C. W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc.
Decision Date | 16 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 56907,56907 |
Citation | 254 S.E.2d 426,149 Ga.App. 354 |
Parties | C. W. MATTHEWS CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC. v. CAPITAL FORD TRUCK SALES, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gerard & Matthews, William T. Gerard, Athens, for appellant.
Greene, Buckley, DeRieux & Jones, Burt DeRieux, Gregory J. Digel, Eilene Crowley, Atlanta, for appellee.
The plaintiff, a construction firm, sued for damages allegedly caused by the use of a defective antifreeze purchased from the defendant. The complaint sounded both in contract and in tort. The appeal is from a grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the basis of improper venue.
The suit was filed in the Superior Court of Cobb County, the county where the cause of action allegedly arose. The defendant is a Delaware corporation with its registered agent and principal place of business in Georgia located in Fulton County. It does not have an office or place of business in Cobb County; however, the complaint alleges that it transacts business there on a regular basis, and there is nothing in the record which can be held to pierce this allegation. The issue with which we are faced in this appeal is whether such activity was sufficient to place venue of the action in Cobb County under the statutory law in effect at the time the suit was filed, i. e., Ga.L.1975, pp. 583, 587 (Code Ann. § 22-404(d)). Held:
Prior to 1975, venue in actions against domestic corporations was controlled by Code Ann. § 22-5301 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 565, 820). This statute and its predecessor, Ga.L. 1884-5, p. 99, provided as follows: Because of the service of process provision, this statute was held to require that, even in tort suits, a corporation have either an agent or a place of business in the county in which suit was filed. See, e. g., Tuggle v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 123 Ga. 480, 51 S.E. 433 (1905); Swift & Co. v. Lawson, 95 Ga.App. 35(1)(a), 97 S.E.2d 168 (1957); Mavity v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 115 Ga.App. 763, 156 S.E.2d 191 (1967). By its terms, Code Ann. § 22-5301 applied only to domestic corporations, leaving some confusion over the rule applicable to foreign corporations. The case of Orkin Ext. Co. v. Gilland, 130 Ga.App. 788, 204 S.E.2d 469 (1974) sought to eliminate this confusion by holding that the statute applied to foreign as well as to domestic corporations.
Section 22-5301 was repealed by Ga.L.1975, pp. 583, 606; and, in its place, Ga.L.1975, pp. 583, 587 was substituted. That statute amended Code Ann. § 22-404(c) and (d) to provide as follows:
It is readily apparent that the language of this statute tracks the language of former Code Ann. § 22-5301, except that for tort actions there is the added requirement that the corporation transact business in the county where the cause of action originated. The plaintiff urges this court to rule that this added requirement had the effect of greatly liberalizing the old law, so as to do away with the requirement, established by judicial construction, that the corporation have an agent or a place of business in the county where the tort action is brought. However, we find no indication that such a radical change was intended by the legislature.
Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga.App. 739, 743, 152 S.E.2d 768, 771 (1966). Whatever doubt may exist concerning the intention of the legislature in passing the 1975 statute is dispelled by an examination of the preamble of the Act. See Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 40, 55 S.E.2d 711 (1949). The preamble states that the purpose of the statute is "to change the venue (requirements) for bringing suits against Foreign corporations . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, we conclude that the purpose of the statute was to unify the venue requirements for suits against foreign and domestic corporations rather than dramatically to alter those requirements in the manner suggested by the plaintiff. Support for this conclusion is provided by...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Porter v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.
...is designed to test the merits of a cause of action and cannot be granted on a matter in abatement. C.W. Matthews, etc., Co. v. Capital Ford, 149 Ga.App. 354, 357, 254 S.E.2d 426 (1979). Because subject matter jurisdiction is such a matter, Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, 232 Ga. 614, 6......
-
Gale v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.
...subject matter jurisdiction is not an appropriate matter for a grant of summary judgment, however, C.W. Matthews, etc., Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, 149 Ga.App. 354, 357, 254 S.E.2d 426; Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, 232 Ga. 614, 615, 208 S.E.2d 459, the claim must be remanded to ......
-
Bozeman v. Tifton Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 63843
...clearly apparent either by express declaration or by necessary implication. [Cit.]' [Cits.]" C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, 149 Ga.App. 354, 356, 254 S.E.2d 426 (1979). "Words and phrases, the meaning of which has been ascertained in a statute, are, when used in ......
-
Srm Realty v. Capital Flooring Enterprises
...S.E.2d 225 (1998). 6. City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609(2), 176 S.E.2d 81 (1970). 7. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, 149 Ga.App. 354, 356, 254 S.E.2d 426 (1979) (citation and punctuation 8. See, e.g., Burgin & Sons Glass Co. v. McIntire, 7 Ga.App. 755, 68......