C.E. v. J.E.

Decision Date23 September 2015
Docket NumberSJC–11945.
PartiesC.E. v. J.E.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Miriam G. Altman, Lexington, & Valerie E. Cooney for the wife.

Peter J. Jamieson, North Andover, for the husband.

Opinion

RESCRIPT.

C.E. (wife) appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying her petition for relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3

, specifically, a stay pending her appeal from a judgment of divorce nisi. At trial, the wife alleged that the husband, J.E., sexually abused one of the parties' two minor children. The judge found, after a fourteen-day trial, that the alleged abuse had not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. A judgment of divorce nisi issued, paragraphs 3 and 4 of which grant the husband unsupervised parenting time with the children. The wife moved in the Probate and Family Court and before a single justice of the Appeals Court for a stay pending appeal of these two paragraphs. Mass. R.A.P. 6, as appearing in 454 Mass. 1601 (2009). When those motions were unsuccessful, the wife filed her petition pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeking a stay, which a single justice of this court denied without a hearing. On the wife's emergency motion, we issued an interim order staying paragraphs 3 and 4 pending further order of this court. We now vacate our interim order and affirm the judgment of the single justice.2

“Relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3

, is extraordinary. We will not disturb the single justice's denial of relief absent an abuse of discretion or other clear error of law. See, e.g., Matthews v. Appeals Court, 444 Mass. 1007, 1008, 828 N.E.2d 527 (2005). A petitioner seeking relief under the statute ‘must “demonstrate both a substantial claim of violation of [her] substantive rights and error that cannot be remedied under the ordinary review process.” McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497, 650 N.E.2d 780 (1995), quoting Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (1990).” Bledsoe v. Commissioner of Correction, 470 Mass. 1017, 1017, 21 N.E.3d 542 (2014), quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 1003, 1003, 942 N.E.2d 171 (2011). Here, the wife had an adequate remedy in the ordinary review process, as she “had the opportunity to appeal from the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court to a panel of that court and “also could have requested that the Appeals Court expedite such an appeal.” Blonde v. Antonelli, 463 Mass. 1002, 1002, 971 N.E.2d 1279 (2012), quoting Gifford v. Gifford, 451 Mass. 1012, 1013, 888 N.E.2d 924 (2008). She did not exercise this opportunity. “The single justice was not obligated to exercise this court's extraordinary power where [the wife] did not attempt to pursue ordinary appellate remedies.” Blonde v. Antonelli, supra. We cannot assume that an expedited appeal before the Appeals Court would have been unavailable or inadequate.

Moreover, on review of the materials that were before the single justice and that have been submitted to the full court, we agree that a stay was not warranted. “An appellant seeking a stay pending appeal must ordinarily meet four tests: (1) the likelihood of appellant's success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm to appellant if the court denies the stay; (3) the absence of substantial harm to other parties if the stay issues; and (4) the absence of harm to the public interest from granting the stay.” J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 62.3, at 409 (2d ed. 2007)

. The wife cannot meet the first of these four tests, as she has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her appeal from the underlying...

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  • Prop. Acquisition Grp., LLC v. Ivester, 17-P-1518
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • April 18, 2019
    ...if the stay issues; and (4) the absence of harm to the public interest from granting the stay" (citation omitted). C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016, 1017, 37 N.E.3d 623 (2015). The Ivesters have shown no likelihood of irreparable harm because even if they are successful in their Superior Court ......
  • Calzado v. Com.
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    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2018
    ...cannot be remedied under the ordinary review process," an essential part of the showing under G. L. c. 211, § 3. See, e.g., C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016, 1016, 37 N.E.3d 623 (2015), quoting McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497, 650 N.E.2d 780 (1995). This presents a further reason......
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  • Griffin v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 16-P-1238
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    • August 7, 2017
    ...for postjudgment injunctions pending appeal are subject to the same standards as those for preliminary injunctions. See C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2015). Accordingly, the moving party must ordinarily make three showings to obtain an injunction: (1) a likelihood of success on the me......
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