Byrd v. United States, 11350.
| Decision Date | 22 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 11350.,11350. |
| Citation | 377 A.2d 400 |
| Parties | Samuel L. BYRD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
August Bequai, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, for appellant.
Iraline G. Barnes, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Bette E. Uhrmacher and Lillian A. McEwen, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, NE-BEKER, Associate Judge, and PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired.
After pleading guilty to a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, appellant was sentenced to a term of from three to nine years' imprisonment. Thereafter appellant, having obtained other counsel, moved with supporting authority for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty. As grounds for the motion he urged that he was without effective assistance of counsel when he entered the plea and that he was subjected to pressure. The motion was denied and this appeal followed.
Appellant makes a number of claims of error, but the only issue deemed by us to be of substance is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the postsentence motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. Finding an abuse of discretion, we reverse.
A brief review of the record is required to put the issue in perspective. Appellant was charged in a four-count indictment with assault with intent to kill while armed (D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-501, -302), assault with intent to kill (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-501), assault with a dangerous weapon (D.C. Code 1973, § 22-502), and carrying a pistol without a license (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204).
Appellant moved, pretrial, to suppress statements made by him after his arrest. At the hearing on that motion, there was uncontroverted testimony by government witnesses in substance as follows.
At the time of his arrest, appellant was read the Miranda1 warnings. Nevertheless, he admitted that he shot the complaining witness, but insisted that the shooting was in self-defense. The complaining witness identified appellant as his assailant. Upon conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and immediately thereafter the case was called for trial.
Appellant announced to the court that he was not ready for trial and requested a postponement. The reasons assigned were that he had met with his court-appointed counsel only on rare occasions and that his counsel had refused to interview and obtain the presence of certain claimed alibi witnesses?2 Based upon what he termed ineffective assistance, appellant informed the court that he did not want further representation by his appointed counsel.3 Then followed a lengthy and wide-ranging verbal exchange between appellant and the trial judge.
THE COURT: If you don't want [your present counsel] to represent you, . . . . You can do the same thing any other defendant in your circumstances can do. You can retain somebody and have him come in here and represent you, or you can represent yourself.
Appellant informed the court that he would like to retain another attorney. The court responded:
It is too late to do that now. If you think I am going to stop the trial of this matter until you get a chance to retain an attorney, Mr. Byrd, you have another thing coming.
Appellant insisted that he had no faith in his attorney and again asked for a postponement.4 The court refused the request saying: Appellant stated: "I'm almost into the position where I am forced to take a plea." The trial court disagreed, but cautioned appellant that he shouldn't expect his trial counsel "to work miracles."
Appellant then asked the trial court if he still had the option of representing himself. The court replied in the affirmative and appellant said: "I guess I will do that if I am up against the wall."
The court asked appellant what he would do when the witness who testified at the suppression hearing repeated their testimony before a jury. Appellant replied that he would take the stand and explain to the jury that he did not shoot the complaining witness.
At this point, the court granted appellant's motion to proceed pro se, but ordered appointed counsel to remain and assist in the defense.
The court then suggested that appellant would be well advised to become acquainted with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and the concept of an Alford plea, since, in the court's words, sometimes it is in a defendant's best interest to plead guilty "because of the weight and the nature and the extent of the Government's evidence and the lack of such weight and extent and breadth so far as his evidence was concerned."
Having informed appellant of the advantages of an Alford plea, the court continued saying:
Now, you know yourself, I'm sure, if you come up here and you get convicted of assault with intent to kill while armed with a pistol under these circumstances, I sit up here and listen to all this evidence about his man being shot, this .45 automatic, two or three weeks in the hospital, all these pictures and photographs and doctor testifying he is almost dead, you know, if you get convicted, the jury brings back a verdict of guilty in that, you are looking at a long ways down the road — long ways down the road.
Now, what is the Government offering in this case?
You are talking about a maximum of ten years.
* * * * * *
See, what you are doing, Mr. Byrd . . . I know it is your life. And I know it is your time . . . But, Mr. Byrd, I am telling you there's no way in the world, if I was in [your attorney's] shoes, that I would have the slightest hope of walking out of this one, because . . . they got you right between the eyes. . . .
The court then pointed out that the jury would have to disbelieve every one of the government's witnesses in order to acquit appellant, saying:
See, if they don't, the price is so terrible that you might have to pay. You might ask yourself, do I want to give a possible ten years in order to avoid the risk of getting . . . me on life. See? See, Mr. Byrd, the thing about it in some cases life don't mean too much because you know the Court ain't going to sentence a man to life . . . But now here in your case you are talking about a situation where a man was shot. He was shot with a gun. You got a previous record of armed robbery. You've got a previous record of carrying a dangerous weapon. See?
Appellant thereupon indicated to the court that he was ready to plead guilty to the single charge of assault with a dangerous weapon and the plea was entered.
The sequence of events at the conclusion of the suppression hearing has been set out in considerable detail so as to distinguish this case from one in which the trial court has carefully confined its participation in the plea bargaining process within the limits delineated by Superior Court Criminal Rule 11.5 Where, as here, the defendant is proceeding pro se, it is of course the duty of the trial court to render not only the advice and guidance the Rule requires, but also to exercise the restraint it mandates. The sense of all of this is that the trial court's remarks must not cross the fine line that demarcates advice from coercion. From the record in this case, as quoted above, it appears that the line was crossed in an impermissible way manifesting an almost complete disregard for the mandatory requirements of Rule 11(e).
The essence of the judicial role is neutrality. However this is not to say that the trial judge is relegated to the status of a mere observer during the proceedings, but rather that his participation must be of a neutral nature.
We do not forget that a trial judge has the responsibility of moving a trial along in an orderly and efficient manner; in short that he has the responsibility of managing the conduct of a trial. But that does not mean overmanaging . . . [Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 228 A.2d 846, 848 (1967).]
In discussing the permissible role of the trial judge, it has been pointed out that:
The public interest requires that persons who have committed crimes...
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Gooding v. United States
...for the plea." Failure by the court to meet these Rule 11 standards will require the subsequent grant of a Rule 32(e) withdrawal motion. E.g., id. Although we reverse only for an abuse of discretion, id. at 405, such plea withdrawal motions should be automatically granted, whether made befo......
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German v. United States, 85-1621.
...cases are concerned with protecting the defendant from being coerced into entering a guilty plea. See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 377 A.2d 400 (D.C.1977). Nonetheless, these comments are still participation within the letter of Rule 11 because they intrude upon the judicial neutrality tha......
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Scoot v. U.S.
...Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 996 (D.C. 1980) (Code of Judicial Conduct adopted for the District of Columbia Courts); see also Byrd v. United States, 377 A.2d 400, 404 (D.C. 1977) ("[t]he essence of the judicial role is Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge shall disqu......
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ARRINGTON v. U.S.
...written jury waiver form; "at least some oral statement" from the defendant must accompany a written waiver). See also Byrd v. United States, 377 A.2d 400, 404 (D.C. 1977) (judge's urgings to defendant to enter a guilty plea "cross[ed] the fine line that demarcates advice from 16. The gover......