 174

Luther G. BURTON, Administrator of the Estate of Walter Nicks Burton, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Tony A. WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. COA09-582.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

January 19, 2010.

Appeal by defendant from order entered 2 October 2008 by Judge Kenneth C. Titus in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 November 2009.

Woodruff, Reece & Fortner, by Gordon C. Woodruff, Smithfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Ta-Letta Bryant Saunders, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.

Defendant Tony A. Williams appeals from the trial court's directed verdict in favor of plaintiff Luther G. Burton, the administrator of the estate of Walter Nicks Burton, Sr. Defendant's principal argument is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence because plaintiff was the party with the burden of proof at trial. Our Supreme Court, however, has held that the right to a jury trial is not absolute and is predicated on a preliminary determination by the trial court as to whether there exist genuine issues of fact and questions regarding the credibility of the evidence to be submitted to the jury. Because plaintiff established his claim through documentary evidence, which the parties stipulated was authentic and correct, the trial court properly directed the verdict in favor of plaintiff despite plaintiff having the burden of proof at trial.

Facts and Procedural History

On 20 February 1998, Mr. Burton and his wife Ruth Inez P. Burton (both now deceased) sold their home to defendant, providing owner-financing for $160,000.00 of the $185,000.00 purchase price. The Burtons conveyed the real estate to defendant by general warranty deed, which was secured by a purchase money deed of trust in the amount of $160,000.00. Both the general warranty deed and deed of trust were recorded. Defendant gave a promissory note to Mr. Burton, in which defendant agreed to pay $160,000.00 at 7% interest in 151 monthly payments of $1,240.48.

Due to Mr. Burton's declining health, he executed a power of attorney on 9 March 2005, making plaintiff, his son, his attorney-in-fact. On 7 September 2005, defendant and Mr. Burton executed a promissory note addendum, which continued the monthly payments of $1,240.48 until 1 March 2018. In addition to the addendum, they both signed a payment agreement release on 8 September 2005 that provided that if Mr. Burton died prior to defendant completely repaying the promissory note, then the note became null and void and defendant would be "relieved of any and all remaining financial obligations to or claims by the estate, beneficiaries, creditors, heirs, or assignees of [Mr. Burton]." The addendum and release were recorded on 3 February 2006.

Mr. Burton moved to a nursing home after brain surgery in late 2006. Plaintiff found the release while cleaning out his father's home in April 2007. Plaintiff, as his father's attorney-in-fact, filed suit in Johnston County Superior Court, asserting that the addendum and release were void and unenforceable because (1) Mr. Burton lacked the mental capacity to assent to the addendum and release at the time of their execution; (2) they were procured through undue influence and duress; (3) they were procured through fraud; and (4) they were unsupported by consideration. Plaintiff sought to have the addendum and release stricken from the public record. Plaintiff also asserted claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees.

Defendant filed an answer generally denying plaintiff's claims. Mr. Burton died on 7 July 2007, and plaintiff was substituted as the administrator of his estate by order entered 15 October 2007. By another order entered 15 October 2007, the action was removed to Durham County, where the property is located. Plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens on 10 March 2008 and defendant filed a motion to set it aside on 19 March 2008. Defendant also moved for summary judgment. On 16 May 2008, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and requesting imposition of a constructive trust on the property. After conducting a hearing on 27 May 2008 regarding the outstanding motions in the case, the trial court entered an order on 18 August 2008(1) denying defendant's motion for summary judgment; (2) denying defendant's motion to set aside plaintiff's lis pendens; and (3) allowing plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.

Prior to trial, both plaintiff and defendant filed motions in limine to exclude any testimony coming under the Dead Man's Statute, which the trial court granted. The jury trial began on 16 September 2008, and at the close of plaintiff's evidence, both plaintiff and defendant moved for directed verdicts. The next day, the trial court denied defendant's motion but granted plaintiff's on the ground that the release was void and unenforceable for lack of consideration. On 2 October 2008, the trial court entered a judgment and order reflecting its rulings and directing the verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant moved to stay the order of directed verdict and the trial court denied the motion. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.

Discussion

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the issue of whether the release was supported by consideration when plaintiff had the burden of proof on this issue at trial. Defendant maintains that his constitutional right under N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 to a jury trial was violated because, by granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court "usurped the jury's responsibility" by "prevent[ing] him from presenting evidence and calling witnesses."

Contrary to defendant's contention, however, our Supreme Court, in addressing whether a verdict may properly be directed in favor of the party with the burden of proof, has held that "[t]he constitutional right to trial by jury is not absolute; rather, it is premised upon a preliminary determination by the trial judge that there indeed exist genuine issues of fact and credibility which require submission to the jury." North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 537, 256 S.E.2d 388, 396 (1979) (internal citation omitted). The Court "stressed" that "there are neither constitutional nor procedural impediments to directing a verdict for the party with the burden of proof where the credibility of [the] movant's evidence is manifest as a matter of law." Id. The Court explained that "if the evidence so clearly establishes the fact in issue that no reasonable inferences to the contrary can be drawn[,]" it is proper to direct the verdict for the proponent notwithstanding a party's right to a jury trial. Id. at 536, 256 S.E.2d at 395.

Thus the dispositive issue on appeal is whether, under the facts of this case, it was proper for the trial court to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff having the burden of proof on his claim that the release was not supported by consideration. When a party moves for a directed verdict, the trial court must determine

whether the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury. In passing upon such motion the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. That is, the evidence in favor of the non-movant must be deemed true, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in his favor and he is entitled to the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn in his favor. It is only when the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict in the non-movant's favor that the motion should be granted.

Dockery v. Hocutt, 357 N.C. 210, 216-17, 581 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

While not unconstitutional, it is ordinarily not appropriate to direct a verdict in favor of the party with the burden of proof. See Burnette, 297 N.C. at 538, 256 S.E.2d at 396 (cautioning that "instances where credibility is manifest will be rare, and courts should exercise restraint in removing the issue of credibility from the jury"). A directed verdict in favor of the party with the burden of proof is proper, however, "`when the proponent has established a clear and uncontradicted prima facie case and the credibility of [the proponent's] evidence is manifest as a matter of law.'" Town of Highlands v. Edwards, 144 N.C.App. 363, 366, 548 S.E.2d 764, 766 (quoting Homeland, Inc. v. Backer, 78 N.C.App. 477, 481, 337 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986)), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 74, 553 S.E.2d 212 (2001); accord Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 120 N.C.App. 106, 109-10, 461 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1995) (stating conversely that a directed verdict for proponent is not improper where proponent's right to recovery does not depend on credibility of proponent's evidence and "pleadings, evidence, and stipulations show that there is no issue of genuine fact for jury consideration"). Although the determination of whether the credibility of the proponent's evidence is established as a matter of law "depends on the evidence in each case[,]" there are three "recurrent situations" in which it may be established: (1) where the "non-movant establishes [the] proponent's case by admitting the truth of the basic facts upon which the claim of [the] proponent rests"; (2) where "the controlling evidence is documentary and [the] non-movant does not deny the authenticity or correctness of the documents"; or (3) where "there are only latent doubts as to the credibility of oral testimony and the opposing party has failed to point to specific areas of impeachment and contradictions." Burnette, 297 N.C. at 537-38, 256 S.E.2d at 396 (citations and quotation...