C.R. v. Episcopal Diocese of N.Y.

Citation2023 NY Slip Op 33851 (U)
Docket NumberIndex No. 950098/2021,Motion Seq. Nos. 002,003
Decision Date17 October 2023
PartiesC.R. Plaintiff, v. EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF NEW YORK and THE CATHEDRAL SCHOOL OF ST. JOHN THE DIVINE, Defendants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Unpublished Opinion

MOTION DATE 09/24/21

PRESENT: HON. SABRINA B. KRAUS JUSTICE

DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION

Sabrina B. Kraus, Judge

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 21,22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 58, 59, 60, 61,62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act seeking damages for alleged sexual abuse that occurred in 2006.

PENDING MOTIONS

Defendant the Cathedral School of St. John the Divine (the "School") moves for dismissal of Plaintiff s complaint in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Defendant the Episcopal Diocese of New York (the "Diocese") moves for dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety and for summary judgement in its favor pursuant to CPLR§ 3212. Plaintiff submits opposition to both motions. The motions are consolidated herein and denied for the reasons set forth below.

ALLEGED FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that while a student at the School in 2006, she was sexually abused numerous times by Jose Bravo (Bravo), a teacher employed by the School and assigned to provide educational services at the School by the Diocese. Plaintiff alleges that the School operates under the authority and control of the Diocese. Plaintiff further alleges that the School had notice of Bravo's alleged misconduct with the Plaintiff, in approximately 2006, when Plaintiff reported Bravo's sexual abuse to her friends, whose parents and a therapist then reported it to the School. That despite this knowledge, the School retained Bravo, without conducting a full investigation. The School did meet with Plaintiff, her parents, Bravo, School administrators, and two other students. However, Plaintiff failed to report the sexual abuse at that meeting out of fear. Plaintiff alleges Bravo threatened to cancel her "financial assistance" for the School, if she spoke about what was occurring. The School admonished Plaintiff for "making up the story" and no further action was taken by the School. Plaintiff alleges the sexual abuse continued thereafter, including in Bravo's home, car, and afterschool program. Additionally, Bravo forced Plaintiff to wear his jacket throughout the day in the school hallways and would openly and inappropriately "flirt" with Plaintiff in the hallways. '

The School's Motion for Dismissal

In their motion for dismissal, the School argues that all the individual causes of action and the arguments made fail to state a claim and therefore the entire complaint should be dismissed. The School argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support its negligence claims, but rather made "purely speculative" conclusions regarding the School knowing or reasonably should have known (no foreseeability) of Bravo's alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiff.

The School asserts that any alleged abuse also occurred off the School's premises and not while Plaintiff was otherwise under the School's custody and control. Further, that these factors therefore would render Plaintiffs claim for negligence legally insufficient.

Lastly the School argues that the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages against them. They argue that there are no facts pled that would rise to the level of intentional or malicious misconduct by the School.

Plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that the factual allegations pled in the complaint are sufficient to warrant Plaintiff obtaining discovery consistent with the CPLR, as well as sufficient to support an award for punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

Dismissal Pursuant to CPLR §3211 (a)(7)

In Eskridge v Diocese of Brooklyn, et al., 210 A.D.3d 1056, 1058 [2d Dept 2022], the Appellate Division reversed an order of dismissal holding that:

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory." (see Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see also Boyle v North Salem Cent. Sch Dist., 208 A.D.3d 744, 745 [2d Dept 2022]; Doe v Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Middletown, 195 A.D.3d 595, 596 [2d Dept 2021],

It is well settled that a motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR §3211 (a)(7) "must be denied if from the pleadings' four corners factual allegations are discerned, which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law. The pleading is to be liberally construed. The criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one." See Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 104 A.D.3d 401, 403 [1st Dept 2013]; African Diaspora Maritime Corp, v Golden Gate Yacht Club, 109 A.D.3d 204 [1st Dept 2013], "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish [his or her] allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss." EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11,19 [2005].

The standard on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action is not whether the party has artfully drafted the pleading, but whether deeming the pleading to allege whatever can be reasonably implied from its statements, a cause of action can be sustained, (see Stendig, Inc. v Thorn Rock Realty Co., 163 A.D.2d 46 [1st Dept 1990]; Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. v Blumberg, 242 A.D.2d 205 [1st Dept 1997]).

The court will address each of the grounds upon which the School seeks dismissal in turn.

Negligence Claim

The School argues that Plaintiffs cause of action for negligence which is premised on negligence in the hiring, retention, and supervision of Bravo should be dismissed as the allegations are "boilerplate and conclusory". They allege that there are no specific factual allegations detailing how the School knew of or should have known of a risk of sexual abuse by Bravo.

A necessary element of a cause of action alleging negligent retention or negligent supervision is that the "employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury" and nevertheless, continued the employee's service. See Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 47 A.D.3d 653, 654 [2d Dept 2008]; Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 161 [2d Dept 1997], cert denied 522 U.S. 967 [1997]; see also Peter T. v Children's Vil., Inc., 30 A.D.3d 582, 586 [2d Dept 2006], There is no statutory requirement that causes of action sounding in negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision be pleaded with specificity. See Kenneth R., id. Under . this holding, Plaintiffs are not required to provide extensively detailed allegations at this juncture in the litigation, and the School has not introduced any evidence conclusively establishing that Plaintiffs allegations are false. Liability for negligent hiring is based not on the tortious conduct of the employee but on the negligence of the defendant-employer for failures involving the risk of harm by the employee to others, (see, e.g, Ford v Gildin, 200 A.D.2d 224 [1st Dept 1994]).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, at this juncture, that the School may have had knowledge of Bravo's propensity to sexually abuse the Plaintiff. The branch of the School's motion to dismiss the claim of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision is denied as premature.

The School further argues for dismissal of the complaint since the alleged sexual abuse did not occur on school property nor while the Plaintiff was in the care and custody of the School, and the School did not breach any fiduciary duty.

"Schools have a duty to adequately supervise the students in their care and may be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision". Nevaeh T. v City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 840, 841 [2d Dept 2015]; Timothy Me. V Beacon City Sch. Dist., 127 A.D.3d 826, 827 [2d Dept 2015]. Further, "[a] fiduciary relationship exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation. Mere allegations that a fiduciary exists, with nothing more, are insufficient." (see AG Capital Funding, LP v State Street Bank and Trust, 11 N.Y.3d 146, 158 [2008]).

The complaint describes the employer/employee relationship between the School and Bravo, as well as details the relationship between Bravo and Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged acts of sexual abuse by Bravo which occurred off the school premises including at his home and in his car, when he would transport Plaintiff to and from school. Other incidents of alleged inappropriate touching of the Plaintiff occurred at the afterschool dance program created by Bravo. Additionally, it is alleged that Plaintiff "openly and notoriously" wore Bravo's jacket consistently around the school building during school hours at his request. Bravo would repeatedly and openly flirt with and inappropriately touch the Plaintiff in a "flirty" way in the hallways of the School.

"The duty owed by a school to its students stems from the fact of its physical custody over them." Pratt v...

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