Nelson v. Cnty. of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 26 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:12–cv–02040–MCE–GGH.,2:12–cv–02040–MCE–GGH.
• Citation: 926 F.Supp.2d 1159
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: James M. NELSON, an individual, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a governmental entity, et al., Defendants.

926 F.Supp.2d 1159

James M. NELSON, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a governmental entity, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:12–cv–02040–MCE–GGH.

United States District Court,

E.D. California.

Feb. 26, 2013.

Kathleen Marie Erskine, Richard Albert Love, Love and Erskine LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Tina I. Mangarpan, Jeffrey Steven Behar, Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Long Beach, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., Chief Judge.

Plaintiff James M. Nelson (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendants County of Sacramento (“County”), Sacramento County Sherriff's Department (“Sheriff's Department”), Sacramento County Sheriff Scott R. Jones (“Jones”), Murray Boulware (“Boulware”), Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Michael Vale (“Vale”), and Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Jeffrey Shelldorf (“Shelldorf”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) on August 23, 2012.¹

Plaintiff alleges in his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that Defendants deprived him of his Constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also committedbattery, assault, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress and elder abuse against him.² Now before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).³ (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss FAC, Oct. 16, 2012, ECF No. 14.) Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff cannot assert a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim; (2) the Sheriff's Department should be dismissed as a defendant because it is not a proper party to this action; (3) Boulware should be dismissed as a defendant because Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Boulware; (4) Jones has Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 liability; (5) Because of Jones's immunity, the County should be dismissed as a defendant; and (6) this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims and defendants.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a seventy-two-year-old veteran with hearing problems who subsists on Social Security. (FAC ¶ 8, 11.) On January 1, 2012, he drove to Sacramento International Airport's Terminal B, which was under construction, to pick up his daughters. Plaintiff parked his car at the curb in front of the terminal and went inside to check the status of his daughters' flight. Plaintiff claims he did not see any signs restricting parking at the curb, but when he returned from the terminal, Boulware was placing a parking citation on Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff claims he told Boulware that Plaintiff could not afford the ticket, but Boulware responded, “Not my problem.” (FAC ¶¶ 10, 11.)

Plaintiff drove away, circled the airport and returned to the terminal ten minutes later, remaining in the vehicle this time. Plaintiff alleges Boulware told Plaintiff that Plaintiff could not park at the curb and that if Plaintiff did not leave, “I will call the cops.” Plaintiff alleges airport policy allowed motorists picking up passengers to sit at the curb for up to five minutes. Plaintiff told Boulware, “Someone should kick your ass” and “go ahead and call the cops.” Plaintiff then drove away from the terminal a second time before turning around and once again heading back toward the airport. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 12, 14.)

Plaintiff alleges Boulware informed the Sheriff's Department that Plaintiff was driving at the airport. According to Plaintiff, Vale and Shelldorf received a dispatch describing Plaintiff and his vehicle and then spotted Plaintiff driving back toward the terminal. According to Plaintiff, the deputies pulled over Plaintiff, who then stepped out of his vehicle to determine why the deputies stopped him. Plaintiff alleges the deputies threw him to the ground, pinned his right arm behind his back, punched him in the head, grabbed his left ankle and dragged him on the road and into a standing position before handcuffing him. (FAC ¶¶ 14–16.)

Plaintiff claims he then was treated for facial lacerations and abrasions before Vale and Shelldorf booked and jailed him at the Sacramento Central Main Jail for resisting arrest and obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. Plaintiff was released from jail about 4:30 a.m. on January 2, 2012, and claims he immediately went to the Sacramento Veteran's Administration Medical Center Emergency Department for examination and treatment. (FAC ¶¶ 17–18.)

Plaintiff was charged with two misdemeanors: resisting a peace officer in the discharge of his duty and use of offensive words. Plaintiff pled not guilty to both charges, which ultimately were dismissed. (FAC ¶¶ 19–21.) Plaintiff subsequently brought the present action and filed his FAC on September 25, 2012. (Pl.'s FAC, Sept. 25, 2012, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff claims Vale and Shelldorf used excessive force against him during the arrest.

Plaintiff further alleges the County, the Sheriff's Department, and Jones established and maintained an unconstitutional policy, decision, directive, action and/or order that resulted in: (1) deliberate indifference to a pattern of excessive force; (2) inadequate training of deputies in questioning, detaining and custody of individuals; and (3) avoiding and/or covering up complaints of physical attacks on citizens by law enforcement officers. (FAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants' actions deprived Plaintiff of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (FAC ¶ 29.) In addition to his constitutional claims under § 1983, Plaintiff also asserts state tort claims for battery, assault, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as elder abuse under California Welfare & Institutions Code sections 15610.63 and 15657. (FAC ¶ 34–70.)

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. (ECF No. 14.)

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. Id. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Court also is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) ... requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citation omitted). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. If the “plaintiffs ... have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ ” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant a leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment ....” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri–Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir.2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims; Defendants' Eleventh Amendment Immunity Defense.

1. Distinguishing Between Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims.

Section 1983 provides relief against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... causes ... any citizen of the United States ... the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 gives parties “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting ...