Bynes v. School Committee of Boston

• Decision Date: 21 November 1991
• Citation: 411 Mass. 264,581 N.E.2d 1019
• Parties: , 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 943, 70 Ed. Law Rep. 1217 Willie BYNES, Jr., & another 1 v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON & others. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1019

581 N.E.2d 1019

411 Mass. 264, 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 943,

70 Ed. Law Rep. 1217

Willie BYNES, Jr., & another ¹ v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 8, 1991.

Decided Nov. 21, 1991.

Harold L. Lichten, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Stephanie S. Lovell, Special Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, for School Committee of Boston & another.

E. Susan Garsh, Boston, for Nat. School Bus Service, Inc.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Willie Bynes, Jr., and Joan Dyott, commenced this action against the defendants who terminated their employment as school bus drivers in the city of Boston because of their criminal records. They are appealing from a judgment of the Superior Court which determined, inter alia, that the defendants had not violated G.L. c. 151B, § 4(9) (1990 ed.), and G.L. c. 6, § 172 (1990 ed.), in discharging the plaintiffs. This court granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. We affirm the judgment.

The school committee of Boston (school committee) provides bus transportation for approximately 25,000 Boston public school students through vendor contracts with private companies. Pursuant to such a contract, ARA Transportation, Inc. (ARA), provided school bus services from 1978 through the end of the 1984-1985 school year. In September of 1985, National School Bus Service, Inc. (National), succeeded ARA and undertook the transportation of the students through a vendor contract with the school committee. As part of the school committee's contract with both ARA and National, it had "the right to reject ... at any time prior to or during employment, any person deemed ... to be unfit for such employment."

In early 1985, as a result of the concerns of certain members of the school committee about the past criminal records of school bus drivers, school department staff requested the Criminal History Systems Board (board) to conduct background investigations on all Boston public school bus drivers pursuant to the Criminal Offenders Record Information (CORI) Act, G.L. c. 6, §§ 167-172 (1990 ed.). In accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 6, § 172(c ), the board certified the school committee for access to criminal record information pertaining to convictions of individuals seeking employment or employed as school bus drivers. The board, consistent with its responsibility under G.L. c. 6, §§ 168, 171, reviews criminal records before releasing them to determine that only relevant information is released. Pursuant to the committee's certification, school department staff requested CORI on the bus drivers by stating: "I request that you furnish me with CORI on each of the drivers."

Bynes and Dyott had been school bus drivers since 1978 and 1977, respectively, until their dismissals in 1985. The board sent the school committee information which indicated that Bynes had a 1972 conviction for assault by means of a dangerous weapon and a 1983 charge for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The 1983 charge was dismissed in 1984 after Bynes paid court costs and restitution to the victim, his wife. The information that the board sent to the school committee also indicated that Dyott was arrested and convicted in 1975 for possession of a controlled substance, marihuana, with intent to distribute, for which she received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation. On or about May 24, 1985, pursuant to the contract between the school committee and ARA, the school committee directed ARA to discharge twelve bus drivers, including Bynes.

On June 20, 1985, the school committee promulgated a mandatory disqualification regulation, which was incorporated into the contract between the school committee and National, as well as the collective bargaining agreement between National and the bus drivers' union. The regulation provided, in relevant part, that an individual would not be eligible for employment as a school bus driver if he or she either had been convicted at any time of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance or had been convicted of a violent felony within the past five years. As a result of this policy, on August 23, 1985, the school committee instructed National not to hire certain drivers, including Bynes and Dyott, and National complied with the school committee's instructions. ³

Although the plaintiffs' lawsuit initially contained four counts, their appeal concerns only their claims under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(9), and c. 6, § 172, as to which judgment entered for the defendants.

1. G.L. c. 151B, § 4(9) claim. The plaintiffs argue that the Superior Court judge misinterpreted G.L. c. 151B, § 4(9), by failing to give it its plain meaning and also by failing to construe § 4(9) in light of G.L. c. 6, § 172. ⁴ The plaintiffs first contend that § 4(9) bans all requests by an employer for the prohibited information from any source. The plaintiffs assert, therefore, that both dismissals violated § 4(9), because the requested CORI on Bynes included an arrest without a conviction, and the information on Dyott included a misdemeanor conviction more than five years prior to the request. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that, in order to read c. 151B, § 4(9), and c. 6, § 172, harmoniously, an employer should be limited in seeking CORI to that which the employer can seek under § 4(9).

We disagree with the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 4(9) for a variety of reasons. The plain language of the statute rebuts the plaintiffs' contention. "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Massachusetts Community College Council v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 402 Mass. 352, 354, 522 N.E.2d 416 (1988), quoting James J. Welch & Co. v. Deputy Comm'r of Capital Planning & Operations, 387 Mass. 662, 667, 443 N.E.2d 382 (1982). If we were to read the phrase in § 4(9) ("to request any information") as broadly as the plaintiffs read that phrase, to apply to any request from any source, we would render the subsequent phrase "to use any form of application or application blank which requests such information" superfluous. Surely the plaintiffs' interpretation of "request any information" would include such requests on application forms. It is another elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be read in such a way as to render its terms meaningless or superfluous. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 410 Mass. 188, 192, 571 N.E.2d 617 (1991). International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 813, 467 N.E.2d 1331 (1984).

The Legislature's intent was merely to protect employees from such requests from their employers and not to proscribe employers from seeking such information elsewhere. The legislative history of § 4(9) supports this interpretation. See Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 406 Mass. 431, 443, 548 N.E.2d 869 (1990) ("Statutes are to be interpreted not based solely on simple, strict meaning of words, but in connection with their development and history, and with the history of the times and prior legislation"). As originally enacted, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(9), inserted by St.1969, c. 314, and as amended by St.1972, c. 428, prohibited discrimination against employees or applicants who failed to furnish certain criminal history information, and it also placed restrictions on application forms. The relevant change in the 1974 revision of § 4(9) prohibited requests for this information and the maintenance of records including this information. St.1974, c. 531. The Superior Court judge's reading of § 4(9), as amended, that it is limited to an employer's request for information from an employee or prospective employee, is consistent with the original purpose of the statute, which was to protect employees from discrimination for their failure to provide their employers with restricted criminal history information.

Nothing indicates that the Legislature intended that the limited provisions of the 1974 version of § 4(9) would have the broad reach envisioned by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' interpretation of § 4(9) would turn that limited prohibition against an employer's request to an employee or prospective employee into a general prohibition against an employer's use of such information. If that were the Legislature's intent, surely the Legislature might have utilized the broader anti-discrimination language already utilized in G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) (1990 ed.), concerning employment discrimination, or even might have just amended § 4(1) to include the protections envisioned by the plaintiffs.

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission), the agency responsible for enforcing c. 151B, has also construed the protection afforded by § 4(9) to be "quite narrow in scope" and "directed primarily at the preemployment inquiry, particularly the application form." McGowan v. Stoneham Police Dep't, 6 M.D.L.R. 1639, 1648 (1984), quoting LeBoeuf v. Lodding Eng'g, 2 M.D.L.R. 1381, 1383 (1980). The commission's interpretation of its governing statute is entitled to substantial deference. Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 204, 424 N.E.2d 244 (1981). In McGowan, the commission specifically upheld a hearing commissioner's determination that the use of an individual's arrest record, not directly obtained from that individual, in making employment decisions does not violate § 4(9). ⁵ McGowan, supra at...