Butler v. San Diego Sheriff's Dep't

• Decision Date: 19 July 2022
• Docket Number: 22-cv-690-MMA (DEB)
• Parties: STEPHON BUTLER Inmate #22709674, Plaintiff v. SAN DIEGO SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

STEPHON BUTLER Inmate #22709674, Plaintiff v. SAN DIEGO SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-690-MMA (DEB)

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 19, 2022

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND [DOC. NO. 2] DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)(1)

HON MICHAEL M. ANELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Stephon Butler (“Plaintiff” or “Butler”), currently housed at the Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”), located in Vista California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $402. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).^[1] The action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 83-84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84-85.

In support of his IFP Motion, Butler has submitted a certified copy of his prison certificate which indicates that during the six months prior to filing suit he had an average monthly balance of $45.80, average monthly deposits of $111.67, and had an available balance of $274.81 in his account at the time he filed suit. Doc. No. 2 at 4. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP and imposes an initial partial filing fee of $22.33 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The remaining balance of the fee owed in this case will be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Butler is a prisoner, his Complaint requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Discussion

Butler alleges his federal due process, Eighth Amendment, and equal protection rights have been violated by Defendants. Specifically, he claims has been given the wrong medication on several occasions, he has untreated knee pain, he needs new dentures, has not been given proper food, he has been forced to wear dirty clothes, he has been exposed to Covid and cold temperatures, and his mail has been delayed. See Doc. Nos. 1, 3-5. He also alleges he is being unfairly denied credits and has been improperly classified as a violent felon. See Doc. No. 1 at 3.

1. San Diego Sheriff's Department

“Persons” under § 1983 are state and local officials sued in their individual capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, and/or the local governmental entity itself. See Vance v. Cnty of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The San Diego County Sheriff's Department is managed by and/or a department of the County of San Diego, but it is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See e.g., Saxton v. San Diego County Sheriff's Dept., 2022 WL 1631382, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (stating that “Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim against the San Diego County Sheriff's Department or its subdivisions because those entities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983”) (citing Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1138); Pina v. Sacuan Security & Police, 2021 WL 5761718, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (same); Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 2013 WL 5946112, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell [v. Dep't of Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as the police departments, are not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.”); Nelson v. Cty. of Sacramento, 926 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing Sacramento Sheriff's Department from section 1983 action “with prejudice” because it “is a subdivision of a local government entity,” i.e., Sacramento County). Therefore, Butler cannot pursue any § 1983 civil rights claims against the San Diego Sheriff's Department itself.

Moreover, even if he had named the County of San Diego as a defendant, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (“[Municipalities and other local governmental units . . . [are] among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”), to bring a § 1983 claim he must plead that the “municipality's policy or custom caused a violation of [his] constitutional rights.” Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2011). In short, Butler must allege that: “(1) [he] was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). His pleading includes no such allegations. Therefore, he has failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim as to defendant San Diego Sheriff's Department. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

2. Due Process & Classification

In Count One, Butler claims his due process rights have been violated by defendants because he “is being housed in a high power module for...