Cabell v. State
Citation | 60 Cal.Rptr. 476,67 Cal.2d 150,430 P.2d 34 |
Decision Date | 28 July 1967 |
Docket Number | S.F. 22504 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Parties | , 430 P.2d 34, 34 A.L.R.3d 1154 John Roger CABELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Respondent. In Bank |
Haley, McInerney & Dillon and Haradon M. Dillon, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Bergman and Leonard M. Sperry, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and respondent.
Harry S. Fenton, Robert F. Carlson and Kenneth G. Nellis, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff in this personal injury action appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant State of California. As will appear, we are of the view that the trial court was correct in its apparent conclusion that the State had established a defense to the action. Accordingly, the judgment must be affirmed.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that in December 1961 he was a student at San Francisco State College and while attempting to push open a swinging glass door in a dormitory building his hand 'slipped from the side paneling and was precipitated through the glass on the door, which was not of the safety variety,' thereby injuring plaintiff; that his injuries were caused because defendants 1 negligently designed, constructed, operated and maintained the glass doors in the dormitory. Defendant State in an amendment to its answer alleges, in reliance upon section 830.6 of the Government Code, 2 that the plan, design, standards and construction of the glass door here involved were approved by the State Division of Architecture and by State employees exercising discretionary authority in giving such approval. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was based upon the same defense.
Section 830.6 is a part of division 3.6 added to the Government Code in 1963 to deal comprehensively with the problem of governmental immunity from tort liability. The 1963 legislation, sometimes termed the Tort Claims Act, can constitutionally be applied to causes of action which arose prior to its effective date, in accordance with the express intent of the Legislature stated therein. (Stats.1963, ch. 1681, § 45, subd. (a); Heieck and Moran v. City of Modesto (1966) 64 Cal.2d 229, 231--232, 49 Cal.Rptr. 377, 411 P.2d 105; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 844--846, 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868; see also Teall v. City of Cudahy (1963) 60 Cal.2d 431, 34 Cal.Rptr. 869, 386 P.2d 493; Flournoy v. State of California (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 520, 531--537, 41 Cal.Rptr. 190; Hayes v. State of California (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 48, 41 Cal.Rptr. 502; City of Burbank v. Superior Court (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 675, 42 Cal.Rptr. 23; Loop v. State of California (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 591, 49 Cal.Rptr. 909; Dahlquist v. State of California (1966) 243 A.C.A. 208, 210, 52 Cal.Rptr. 324.) No sound basis exists for differentiating in this respect, with attendant inequality, between causes arising out of so-called 'proprietary' as distinguished from 'governmental' activities, or between those based on statute and those grounded on rules established by judicial decisions. (See Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457.)
Section 835 3 declares that except as otherwise provided by statute a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes certain things, including notice to the entity of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken protective measures. Section 835 is a part of the chapter to which the immunity or defense of plan or design applies, which is found in section 830.6 (ante, fn. 2) and relied upon by defendant.
The rationale of this immunity, as explained by the California Law Revision Commission (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity 823) is: (See Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability (Cont.Ed.Bar 1964) p. 217.) Further, (Id. p. 556.)
From the supporting and opposing declarations filed with respect to defendant's summary judgment motion in this case it appears that the glass through which plaintiff's hand was thrust was a pane in a fifth-floor swinging lavatory door of a State-owned dormitory in which plaintiff was a paying resident. Plans and specifications for the dormitory, including lavatory doors and the glass therein, were prepared in 1957 by the State Division of Architecture, after staff study, and thereafter approved by the State Architect, the State Public Works Board, and in November 1958 by the State Department of Public Works. 'Obscure' glass, which is 1/8 inch thick, was specified for the doors, and installed, and was the type in the door here involved at the time plaintiff was injured. The wooden frame enclosing the glass was six inches wide; on the frame was a metal plate four inches wide which 'was the standard type used on wooden doors that swing.' According to the declaration of the deputy state architect, at the time the plans and specifications for the dormitory were adopted and approved
It is thus apparent that there is substantial evidence upon the basis of which a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or standards for the lavatory doors, including the glass, or a reasonable governmental body or employee could have approved them, and that accordingly defendant State has established its immunity under section 830.6 (ante, fn. 2) with respect to the door as originally planned and constructed.
However, the summary judgment declarations further disclose that as early as December 1960 another student had been injured when the glass in a sixth-floor lavatory door in the dormitory had given way and broken when he had attempted to push the door open; that approximately one month before plaintiff was allegedly injured in December 1961 the glass in the door involved in plaintiff's accident had shattered and broken into pieces when a student's arm had come in contact with it, and had been replaced by the college maintenance department with the same type of glass as that originally installed; the glass pane in another lavatory door on the same floor of the dormitory had also broken about a month before plaintiff's accident.
Plaintiff contends that the type of glass originally installed had thus been shown to be dangerous and that replacement of the broken glass with the same type as originally used constituted maintenance of a dangerous condition by defendant State to which the plan or design immunity does not apply. We are persuaded that there is no merit in this contention. As noted hereinabove, the plan or design is to be judged as of the time it was adopted or approved. If the broken glass had not been replaced at all but instead had been left with sharp or jagged pieces still in the door, or if it had been replaced with glass inferior to that originally used, then a charge of dangerous condition could not be met with the plan or design defense. But when, as here, the maintenance was in conformity with the original plans and specifications, the immunity provided by section 830.6 comes into play. Our holding that the immunity applies with respect to ordinary routine maintenance of public property is, of course, to be distinguished from a situation in which reconstruction or new construction is engaged in and in which the showing of reasonableness should relate to the time of adoption of the plan or design for such reconstruction or new construction and not to the time of adoption of the original plan or design.
The summary judgment in favor of defendant State of California is affirmed.
The interpretation of section 830.6 of the Government Code 1 in the majority opinion is demonstrably erroneous. The section is but one of many statutes dealing with governmental immunity drafted by the Law Revision Commission after several years of study. Section 830.6 was adopted by the Legislature exactly as recommended by the commission. The latter expressed its interpretation of...
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Morris v. County of Marin
...Tort Claims Act. On the basis of such statements, this court has overruled two of its own decisions, Cabell v. State of California (1967) 67 Cal.2d 150, 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34, and Becker v. Johnston (1967) 67 Cal.2d 163, 60 Cal.Rptr. 485, 430 P.2d 43. (Baldwin v. State of California......
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...the immunity granted by the statute. Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal.2d 163, 60 Cal.Rptr. 485, 430 P.2d 43 (1967), Cabell v. State, 67 Cal.2d 150, 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34 (1967). In Cabell a glass door had been originally designed in accordance with the then contemporary standards. A stude......
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...of California, in two 1967 cases, Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal.2d 163, 60 Cal.Rptr. 485, 430 P.2d 43 (1967), and Cabell v. State, 67 Cal.2d 150, 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34 (1967), construed the California design immunity statute as granting perpetual immunity to the State of California, th......
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Cornette v. Department of Transp.
...that design immunity, once acquired, persisted regardless of any subsequent change of conditions. "In Cabell [v. State of California (1967) 67 Cal.2d 150, 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34], we held that section 830.6 immunized the state from liability arising from the breaking of a glass door ......