C. Keller v. State, Criminal 815
Decision Date | 08 July 1935 |
Docket Number | Criminal 815 |
Citation | 46 Ariz. 106,47 P.2d 442 |
Parties | C. KELLER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. M. T. Phelps, Judge. Judgment reversed with instructions.
Mr. V L. Hash, for Appellant.
Mr Arthur T. La Prade, Attorney General, Mr. P. H. Brooks Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. M. M. Hill, City Attorney, for Respondent.
This is an appeal by C. Keller, hereinafter called defendant, from a judgment of the superior court of Maricopa county sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of $25 and costs of $54 for the crime of reckless driving, or to be imprisoned in the county jail for a period of not in excess of twenty-five days. While the case on its face is one of minor importance, yet it involves questions of law which merit most careful and serious consideration.
The facts necessary for a determination of the matter may be stated as follows: A complaint was filed in the city court of the city of Phoenix on the 30th day of December containing the following allegations:
The case was tried to the court, which found defendant guilty, and he was fined $25 with the alternative of imprisonment, whereupon he appealed to the superior court of Maricopa county. The case was tried in that court before a jury, which also found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 and $54 costs, or, in lieu thereof, to suffer imprisonment, and from such judgment this appeal is taken.
There are a number of assignments of error, but we think we need consider only the first one, which reads as follows:
The city of Phoenix is a so-called "home rule" city, having framed its charter under section 2, article 13, of the Constitution of Arizona. By the charter the legislative powers of the city are vested in a city commission, and the commission on November 27, 1929, regularly passed ordinance 1492, which was a regulatory traffic ordinance, governing the operation of automobiles on the streets of the city. The ordinance contained, among other things, the following section, and it was upon this section that the complaint was based. There is no express power in the charter of the city of Phoenix authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating drivers of motor vehicles in the use of its streets and public ways, and if such power can be implied therefrom, it must be from the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 4, of the charter which read, in part, as follows:
It is the contention of defendant that the entire subject of the use of public highways in the state of Arizona, including the streets of all incorporated cities thereof, has been fully covered by the legislature in chapter 31, Revised Code 1928, commonly known as the "Highway Code," and that it has particularly dealt with the subject of reckless driving in section 1689, Revised Code 1928, which reads as follows:
§ 1689. Reckless driving; penalty. Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway without due caution and at a speed or in a manner endangering or likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than five nor more than ninety days, or by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
It is his further contention that by so doing the legislature has withdrawn from all municipalities the right to legislate on the subject of reckless driving on the streets of the municipality, and that the ordinance under which the complaint in this case was drawn attempts to cover the precise subject covered by section 1689, supra, and is therefore void. If this be true, it necessarily follows that a complaint predicated thereon does not state a public offense, and a conviction upon such a complaint is a nullity. In support of this contention he refers to the very recent case of Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037, 1038, rehearing denied 38 Ariz. 466, 300 P. 1010.
It is the contention of the state: First, that the legislature has expressly excluded all highways in incorporated cities of the character of Phoenix from all the provisions of the Highway Code that are not specifically by such Code stated to be applicable thereto. In support of this position it cites section 1687, Revised Code 1928, which reads as follows:
(Italics ours.)
Second, that even if the ordinance is invalid, under the principles laid down in the Clayton case, supra, that nevertheless the complaint charges a public offense under the provisions of section 1689, supra, and that defendant was legally tried and convicted of such offense in courts which had full jurisdiction to hear a charge under said section, to wit, the city court of the city of Phoenix and the superior court of Maricopa county.
It will be seen that the questions involved are of considerable importance, both as to the respective powers of the state and of many of our incorporated cities in controlling traffic in such cities, and as to the jurisdiction of police courts and of the superior courts.
We consider first the validity of the ordinance. The general principle involved was considered and discussed by us very elaborately in the case of Clayton v. State supra. In that case we determined whether an ordinance of the city of...
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