Byrne v. Fisk
| Decision Date | 19 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | SC-2022-0560 |
| Parties | Douglas P. Byrne v. Vera Fisk |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court (CV-20-901659)
Douglas P. Byrne appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. For the reasons explained below we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.
On December 8, 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence in Huntsville. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slipresistant boots, as required by his employer.
Byrne traversed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located. According to Byrne's testimony, he was holding the handrail and being careful. However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019.
In December 2020, Byrne commenced this action against Fisk and fictitiously named parties. Byrne alleged that there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Byrne sought awards of compensatory and punitive damages.
Fisk answered Byrne's complaint and, in March 2022, moved for a summary judgment. Fisk attached evidence in support of her summaryjudgment motion. Byrne responded to Fisk's summary-judgment motion, attaching evidence in support of the response. Fisk filed a reply to Byrne's response. On May 1, 2022, the circuit court entered an order granting Fisk's summary-judgment motion without specifying the precise reason or reasons for its judgment. Byrne appealed to this Court.[1]
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross &Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. '[Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).
Before turning to the parties' appellate arguments, we first note that Byrne concedes on appeal that a summary judgment was proper regarding his "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Therefore, we will not consider the propriety of the judgment on that claim, and the following analysis addresses only the propriety of the judgment on Byrne's negligence claim.
."
Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So.2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002).
Regarding the duty element of a premises-liability negligence claim, this Court has explained:
Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So.3d 93, 98 (Ala. 2010)(footnote omitted).
The parties agree that Byrne was an invitee on Fisk's premises at the time of Byrne's fall. Consequently, regarding Byrne, Fisk had a general duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and, if the premises were not reasonably safe, to warn Byrne of defects and dangers that were known to Fisk but that were hidden or unknown to Byrne. Id. The parties' arguments focus primarily on the evidence produced regarding whether the condition of Fisk's premises was defective or unreasonably dangerous and whether that condition proximately caused Byrne's fall. Fisk also argues that, under the circumstances present at the time of Byrne's fall, any danger posed by the condition of her premises was open and obvious as a matter of law, thereby relieving her of any duty to warn Byrne. We address each issue in turn.
Fisk argues that no defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on her premises, the presence of which is an essential element of Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim. See Davis, 58 So.3d at 98.
"Locke v. City of Mobile, 851 So.2d 446, 448 (Ala. 2002)." City of Gadsden v. Harbin, 148 So.3d 690, 696 (Ala. 2013). Citing her own deposition testimony and Byrne's deposition testimony, Fisk notes the following.
Fisk's porch and the steps leading to the porch were constructed in the 1950s. The tile covering the steps and the porch was installed in 2010 or 2012. Fisk testified that she was unaware of any other slips or falls on the porch before Byrne fell in December 2018. Byrne testified that, before his fall, he was not aware of anyone else who had complained about the condition of Fisk's porch, that he had not complained about the condition of the porch, and that, as far as he knew, he was the only person who had ever fallen on the porch. Fisk also testified that she had never had any problem with the tile covering the porch and the steps being slicker when wet.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Fisk produced sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing that no defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on her premises at the time of the incident. See Harbin, 148 So.3d at 696. Thus, the burden shifted to Byrne to produce substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding that issue. See Dow, 897 So.2d at 103839.
In opposition to Fisk's summary-judgment motion, Byrne produced an affidavit executed by Hal K. Cain, a professional engineer, who averred that he possessed, among other credentials, a contractor's license. Cain's affidavit averred that he had reviewed transcripts of the parties' depositions and photographs of Fisk's premises, including photographs depicting certain measurements of her steps and porch landing. Cain's affidavit indicated that two defects likely existed on Fisk's premises. First, Cain averred:
Second Cain noted that the five steps leading to Fisk's porch were uneven in height and depth, which he averred did not comply with the requirements of the 1991, 1994, 1997, and 1999 Standard Building Codes or the 2009 International Residential Code, which codes Cain averred were applicable in the City of Huntsville at the time of Byrne's fall and in 2012. According...
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