BUTTE MINERS'UNION NO. 1 v. Anaconda Company

• Decision Date: 03 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 596.,596.
• Citation: 159 F. Supp. 431
• Parties: BUTTE MINERS' UNION NO. 1 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, an unincorporated association; Anaconda Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 117 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an uincorporated association; Great Falls Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 16 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an unincorporated association; The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. The ANACONDA COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

159 F. Supp. 431

BUTTE MINERS' UNION NO. 1 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, an unincorporated association; Anaconda Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 117 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an uincorporated association; Great Falls Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 16 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an unincorporated association; The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. The ANACONDA COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.

No. 596.

United States District Court D. Montana, Butte Division.

March 3, 1958.

Nathan Witt, New York City, and Leif Erickson, Helena, Mont., for plaintiff.

J. T. Finlen, W. M. Kirkpatrick, P. L. MacDonald, Sam Stephenson, Jr., and Joseph B. Woodlief, Butte, Mont., for defendant.

MURRAY, Chief Judge.

This is an action brought by the plaintiffs under the provisions of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, for specific performance of the arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agreements in an industry affecting commerce. Plaintiffs are the bargaining agents for the miners and mill and smelter workers employed by defendant in its mines at Butte, Montana, and in its smelters at Anaconda and Great Falls, Montana.

Butte Miners' Union No. 1, Anaconda Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 117 and and Great Falls Mill and Smeltermen's Union No. 16, are each affiliated with the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. Each of the three local unions entered into a separate contract with defendant covering "rates of wages, hours of labor, and other conditions of employment" covering miners employed by defendant in its Butte mines and smeltermen employed by defendant in its Anaconda and Great Falls smelters respectively. The International Union is also a party to each agreement. The three agreements, which will be hereinafter referred to as the collective bargaining agreements, differ in some respects, but the provisions of each agreement that are relevant and material to this case are identical. Each of the collective bargaining agreements is dated July 1, 1956, and they are effective from July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1959.

In addition there is in existence between each of the local unions and the defendant company a pension plan agreement. These agreements, which will be hereinafter referred to as pension agreements, are each dated March 14, 1952, and have been amended twice since that date, the first amendment in each instance being dated October 15, 1954; and the second amendment in the case of the Butte miners and Anaconda smeltermen's pension plan agreement being dated June 29, 1956, and the second amendment to the Great Falls smeltermen's pension plan agreement being dated July 7, 1956. Insofar as relevant and material in the case, the provisions of the pension plan agreements are the same in each instance.

Disputes arose between the unions and the company concerning the termination by the company of the employment of union member employees upon their reaching the age of 68 years even though the said employees were not eligible for pensions under the pension agreements. At each of the places where such terminations occurred, the union concerned listed the termination as grievances, and attempted to have the dispute settled under the grievance procedure set up in the collective bargaining agreements, the final step of which is arbitration. The company refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, taking the position that the terminations were made under the provisions of the pension agreements, and that the pension agreements do not provide for the arbitration of such disputes. The unions filed this action seeking to compel the defendant to submit the dispute to the arbitration process provided in the collective bargaining agreements. Defendant answered and attached to its answer a copy of the collective bargaining agreements dated July 1, 1956, between the defendant and each of the plaintiffs, and also a copy of the pension agreements dated March 14, 1952, together with amendments, between the defendant and each of the plaintiffs. Each side to the suit has moved for summary judgment upon the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, plaintiffs and defendant each claiming to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The main issue in this case is whether the termination by the defendant of the employment of members of plaintiff unions who have reached 68 years of age, even when such persons are not entitled to pension under the pension agreements, constitutes a dispute or grievance between plaintiff unions and defendant company which is arbitrable under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. There is also the question of whether the Court may order the specific performance of the arbitration agreement even if it is found that an arbitrable dispute exists.

Whatever doubt may have once existed as to power of the Court to order specific performance of the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement has been put to rest by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union, etc. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, and General Electric Co. v. Local 205, etc., 353 U.S. 547, 77 S.Ct. 921, 1 L.Ed.2d 1028. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at page 456, 77 S.Ct. at page 917, the Court said:

"It seems, therefore, clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication rejecting the common-law rule, discussed in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 44 S.Ct. 274, 68 L.Ed. 582, against enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations.

"The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. * * *."

The Section 301(a) referred to in this quotation is Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, under which the present suit is brought.

Defendant in its brief and oral argument contends that the law of the State of New York is controlling in this case because by a specific provision of the pension agreements New York law is made applicable and controlling in the interpretation of those agreements. However, it is the collective bargaining agreements which must be construed to determine the narrow issue presented in this case, and not the pension agreements. The Court is not here concerned with whether the terminations of employment in dispute were justified by the provisions of the pension agreements. If an arbitrable issue is found to exist under the collective bargaining agreements, the arbitrator will apply New York law in determining whether the terminations of employments complained of were or were not justified by the provisions of the pension agreements. In construing the collective bargaining agreements with reference to whether an arbitrable dispute exists between plaintiffs and defendant here, the Court, in accordance with Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, must apply federal law, of which there seems to be a considerable body already fashioned, and this Court is not faced with the necessity of fashioning any law in this case.

In Local 205, etc. v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85, 101, affirmed, 353 U.S. 547, 77 S.Ct. 921, 1 L.Ed.2d 1028, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said:

"The scope of an arbitration pledge is solely for the parties to set, and thus the determination of whether a particular dispute is arbitrable is a problem of contract interpretation."

We turn then to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements with reference to disputes, grievances and arbitration to determine the scope of the arbitration pledge. Except for slight differences in wording between the three agreements, which are not material here, those provisions are:

"Walkouts, Lockouts,

Protection of Property:

"During the life of this agreement the Union agrees that there shall be no collective cessation of work by the members of the Union on account of any controversy with the Company respecting the provisions of this agreement, or any other controversy that may arise between the parties to this agreement, until and unless all of the means of settling any such controversy under the provisions of this agreement, or otherwise, shall have failed. The Company agrees that it will not lock out the employees covered by this agreement on account of any controversy with the employees respecting the provisions of this agreement, or any other controversy that may arise between the parties to this agreement, until and unless all other means of settling such controversy under the

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