Byers v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action RDB-12-2348,Criminal Action RDB-08-0056 |
| Parties | PATRICK ALBERT BYERS, JR., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Following a capital trial, Petitioner Patrick Albert Byers, Jr. (“Petitioner” or “Byers”) was convicted by a jury of several charges stemming from the murder of Carl Lackl (“Lackl”). Although Byers was in state prison at the time of Lackl's murder, the Government established at trial that he used a contraband cellphone to arrange the murder in order to prevent Lackl from testifying against him in his state trial for the 2006 murder of Larry Haynes (“Haynes”). He was convicted of conspiracy to use a facility of interstate commerce in commission of a murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (Count One); use of a facility of interstate commerce in the commission of a murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (Count Two); conspiracy to murder a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count Three); murder of a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count Four); three charges related to the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 924(j), 924(o) (Counts Five, Six, and Seven); and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Eight). (See Jury Verdict, ECF No 316.)
On May 4, 2009, the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict as to the death penalty. (See Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, ECF No. 94; Special Verdict, ECF No. 339.) This Court sentenced Byers to four consecutive terms of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. (Judgment, ECF No. 340.) Specifically, this Court sentenced Byers to:
(Id. at 3.)[1] Accordingly, the life sentences in Counts One, Two, Five, and Six are independent of the life sentences imposed in Counts Three and Four.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Byers' convictions on May 6, 2011. See United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2011). Thereafter, Byers filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 412; see also Supplement, ECF No. 424.) On September 16, 2015, this Court denied that motion and denied a certificate of appealability. (Sept. 6, 2015 Mem. Op., ECF No. 464; Sept. 16, 2015 Ord., ECF No. 465.) In the following years, Petitioner has twice requested authorization from the Fourth Circuit to file successive § 2255 motions, and twice been denied. (See Appeal No. 18-326, ECF No. 557-2; Appeal No. 21-292, ECF No. 557-4.)
On March 22, 2022, this Court construed Byers' pro se Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 474) as a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and granted this motion in part. (See Mar. 22, 2022 Mem. Ord. 8, ECF No. 534.) This Court reopened Byers' original § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 412), permitting him to amend this motion and challenge his convictions as to Counts Three, Four, and Eight, and appointing counsel to assist him. (Mar. 22, 2022 Mem. Ord. 6-7.) Currently pending are Byers' Amended Motion to Vacate Sentence (ECF Nos. 543, 412), Motion for Home Confinement (ECF No. 553); Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 510); Motion for Review of Detention Order (ECF No. 513); and Motion for Deficient Service (ECF No. 460). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, Byers' Amended Motion to Vacate Sentence (ECF Nos. 543, 412) is hereby DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. His remaining motions (ECF Nos. 460, 510, 513, 553) shall be addressed separately.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on four grounds: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence,” (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or (4) “the sentence ‘is otherwise subjected to collateral attack.'” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted a ‘fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).
The scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is far narrower than an appeal, and “a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982). Thus, any failure to raise a claim on direct appeal constitutes a procedural default that bars presentation of the claim in a § 2255 motion unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010); see Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994); see also United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999).
The facts of this case and the evidence produced at trial were reviewed in the Fourth Circuit's opinion denying Byers' appeal, see United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 201-06 (4th Cir. 2011), and this Court's opinion denying his first collateral attack, see Byers v United States, Civ. No. RDB-12-2348, Crim. No. RDB-08-0056, 2015 WL 5450179, at **1-5, 8-11 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2015). This Court reopened Byers' § 2255 motion and granted leave to amend in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), and the involvement of former Baltimore Police Sergeant Wayne Jenkins, who has since been convicted of federal racketeering, robbery, obstruction of justice, and other related charges arising out of his participation in the Baltimore Police Department's disgraced Gun Trace Task Force. (Mar. 22, 2022 Mem. Ord. 6.) This motion challenges Byers' convictions under Counts Three, Four, and Eight in light of these developments, presents several additional arguments against his remaining convictions, and seeks further leave to amend.
Although this Court authorized Byers to amend his Motion to Vacate Sentence (ECF No. 412) and introduce new challenges against Counts Three, Four, and Eight, that narrow mandate does not necessarily suggest that Petitioner's new claims would be successful. After careful review of the parties' arguments, this Court finds that many of Petitioner's claims are untimely, while others are jurisdictionally barred. In the alternative, this Court concludes that each of Petitioner's arguments fail on the merits. This Court has already determined that the pre-Fowler jury instructions used in this case were harmless. See Goodman v. United States, Civ. No. RDB-12-2972; Crim. No. RDB-08-0056; 2015 WL 5735364, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2015). Additionally, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that Jenkins committed perjury in his testimony, or that there is any reasonable probability this alleged perjury affected the verdict in this case. Accordingly, Byers' Amended Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 543, 412) is hereby DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
As an initial matter, the Government contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Byers' arguments, as the instant motion constitutes an unauthorized habeas petition. (See Gov't's Resp. 2, 8-12, ECF No. 557.) The Supreme Court has held that a collateral motion that “seeks to add a new ground for relief” or “attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits” is properly recharacterized as a successive habeas petition. Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005); accord United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015) (). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to require appellate precertification for successive habeas petitions:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see also § 2244(b)(3)(A); accord In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (describing effects of AEDPA). Accordingly, absent pre-filing authorization from the Court of Appeals, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive habeas motion. Winestock, 340 F.3d at 205.
The Government correctly observes that Petitioner's challenges to Counts Three, Four, and Eight constitute direct attacks on his convictions and sentences that would ordinarily trigger the jurisdictional bar...
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