C.W.R., In Interest of
| Decision Date | 22 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1181,93-1181 |
| Citation | 518 N.W.2d 780 |
| Parties | In the Interest of C.W.R., A Child, State of Iowa, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., John M. Parmeter, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Judy Sheirbon, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Marleen Loftus, Asst. County Atty., for appellant State.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Ahmet S. Gonlubol, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for child.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.
This case comes before us on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of the State's motion to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile, C.W.R., to the district court. We affirm.
In April 1993, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that C.W.R. had committed three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. C.W.R. stipulated at his detention hearing that there was probable cause to believe he committed the acts of sexual abuse. When the petition was filed C.W.R. was sixteen years and eight months of age. The State requested that jurisdiction of the case be transferred to adult court.
At the waiver hearing in May all the witnesses, except the juvenile court officer and the director of the Boys and Girls Home in Sioux City, recommended that C.W.R. remain in the juvenile court system and obtain treatment in a residential facility. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the parties agreed that C.W.R. would be evaluated at Charter Hospital in Dallas, Texas at his parents' expense.
After C.W.R.'s evaluation at Charter Hospital was completed, that facility recommended that C.W.R. remain in the juvenile court system. Charter also recommended placement of C.W.R. in a residential treatment facility.
The waiver hearing reconvened in July 1993. Testimony at that hearing included opinions by medical professionals that C.W.R. should remain under juvenile court jurisdiction. Evidence was also introduced, however, that C.W.R. could not complete a treatment program within the time the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over him.
In ruling on the waiver motion, the juvenile judge considered the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 232.45(6) (1993). He concluded that there were reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of C.W.R. within the juvenile system and that transfer of C.W.R. into the adult system would not be in his best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.45(6) (1993). Therefore, the court denied the motion to waive jurisdiction.
The State first appealed to the district court pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.7103. Subsequently, the State withdrew its appeal to the district court and filed a request for an interlocutory appeal with this court. See Iowa R.App.P. 2. That request was granted.
C.W.R. asks us to dismiss this appeal for three reasons: (1) the State failed to appeal to the district court as a prerequisite to an appeal to this court; (2) no appeal is allowed from an interlocutory order in a juvenile matter; and (3) if the State is allowed to appeal, the juvenile's right to equal protection of the laws is violated. We address each contention separately below.
A. C.W.R. argues that we should dismiss the State's appeal because the State did not follow the proper procedure for appeals set out in section 602.7103. He claims that section 602.7103 requires the State to seek direct review of the order entered by the associate juvenile judge in the district court before appealing to our court. The State contends that section 602.7103 gives parties the right to appeal to the district court but does not preclude a direct appeal to the appellate court if properly requested pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.133 for final orders or pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 for interlocutory orders. We agree with the State.
Section 602.7103(3) provides in part:
The parties to any [proceeding other than a termination of parental rights proceeding] heard by an associate juvenile judge are entitled to appeal the order, finding, or decision of an associate juvenile judge, to the district court.
Iowa Code § 602.7103(3) (1993). Before its amendment in 1992, this section used substantially the same language in referring to appeal rights from the ruling of a referee in juvenile matters:
The parties to a proceeding heard by the referee are entitled to a review by the judge of the juvenile court of the referee's order, finding, or decision, if the review is requested within ten days after the entry of the referee's order, finding, or decision.
Iowa Code § 602.7103(3) (1991).
In considering section 602.7103 prior to the 1992 amendment, we said that parties are not required to seek a juvenile court judge's review of a referee's decision in order to render the decision final for purposes of review. In re D.L.C., 464 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Iowa 1991); In re D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1985). We give amended section 602.7103 a consistent interpretation. The language "entitled to a review" is the same in both the new and old statutes. We read this language to mean that the parties may seek review by the district court of the associate juvenile judge's order but are not required to do so as a prerequisite to review at the appellate level.
B. C.W.R. next argues that an order denying or granting a waiver motion is interlocutory and may not be appealed. He cites the case of In re Clay, 246 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1976). In Clay, we explained that an order transferring a cause from one state court to another is ordinarily deemed to be interlocutory, therefore, not final and appealable of right. Clay, 246 N.W.2d at 264. We noted that appeals from the juvenile court must follow the same rules applicable to appeals from the district court. Id. at 265. Because the juvenile in Clay had not obtained permission to appeal the juvenile court's interlocutory order transferring jurisdiction to adult court, we dismissed the juvenile's appeal. Id. at 266.
In contrast, here the State requested and was granted an interlocutory appeal. See Iowa R.App.P. 2. Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the associate juvenile judge's order denying the State's waiver motion.
C. C.W.R.'s final argument supporting dismissal of this appeal is based on the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. He correctly contends that whatever avenue of appeal is allowed in juvenile proceedings must be applied equally to both parties. See Shortridge v. State, 478 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1991) ().
C.W.R. claims that allowance of an interlocutory appeal here coupled with the dismissal of the appeal in Clay establishes different standards for appeal by the State and the juvenile. However, C.W.R. ignores the procedural distinction discussed above between this case and Clay. In Clay, the juvenile filed a direct appeal from an interlocutory order without permission. Here, the State requested permission to appeal and was granted that right. C.W.R.'s equal protection claim fails because there is no disparate treatment of juveniles and the State. Either party may apply for an interlocutory appeal; the juvenile in Clay simply failed to do so. 1
The waiver statute, Iowa Code section 232.45, vests discretion in the juvenile court ruling on the waiver application. Our review of the associate juvenile judge's decision to deny the waiver motion is de novo in that we examine all the evidence to determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v. Greiman, 344 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa 1984).
Section 232.45(6) provides that, following a waiver hearing, the court may waive jurisdiction if the following criteria are met: (a) the...
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