Butts v. AVX Corp., 0949
| Decision Date | 24 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 0949,0949 |
| Citation | 292 S.C. 256,355 S.E.2d 876 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Michael W. BUTTS, Appellant, v. AVX CORPORATION, Respondent. . Heard |
Larry L. Hanna and Randall K. Mullins, Myrtle Beach, for appellant.
Haynsworth, Baldwin, Miles, Johnson, Greaves & Edwards, Greenville, for respondent.
Michael W. Butts brought suit against AVX Corporation alleging causes of action for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and deceit, and unjust enrichment. Butts' causes of action allegedly relate to his termination from AVX. The trial court granted AVX's motion for summary judgment on the ground that each of Butts' causes of action was rooted in a collective bargaining agreement and that, because Butts failed to exhaust his remedies under the agreement, each of his causes of action was subject to dismissal. Butts appeals. We affirm.
The basic issue is whether the trial court properly granted AVX summary judgment on each of Butts' causes of action.
Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Spencer v. Miller, 259 S.C. 453, 192 S.E.2d 863 (1972); Gilmore v. Ivey, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (Ct.App.1986). In addition, it must be shown that further inquiry into the facts is not needed to clarify the application of law. Folkens v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 348 S.E.2d 839 (Ct.App.1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence most strongly against the moving party. Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc. v. Hilton, 278 S.C. 624, 300 S.E.2d 594 (1983).
AVX employed Butts as a tool and die maker from November 1977 until September 1982. A collective bargaining agreement between AVX and Local Union No. 382 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers covered employees of AVX.
Butts underwent surgery for the removal of nodules from his vocal chords and, as a consequence, missed one day of work. His physician supplied him with a medical excuse and wrote upon it, "no vocalization."
Butts returned to work on September 14, 1982, and offered the excuse to AVX's nurse for her to validate it. The nurse refused to accept the excuse, claiming Butts had exhausted his medical excuses for the year. Butts denied that he had done so and reported the matter to his supervisor.
In discussing the dispute with his supervisor, Butts wrote him notes in which he sought the supervisor's assistance and defended his position. The supervisor left Butts in the shop and went to talk with the nurse.
The supervisor thereafter returned to the shop and reported to Butts the nurse's refusal to change her position regarding the number of medical excuses Butts had taken for the year. Because he experienced difficulty in getting his "point across" to his supervisor, Butts attempted to explain his position vocally.
The two then went to another supervisor's office where they discussed the nurse's refusal to accept Butts' medical excuse. Butts expressed particular concern about being penalized for his absence from work.
After stating that he could not work under the stress of the situation, Butts left the supervisor's office and turned in his tools. He also punched his time card and took the card to his supervisor. The latter initialed Butts' time card and Butts walked out. As he was leaving, Butts told his supervisor that his conversations with him and the other supervisor had irritated his throat.
A friend telephoned Butts at home and informed him that his supervisor had listed Butts as a "quit." Butts immediately called and asked for his supervisor. On learning he had gone for the day, Butts spoke with the other supervisor familiar with his problem. The other supervisor suggested that Butts not "worry about it" and assured him that "everything's all right."
When Butts returned to work the next morning, his supervisor told him that he no longer had a job. Later that morning, Butts met with management and union representatives and explained to them all that had happened. One of the management representatives advised Butts to go home and await a decision on his job status.
That afternoon Butts received a telephone call from a management representative who told Butts that he was being "put down officially as a 'quit.' "
The following day Butts met briefly with the management representative who had telephoned him and with a union representative. The management representative advised Butts that he stood by his earlier decision.
As Butts left the meeting, Butts informed the union representative that he wished to file a grievance. The union representative told Butts that "it won't do any good...."
The collective bargaining agreement, with which Butts was familiar, prescribed a grievance procedure that an aggrieved employee was required to follow whenever the employee had a dispute with management that arose under and during the term of the agreement. The first step called for an attempt by the employee and his supervisor or foreman "to adjust the matter." If they failed in their effort "to reach a satisfactory adjustment," the employee was required to submit within a prescribed time to his Department Manager a written grievance signed by both the employee and the Chief Steward, a union representative.
Although he attempted to adjust the matter with his superiors, Butts never filed a written grievance with his Department Manager. The agreement expressly provided that an aggrieved employee's failure to file a grievance in a proper manner and within the prescribed time limit constituted a waiver and abandonment of the grievance and precluded the grievance from "thereafter form[ing] the basis of any further grievance between the parties."
After waiting over two years, Butts brought the instant action. Butts' cause of action for wrongful discharge alleges that AVX willfully attempted to circumvent its written policies in discharging him; his cause of action for breach of contract expressly refers to alleged seniority rights; his cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges that AVX's agents, knowing of his inability to talk, willfully engaged him in a verbal argument over the issue of his absence from work for medical reasons; his causes of action for fraud and deceit alleged that AVX knowingly misrepresented that he, as an AVX employee, would have certain rights and benefits regarding "seniority, termination, leave, and absences;" and his cause of action for unjust enrichment alleges that AVX, "in direct contradiction of its expressed policies," benefited by discharging him and employing another person to perform his job function at a lesser salary.
Butts' principal contention is that the trial court committed reversible error in holding that his causes of action should be dismissed because of his failure to bring them under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (). He argues that his causes of action, which are based on state law, are not so related to the collective bargaining agreement that they must be resolved by reference to federal law.
Section 301 requires the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law for use in addressing disputes arising out of labor contracts. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). An action brought in a state court alleging a violation of a labor agreement, therefore, must be brought under Section 301 and it must be resolved by reference to federal law. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 ...
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