C. P. A. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 24 November 1953
• Docket Number: No. 34482,34482
• Citation: 263 P.2d 731
• Parties: C. P. A. CO. v. JONES.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 731

263 P.2d 731

1953 OK 345

C. P. A. CO. v. JONES.

No. 34482.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Nov. 24, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where policy of unemployment insurance provides that cause of discharge appearing in letter of discharge or suspension shall be regarded as the sole cause of loss of employment, and that if no cause be stated in letter, the cause or causes stated in record of investigation conducted by employer shall be considered as the cause or causes, and letter fails to state cause, the record of investigation conducted by employer prior to discharge or suspension, is admissible in evidence to show cause or causes of discharge or suspension from employment.

R. M. Mountcastle, Muskogee, for plaintiff in error.

Forrester Brewster and Harry G. Davis, Muskogee, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM.

Lee O. Jones commenced this action in the District Court of Muskogee County against C.P.A. Company, a corporation, to recover upon a policy of insurance against unemployment. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff and defendant has appealed. The parties will be referred to as they appear in the trial court.

The pertinent facts on which this action is based are as follows: Lee O. Jones had been employed as a machinist since 1944 at Heavener, Oklahoma by the Kansas City Southern Railroad Company. Prior to January 16, 1948, he had worked on a shift with other machinists. On that date he was assigned to a night shift where he had to work alone.

On January 26, 1948, the plaintiff made application to defendant for a policy of insurance insuring him against unemployment. His application was accepted on January 28, 1948, and the policy issued.

While plaintiff was employed prior to January 16, 1948, he always had others working with him who were able to make out certain written reports required of one in his position. He was unable to read and write and could not prepare the reports, but he could sign his name thereto after some of his friends prepared them. These reports in writing were required by the Interstate Commerce Commission. They had to be made monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. One copy was kept in the reports at Heavener, one placed on the engine to which it applied, one sent to the master mechanic at Pittsburg, Kansas, and one sent to the I.C.C. at Washington, D. C.

When on January 16, 1948, the plaintiff was forced to work alone because of a reduction in force, he was unable to make the required reports and had no one to make them for him. This fact was called to the attention of the roundhouse foreman, who called it to the attention of the master mechanic of the road at Pittsburg, Kansas.

The master mechanic came to Heavener and conducted an investigation on July 29, 1948, after giving the plaintiff two days' notice of the hearing. The plaintiff was present and admitted that the proceedings were fair. On February 6, 1948, the plaintiff was given a letter of discharge or suspension and was out of employment for the next 50 days. The letter was as follows:

'Heavener, Okla. Feb. 6-48

'Mr. Lee O. Jones

'Effective with the date you have been disqualified as Machinast (sic) on the shift you have been assigned and you are being removed from the job and are being shown out of service.

'Yours truly,

'Geo. H. Rockwell

'Gen. R. H. Foreman K. C. S. Ry. Co.'

In this connection we find that the policy of insurance contained the following provisions relative to letter of discharge and papers reflecting the investigation held by the employer prior to discharging an employee, being Sec. 14 of the Policy:

'The cause assigned by the employer for discharge or actual suspension shall be the sole basis for determining the liability of the Company. In the event the employer states no specific cause in the official letter of discharge, the cause or causes as shown by the investigation papers relating to the Insured's discharge or actual suspension, will be deemed to be the cause or causes of discharge.'

We find that the above letter states no specific cause for discharge and that we are justified in examining the investigation papers relating to the insured's discharge or actual suspension from employment.

Other pertinent provisions of the policy are:

'In consideration of the application for this policy, a copy of which application is attached hereto and made a part hereof, and the payment of a premium of $4.75 per month * * * hereby insures Lee O. Jones * * * employed by the Kansas City Southern Railroad, as hereinafter provided, * * * against loss occasioned by actual suspension from his employment, discharge from his job, * * * subject to all of the conditions and limitations herein contained or endorsed hereon.'

Under the heading of 'Discharge or Suspension' it provides:

'If, while this policy is continued in force, the insured shall lose his job by discharge, or be actually suspended from his employment for cause occurring after the date that his application has been received and accepted, the Company will pay ten dollars a day, for each day that the Insured is under discharge or actual suspension but in no event to exceed fifty days * * *.'

The application for the policy states as follows:

'* * * In no event, however, shall the company be liable for causes originating on or prior to the date of the acceptance of the application.'

The defendant has submitted 18 assignments of error but has discussed them under the following alleged errors:

Overruling defendant's motion for a new trial The refusal to admit certain testimony offered by the defendant;

Refusal to permit defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff on matters on which no was interrogated on direct examination and refusal to admit certain of the defendant's exhibits;

In admitting certain evidence offered by plaintiff and objected to by defendant;

Error in giving instruction No. 4;

Refusal to give defendant's requested instruction No. 8(8A);

In accepting and approving a verdict in disregard of the Court's instructions.

Instruction No. 4 is as follows:

'If you find by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, on the 28th day of January, 1948, received and accepted the application of plaintiff and issued the policy sued on pursuant thereto, and at said time, plaintiff was employed, and thereafter, plaintiff lost his job by discharge for cause occurring after date of acceptance of said application, and that plaintiff notified defendant as required by the provisions of said policy, or defendant waived such notice, plaintiff would be entitled to recover, and your verdict should be in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $500.00.'

We find no error in giving the foregoing instruction.

Instruction No. 8(8A) requested by defendant is as follows:

'Gentlemen of the jury, you are further instructed that Paragraph 14, third page of the policy, provides as follows, to-wit:

"The cause assigned by the employer for discharge or actual suspension shall be the sole basis for determining the liability of the Company. In event the employer states no specific cause in the official letter of discharge, the cause or causes as shown by the investigation papers relating to the Insured's discharge or...