Clay, In Interest of, 2--59020
Decision Date | 20 October 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 2--59020,2--59020 |
Citation | 246 N.W.2d 263 |
Parties | In the Interest of Anthony Maurice CLAY, a child. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Leslie Babich, of Allen, Babich & Bennett, Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore R. Boecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chester C. Woodburn, III, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Heard by MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, REES, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ.
Anthony Maurice Clay appeals from an order entered in juvenile division of the Polk District Court transferring alleged violation of the law (a felony) to criminal division for appropriate action. Appeal dismissed.
By petition filed in juvenile court Clay, age then 17, allegedly operated a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, Section 321.76, The Code 1975. After a contested juvenile hearing the cause was ordered transferred upon the State's motion. See Code § 232.62.
The State now urges Clay's appeal from the transfer order be dismissed. In light of our disposition upon that premise no useful purpose will be served by alluding to contentions instantly voiced by Clay.
Notably, a juvenile court is a division of our unified 'Iowa District Court'. See Code § 602.1. See also §§ 231.1--231.4; 232.2(1).
And, Code § 232.62 provides: 'The criminal court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court over children less than eighteen years of age who commit a criminal offense.'
Furthermore, an order transferring a cause from one state court to another is ordinarily deemed interlocutory, therefore not final and appealable as of right. See Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1958); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 115f at 315.
Our holding does not, however, rest upon the foregoing alone. Rather it is a factor considered in resolving the case at hand.
At the outset this apt statement in People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 530--531 (1969), is deemed persuasive:
'There is no discernible pattern in the procedures of the various States as to the reviewability of such (transfer) orders, and because the matter depends so largely upon the varying provisions of the applicable statutes, nothing is to be gained by a detailed analysis of the authorities from other jurisdictions. We do not regard the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, which characterized the waiver of jurisdiction as a
To us Jiles, supra, says an order transferring a juvenile proceeding to the criminal division for proper action, although critically important, is not per se a final adjudication. Rather, it takes on all the attributes of a preliminary procedural mechanism designed to protect the best interests of a juvenile and the public. See Code § 232.72. It does not in any respect constitute a determination as to guilt or innocence. Further in this vein the record clearly reveals no delinquency determination was ever made or entered, either independently or as an integral part of the instant transfer.
Briefly stated, the involved order was not a final judgment from which appeal could be had as a matter of right. See In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Mo.1972); In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158, 159 (1974); cf. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 1154, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973); State v. Aumann, 236 N.W.2d 320 (1975). See generally In re Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1971).
Clay's invocation of appellate review, we are not so persuaded.
The cited statute provides:
(emphasis supplied).
It could be reasonably argued the italicized first sentence of § 232.58, if lifted out of context, permits appeal from the transfer order. But this approach would run counter to well established principles.
As articulated in Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 113--114 (Iowa 1976):
(emphasis supplied).
See also State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46:05 (Sands 4th ed. 1973).
Guided by the foregoing we are satisfied the General Assembly qualified the above noted first sentence of § 232.58 by this next following phraseology: 'The procedure for such appeals shall be governed by the same provisions applicable to appeals from the district court.'
What then is the relevant procedure provided for appeals from the district court? Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d...
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...663, 128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000 (1976) ; People in Int. of D.H ., 37 Colo.App. 544, 552 P.2d 29 (1976) ; Interest of Clay , 246 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1976) ; In re Appeal No. 961 , 23 Md. App. 9, 325 A.2d 112 (1974) ; Interest of Watkins , 324 So.2d 232 (Miss. 1975) ; In re T.J.H. , 479 S.......
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