C. R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J
| Decision Date | 27 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | A166189 |
| Citation | 308 Or.App. 773,481 P.3d 334 |
| Parties | C. R., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUGENE SCHOOL DISTRICT 4J, an Oregon public school district, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Marianne G. Dugan, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Blake Fry, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Karen M. Vickers and Mersereau Shannon LLP.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Landau, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff brought this action for defamation and negligence to recover damages for injury to his reputation that he alleges were caused by defendant Eugene School District 4J when it mishandled school disciplinary proceedings. Defendant filed a special motion to strike the claims under ORS 31.150, Oregon's Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, contending that plaintiff's claims seek damages for conduct that is protected under ORS 31.150(2). The trial court granted defendant's motion, and plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff contends, among other arguments raised on appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed defendant's special motion to strike, which was filed after the 60-day statutory deadline, and, further, that the trial court should have rejected the motion on the merits. As explained below, we conclude that, although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the untimely motion, the court erred in granting defendant's motion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Plaintiff was a middle-school student in defendant's school district. In 2011, when he was a seventh grader, plaintiff was suspended for two days based on defendant's determination that he had sexually harassed two younger, disabled students. Several months later, plaintiff was suspended for one day, based on defendant's determination that he had been involved in the theft of items from a teacher's desk.
In 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in federal court, asserting violations of the United States Constitution and claims of negligence and defamation. The court rejected the constitutional claim and dismissed the remaining state-law claims and, in 2013, plaintiff brought the instant action in Lane County Circuit Court alleging defamation and negligence. Plaintiff's defamation claim alleged that, by and through its employees, defendant published and communicated defamatory statements to third parties who had no need to know. Those statements were that plaintiff had sexually harassed disabled younger students, that he was a "ringleader," and that he was a thief. For his negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its duty to plaintiff by "taking actions while plaintiff was within the school boundaries and within school hours to humiliate him, expose him to adult discussions of pornographic concepts, remove him from class, and otherwise cause emotional harm to plaintiff," and "failing to adequately investigate and ascertain the nature of plaintiff's comments, but labeled and punished him regardless, while exposing him to the adult concepts regarding pornography."
On the 59th day after defendant was served with the complaint, the trial court ordered, at plaintiff's request, that the action be held in abeyance pending resolution of plaintiff's appeal of the federal judgment. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court, plaintiff filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court, which the court rejected. C. R. v. Eugene School District 4 J. , 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2117, 198 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2017). Plaintiff then requested a lifting of the stay on his Lane County action, which the court granted.
Eight days after the court lifted the stay—and the 67th day after defendant received service of plaintiff's complaint—defendant filed its special motion to strike, ORS 31.150, contending that the alleged tortious statements and conduct occurred during proceedings or investigations that are protected under ORS 31.150(2)(a), (b), or (c).1
Plaintiff responded that defendant's motion was untimely, having been filed more than 60 days after the service of the complaint. See ORS 31.152(1) (). Plaintiff further responded that the motion should be denied, because defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the alleged tortious statements or conduct were protected under ORS 31.150(2). Plaintiff presented the court with declarations that he asserted described defamatory statements that had occurred outside of the disciplinary process. And plaintiff argued that the negligence claim was based on conduct that did not constitute speech or expression subject to protection under ORS 31.150(2). The trial court granted defendant's motion to strike without explanation and dismissed the claims.
As noted, ORS 31.152(1) requires that a special motion to strike under ORS 31.150 be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time. In his first assignment of error on appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing defendant's motion to strike on the 67th day. Defendant does not dispute that the motion was untimely but contends, simply, that plaintiff has not established that the court abused its discretion in allowing the motion.
In support of his contention that the trial court abused its discretion, plaintiff points out that defendant could have filed its motion in federal court. See, e.g. , Verizon Delaware v. Covad Communications , 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir 2004) (). Additionally, defendant could have timely filed its motion during the first 59 days after service of plaintiff's complaint in Lane County, before the state complaint was held in abeyance, or on the day the complaint was reactivated. Plaintiff asserts that, in light of the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay and the long pendency of the litigation in both state and federal courts—in which both parties have engaged in extensive discovery and legal argument on both the defamation and negligence claims—the allowance of the motion at this late date does not serve the purpose of the anti-SLAPP motion.
We are sympathetic to plaintiff's arguments. We agree that defendant could have filed its motion in the federal action or filed its motion in Lane County Circuit Court before the case was held in abeyance. And, in light of the duration of the litigation between the parties, the trial court's allowance of the untimely motion is not necessarily in furtherance of the underlying policy of ORS 31.150 to permit a defendant who is sued over certain actions taken in the public arena to have a questionable case dismissed at an early stage. See Staten v. Steel , 222 Or. App. 17, 27-32, 191 P.3d 778 (2008), rev. den. , 345 Or. 618, 201 P.3d 909 (2009) ; see also Yes On 24-367 Committee v. Deaton , 276 Or. App. 347, 350-51, 367 P.3d 937 (2016) (); Clackamas River Water v. Holloway , 261 Or. App. 852, 854 n. 1, 322 P.3d 614 (2014) ().
At the same time, the trial court's allowance of the filing of the motion beyond the 60th day was not an abuse of discretion. See C.I.C.S. Employment Services v. Newport Newspapers , 291 Or. App. 316, 326, 420 P.3d 684 (2018) (). ORS 31.150(1) does not place any restriction on a trial court's authority, in its discretion, to allow the motion "at any later time." "Discretion" refers to the trial court's authority "to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct outcomes." State v. Harrell/Wilson , 353 Or. 247, 254, 297 P.3d 461 (2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a decision that is "guided by the wrong substantive standard," or that is "based on predicate legal conclusions that are erroneous or predicate factual determinations that lack sufficient evidentiary support." Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc ., 359 Or. 63, 116-18, 376 P.3d 960 (2016). The statute does not provide any explicit guidance for the trial court's exercise of discretion or require findings (and plaintiff did not separately ask for findings). A court "may not arbitrarily grant or deny permission to file an untimely anti-SLAPP motion," Newport Newspapers , 291 Or. App. at 326, 420 P.3d 684, but the statute does not require the trial court to determine if there is valid excuse for the filing of an untimely motion. The trial court did note defendant's explanation that the filing of the motion in the federal action would not have been strategically beneficial in light of the constitutional...
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