C.B. Rogers Co. v. Meinhardt

• Decision Date: 14 April 1896
• Parties: C. B. ROGERS CO. v. MEINHARDT et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

19 So. 878

37 Fla. 480

C. B. ROGERS CO. v. MEINHARDT et al.

Florida Supreme Court

April 14, 1896

Error to circuit court, Orange county; John D. Broome, Judge.

Action by the C. B. Rogers Company against Paul E. Canova, in which an attachment issued and was levied on goods to which a claim was interposed by Meinhardt Bros. & Co. On the trial of the issue of the right of property, there was a judgment for claimants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed, with directions.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The second paragraph of section 1088, Rev. St., has not curtailed the province of the jury in passing upon the facts of a case nor has it enlarged the powers of the court as to its determination of the facts.

2. The rule established by the statute is that, if no evidence is introduced upon which a jury may lawfully find a verdict for one party, a direction may be given to find for the opposite party; but the judge should never direct a verdict for one party unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it, favorable to the other party, can be sustained.

3. In all cases where there is room for difference of opinion between reasonable men as to the existence of facts from which an ultimate fact is sought to be established, or when there is room for such difference as to the inferences which might be drawn from conceded facts, the court should submit the case to the jury for their finding, as it is their conclusion in such cases that should prevail, and not the views of the judge.

4. The duty devolving upon the court in reference to directing a verdict on the evidence may become, in many cases, one of delicacy, and should be cautiously exercised.

5. A wide latitude is permitted in the proof of fraud, and testimony tending to show that a debtor in failing circumstances, immediately before a sale of his entire property, stated to other parties than the purchaser that he wanted money, and they could have his property at their own price, is admissible as bearing upon a fraudulent purpose in the disposition of the property.

COUNSEL J. M. Cheney, for plaintiff in error.

Beggs &amp Palmer, for defendants in error.

OPINION

MABBY C.J.

This is a claimants' suit, in which the plaintiff in error sued out an attachment against one Paul E. Canova, and caused it to be levied upon a stock of goods alleged to belong to him. Defendants in error claimed the goods levied upon, and filed an affidavit and bond under the statute. At the following term of court a jury was sworn to try the right of property, and at the conclusion of the argument of counsel after all the evidence had been submitted, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for claimants, and refused to give certain instructions asked by the plaintiff in attachment. A verdict was rendered in accordance with the direction of the court, and judgment for claimants entered thereon. The refusal to admit certain evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the giving of the peremptory charge for claimants, and the failure to submit the case to the jury on the facts, under the charges requested, are assigned as errors.

The instruction to the jury to return a verdict for claimants involves a consideration of the evidence submitted in the case. The trial was after the Revised Statutes became operative, and, before we refer to the evidence, the provision in the revision that the circuit or county courts may, under certain conditions, direct a jury to find a verdict, demands notice. The statutory command that the trial court should charge the jury only upon the law of the case found in the act of 1877, and incorporated into the first part of section 1088 of the Revised Statutes, has received a uniform construction by this court that the judge must not charge upon the weight of the evidence, or the credibility of the witnesses. Williams v. La Penotiere, 32 Fla 491, 14 So. 157, and cases cited. In addition to the original provision of the act of 1877 (Rev. St. § 1088), the revision contains the following, viz.: 'If, however, upon the conclusion of the argument of counsel in any civil case after all the evidence shall have been submitted, it be apparent to the judge of the circuit court, or county court, that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for one party, the judge may direct the jury to find a verdict for the opposite party.' We do not see that this new statutory feature has in any respect curtailed, or attempted to curtail, the province of the jury in passing upon the facts of a case; nor has it undertaken to enlarge the powers of the court as to its determination of the facts. Two views have been entertained in the American courts as to the authority of the trial judge, independent of statute, to direct a jury to find a verdict. One is that if there is evidence tending in any degree to establish the cause of action, or defense thereto, the questions of fact involved should primarily be left to the jury to find. This rule goes to the extent of requiring the court to submit the case to the jury upon the evidence, when it only tends to prove the issue, although the court should feel bound to set aside the verdict if the jury should find contrary to its views. Way v. Railroad Co., 35 Iowa, 585; Stephens v. Brooks, 2 Bush, 137. The courts holding this view recognize the right of either party to have his case submitted to the jury, and nothing in the nature of a compulsory nonsuit is permitted. The other view is that, when the facts are not controverted, their consideration may be withdrawn from the jury when, if submitted to them, a contrary verdict would be set aside as against the weight of the evidence. Dryden v. Britton, 19 Wis. 22; Cutler v. Hurlbut, 29 Wis. 152; Lane v. Railroad Co., 14 Gray, 143; Thompson v. Press Co., 37 Minn. 285, 33 N.W. 856; Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131; Wilds v. Railroad Co., 24 N.Y. 430; Algur v. Gardner, 54 N.Y. 360; Godin v. Bank, 6 Duer, 76; Brown v. Railway Co., 58 Me. 384. The statute has established the rule in this state that if it be apparent to the judge, upon the conclusion of the argument of counsel in a civil case, after all the evidence is submitted, that no evidence has been offered upon which they could lawfully find a verdict, he may direct a verdict...