BWB Reasonable & Reliable Transp. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-10564 |
| Parties | BWB REASONABLE AND RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION, LLC, Plaintiff, v. EMPIRE FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
This case involves Plaintiff BWB Reasonable and Reliable Transportation, LLC's claims for the payment of no-fault insurance benefits for medical transportation services it provided to Elijah Spann, stemming from the July 29, 2019 motor vehicle accident that occurred while Spann was driving a vehicle insured by Defendant Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Defendant Empire states that it is undisputed that Spann was logged into a digital transportation network (Uber) when the accident occurred, and that neither the applicable Empire automobile insurance policy nor the Michigan No-Fault Act requires Empire to provide personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for an accident that occurred when Spann was logged into a digital transportation network. Empire now moves for summary judgment, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Empire insurance policy does not provide coverage for Spann's July 29, 2019 automobile accident. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court does not believe that oral argument will aid in its disposition of this motion; therefore, it is dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2).
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant Empire's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17).
On July 29, 2019, Elijah Spann was involved in a motor vehicle accident while he was driving a 2019 Chevrolet Malibu that was owned or leased by Maven Drive LLC and insured by Defendant Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company (“Empire”). Plaintiff BWB Reasonable and Reliable Transportation, LLC (“BWB Reasonable”) provided medical transportation services to Spann arising from that accident. Spann assigned to BWB Reasonable his claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for the services BWB Reasonable provided to him. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.15-16, Assignment of Rights Form.)[1] The Empire insurance policy that covered the 2019 Chevrolet Malibu driven by Spann defines covered vehicles as expressly excluding vehicles while “operated by a person logged into a ‘digital transportation network,' []or while the ‘auto' is being used to transport persons for hire.” (ECF No. 25, Policy (redacted), PageID.881-83.) “Digital transportation network” is defined as “any online-enabled application, software, website or system offered or utilized by a ‘transportation network company' that enables the pre-arrangement of rides.” (Id.) “Transportation network company” is “an entity that uses a ‘digital transportation network' to enable the connection of drivers and passengers for ‘ride-sharing' purposes.” (Id.) “Ridesharing” means “transportation in a personal ‘auto' of the driver that is pre-arranged using a ‘digital transportation network.'” (Id.) Empire explains that this includes, but is not limited to, Uber and Lyft.
Spann admits that he was logged into a digital transportation network (Uber) at the time of the accident (ECF No. 17-2, Spann's discovery responses in Elijah Spann v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Case No. 21-11036 (E.D. Mich.), PageID.544.) Uber's records now confirm that Spann was logged into the Uber application at the time of the July 29, 2019 accident. (ECF No. 24, Uber records (filed under seal).) Plaintiff BWB Reasonable does not dispute, for purposes of this motion, that Spann was an Uber driver and logged into the Uber system, a digital transportation network, at the time of the accident. (ECF No. 27, Pl.'s Resp., PageID.894.)
Plaintiff BWB Reasonable filed suit against General Motors Company and ESIS, Inc. in the Macomb County Circuit Court for the recovery of PIP benefits on September 29, 2020. (ECF No. 1-2, Complaint, PageID.11-14.) BWB Reasonable filed an amended complaint in the state court on December 23, 2020, adding Empire as a defendant. (Id., Amended Complaint, PageID.35-38.) The amended complaint states that BWB Reasonable seeks PIP benefits under the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act for certain “medical transportation” services that BWB Reasonable provided to Spann in connection with injuries Spann allegedly sustained in the July 29, 2019 motor vehicle accident. (Id.)
On February 26, 2021, the state court entered an order dismissing the amended complaint against defendants GM and ESIS. (Id., Order, PageID.103.) On March 15, 2021 Defendant Empire, the only remaining defendant, removed this action from the Macomb County Circuit Court to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal.)
On April 29, 2022, Defendant Empire filed its motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 17, Def.'s Mot.) Empire argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact that (1) Spann was logged into a digital transportation network when the accident occurred on July 29, 2019, and (2) neither the Empire insurance policy nor the Michigan No-Fault Act requires Empire to provide PIP benefits when Spann was logged into a digital transportation network.
Plaintiff BWB Reasonable filed a Response in opposition to Empire's motion for summary judgment on May 20, 2022. (ECF No. 27, Pl.'s Resp.) BWB Reasonable concedes, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, that Spann was an Uber driver and was logged into the Uber system at the time of the July 29, 2019 accident, and does not contest that the Empire insurance policy does not insure Spann's vehicle while he was logged into a digital transportation network. BWB Reasonable instead argues that Empire is equitably estopped from asserting that it is not liable for BWB Reasonable's claims because it voluntarily paid PIP benefits for more than a year before it learned that Spann was logged into Uber's network. BWB Reasonable further argues that the “mend-the-hold” doctrine estops Empire from asserting a defense based on a policy exclusion raised for the first time in the motion for summary judgment.
On June 3, 2022, Empire filed a reply brief arguing that BWB Reasonable cannot assert estoppel where Empire was unaware of the facts barring coverage when it paid PIP benefits to BWB Reasonable, despite Empire's diligent efforts to determine coverage. (ECF No. 28, Def.'s Reply.) Empire further argues that neither estoppel nor the “mend-the-hold” doctrine can be applied to expand or broaden insurance coverage of risks that were not included or that were expressly excluded from the policy.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' for purposes of a motion for summary judgment where proof of that fact ‘would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.'” Dekarske v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 294 F.R.D. 68, 77 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (quoting Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Perry v. Jaguar of Troy, 353 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). At the same time, the non-movant must produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor by a preponderance of the evidence, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, and “[t]he ‘mere possibility' of a factual dispute does not suffice to create a triable case.” Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party must be able to show sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 601 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004)). Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “‘The central issue is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Calumet Farm, Inc., 398 F.3d 555, 558 (6th Cir. 2005)). That evidence must be capable of presentation in a form that would be admissible at trial. See Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558-59 (6th Cir. 2009).
It is undisputed, for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that Spann was logged...
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