C.B. v. State
| Decision Date | 24 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–1163.,11–1163. |
| Citation | 406 S.W.3d 796,2012 Ark. 220 |
| Parties | C.B., Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Louis L. Loyd, Malvern, for Appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Atty. Gen., Rachel H. Kemp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
Appellant, C.B., appeals an order denying his motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9–27–318 (Repl.2009), unconstitutional and an order denying his motion to transfer to juvenile court. In challenging the constitutionality of section 9–27–318, C.B. contends that the statute (1) violates the separation of powers provided in the Arkansas Constitution by “improperly vesting power in the local prosecuting attorney to determine which Court has initial jurisdiction over certain classes of juveniles[,]” and by “allow[ing] the prosecuting attorney to determine the burden of proof and who to place the burden of proof on”; (2) violates the Arkansas Constitution because it allows a prosecutor to set aside the statutory protections afforded juveniles; (3) denies him equal treatment before the law, because juveniles are a special class of citizens afforded special protection under the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution; and (4) violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution by subjecting him to the jeopardy of a life sentence. In challenging the denial of the motion to dismiss, C.B. contends that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his request to transfer the case from circuit court to juvenile court. We affirm the circuit court.
The record reveals the following facts. On January 30, 2010, sixteen-year-old C.B., fifteen-year-old N.D., and eighteen-year-old Brandon Henderson escaped from the Jack Jones Juvenile Justice Center in Pine Bluff. During the escape, C.B. and N.D. attacked Leonard Wall, a security guard, who later died. In addition, C.B. attacked another security guard, Gloria Wilburn, who suffered injuries. After his escape from the juvenile-detention center, C.B. forced his way into the driver's seat of a vehicle occupied by a man and a woman at a gas station, put the vehicle in reverse, ordered the woman out of the vehicle, and then stole the vehicle. C.B., N.D., and Henderson fled the scene; C.B. and N.D. were apprehended in Fort Smith on February 1, 2010, and Henderson was apprehended the next day in Oklahoma.
On March 11, 2010, C.B. was charged in Jefferson County Circuit Court with the felony offenses of capital murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, first-degree escape, theft of property (valued at $2500 or more), second-degree battery, and the misdemeanor offense of theft of property (valued at less than $500). Subsequently, C.B. filed a motion to dismiss and to declare section 9–27–318 unconstitutional and a motion to transfer to juvenile court. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying both motions. C.B. now brings this appeal.
C.B. contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to declare section 9–27–318 unconstitutional. Section 9–27–318(c)(1) provides that when a case involves a juvenile who is at least sixteen years old when he or she engages in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony, a prosecuting attorney may charge the juvenile in either the juvenile or criminal division of circuit court. Section 9–27–318(e) provides that, upon the motion of the court or of any party, the judge of the division of the circuit court in which a delinquency petition or criminal charges have been filed shall conduct a hearing to determine whether to transfer the case to another division of circuit court. Section 9–27–318(h)(2) provides that, upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a case should be transferred to another division of circuit court, the judge shall enter an order to that effect.
Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise is on the challenger of the statute. E.g., Jefferson v. State, 372 Ark. 307, 276 S.W.3d 214 (2008). If it is possible to construe a statute as constitutional, we must do so. Id. Because statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, they should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistakable. Id.
C.B. contends that section 9–27–318 violates the separation of powers provided in the Arkansas Constitution by “improperly vesting power in the local prosecuting attorney to determine which Court has initial jurisdiction over certain classes of juveniles[,]” and by “allow[ing] the prosecuting attorney to determine the burden of proof and who to place the burden of proof on.” The separation-of-powers provisions of the Arkansas Constitution are found in article 4 and provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those which are executive,to another, and those which are judicial, to another.
No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
Ark. Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 2. Additionally, section 3 of amendment 80 provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all courts; provided these rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this Constitution.” Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 3.
In analyzing the constitutionality of statutes in accordance with the separation-of-powers doctrine, this court has held that, Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 7, 308 S.W.3d 135, 141 (citing Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 3). Under our holding in Johnson, the only question that need be asked is whether the challenged legislation dictates procedure.1 If the legislation bypasses our rules of pleading, practice, and procedure by setting up a procedure of its own, then it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id., 308 S.W.3d at 141.
C.B. relies on Johnson to support his contention that, in enacting section 9–27–318, the General Assembly violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because it attempted to create a rule of pleading, practice, and procedure, thereby exercising a power assigned to the judicial department. The Johnson case involved two provisions of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16–55–202 and 16–55–212(b). Section 16–55–202 required the fact-finder in certain civil cases to consider or assess the negligence or fault of nonparties. We concluded that section 16–55–202 violated article 4, section 2 and amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution because it attempted to create a rule of procedure, offending the principle of separation of powers and the powers specifically prescribed to this court by the Arkansas Constitution. Section 16–55–212(b) limited the introduction of medical-costs evidence to the amount of medical expenses paid or the amount to be paid by a plaintiff or on a plaintiff's behalf. We held that, because the rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are within this court's province, the medical-costs provision violated the separation-of-powers doctrine under article 4, section 2 and amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution.
In contrast to the statutory provisions at issue in Johnson,section 9–27–318 does not create a rule of pleading, practice, and procedure. Section 9–27–318, insofar as it vests prosecuting attorneys with the discretion to bring felony charges against sixteen-year-olds in the criminal divisions of circuit courts, is substantive law that is rooted in public policy. The resolution of questions of policy is to be addressed by the General Assembly, which is the policy-making branch of government. See Cato v. Craighead Cnty. Circuit Court, 2009 Ark. 334, at 9, 322 S.W.3d 484, 490. To hold that the General Assembly's enactment of section 9–27–318 was an impedimentto this court's rule-making authority would be to interfere with the legislature's policy-making authority. This we will not do. We hold that the legislature did not create in section 9–27–318 a rule of “pleading, practice and procedure” in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.
C.B. next contends that section 9–27–318 violates article 2, section 12 of the Arkansas Constitution because it allows a prosecutor to set aside the statutory protections afforded to juveniles. Article 2, section 12 provides that “[n]o power of suspending or setting aside the law or laws of the State shall ever be exercised, except by the General Assembly.” The General Assembly passed section 9–27–318 as Act 273 of 1989, and it has amended the statute several times, most recently with Acts 1166 and 1809 of 2003. If, as C.B. contends, any laws had been set aside or suspended, it would have been the General Assembly that did so, which it had the authority to do under article 2, section 12. We hold that section 9–27–318 does not violate article 2, section 12 of the Arkansas Constitution.
C.B. contends that section 9–27–318(c) denies him equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. He...
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