Caboni v. General Motors Corp., 00-31327.

• Decision Date: 02 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-31327.,00-31327.
• Citation: 278 F.3d 448
• Parties: James CABONI; et al., Plaintiffs, James Caboni, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; et al., Defendants, General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

278 F.3d 448

James CABONI; et al., Plaintiffs, James Caboni, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; et al., Defendants, General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-31327.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 2, 2002.

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Terrence J. Lestelle, Philip Reed Adams, Jr. (argued), Lestelle & Lestelle, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paul Victor Cassisa, Jr., Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis, Oxford, MS, Carl Joseph Giffin, Jr. (argued), Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis, Metairie, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GARWOOD and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and FALLON,^* District Judge.

FALLON, District Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant James Caboni appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee General Motors Corporation on Plaintiff Appellant's products liability action brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"). For the following reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND the case for further consideration.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 22, 1998, Plaintiff-Appellant James Caboni was driving his 1996 Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck along Interstate 310 in Saint Charles Parish, Louisiana, when an unidentified vehicle swerved into his lane. Caboni claims that to avoid a collision, he was forced to take evasive action. Such action caused Caboni to lose control of his truck, and the truck slammed into the Interstate's guardrail.¹ The driver's side air bag in Caboni's truck did not deploy upon impact.

Caboni's truck and its air bag system were manufactured by Defendant-Appellant General Motors Corporation ("GM"). Because the truck's air bag did not deploy when Caboni's truck hit the guardrail, Caboni sued GM in state court under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 9:2800.51-9:2800.60, claiming damages for physical injuries, including injuries to his head caused by his head hitting the steering wheel. Specific to this appeal, Caboni alleged that GM's air bag was unreasonably dangerous because it did not conform to an express warranty contained within the truck's owner's manual. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.58.²

On September 23, 1999, GM removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity. GM then filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Caboni could not establish the essential elements required for an express warranty claim under the LPLA. The district court agreed and granted GM's motion. Caboni then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied.

Caboni timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria employed by the district court in the first instance. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir.1994). "Summary judgment is proper only `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making this assessment, this court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

"Courts of Appeals consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, yet the nonmovant may not rely on mere allegations in the pleadings; rather, the nonmovant must respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229, 120 S.Ct. 2659, 147 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000); see also Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir.2000) ("If the movant succeeds in making that showing, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and not rest upon the allegations or denials contained in its pleadings."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1073, 121 S.Ct. 766, 148 L.Ed.2d 667 (2001). After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. EXPRESS WARRANTY CLAIMS UNDER THE LPLA

A. Statutory Framework

In this diversity action, the LPLA applies to Caboni's claims. The LPLA sets forth "exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products." La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.52; see also Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.1995). Further, the LPLA imposes liability on a manufacturer only "for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product." La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(A). As provided by the LPLA, a product may be unreasonably dangerous in one of four ways: (1) construction or composition, (2) design, (3) inadequate warning, and (4) nonconformity to an express warranty. See id. § 9:2800.54(B).

Relevant to this case is the LPLA provision that provides for a claim against a manufacturer for damages arising from a product that is unreasonably dangerous because of its nonconformity to an express warranty made by the manufacturer. Section 9:2800.58 of the LPLA provides:

A product is unreasonably dangerous when it does not conform to an express warranty made at any time by the manufacturer about the product if the express warranty has induced the claimant or another person or entity to use the product and the claimant's damage was proximately caused because the express warranty was untrue.

Accordingly, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate, or provide evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the following: (1) the manufacturer made an express warranty regarding the product, (2) the plaintiff was induced to use the product because of that warranty, (3) the product failed to conform to that express warranty, and (4) the plaintiff's damage was proximately caused because the express warranty was untrue. See id.

B. Analysis of Express Warranty Claim Within the Statutory Framework

1. Existence of an Express Warranty

We turn to the first element of a LPLA express warranty claim-the existence of an express warranty. The LPLA defines an "express warranty" as

a representation, statement of alleged fact or promise about a product or its nature, material or workmanship that represents, affirms or promises that the product or its nature, material or workmanship possesses specified characteristics or qualities or will meet a specified level of performance. "Express warranty" does not mean a general opinion about or general praise of a product. A sample or model of a product is an express warranty.

La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53(6). Caboni points to one excerpt from the truck's owner's manual, arguing that it constitutes an express warranty under the LPLA. That passage provides:

When should an air bag inflate?

The air bag is designed to inflate in moderate to severe frontal or near-frontal crashes. The air bag will inflate only if the impact speed is above the system's designed "threshold level". If your vehicle goes straight into a wall that doesn't move or deform, the threshold level is about 14 to 18 mph (23 to 29 km/h). The threshold level can vary, however, with specific vehicle design, so that it can be somewhat above or below this range.

1996 S-Series Pickup Owner's Manual, p. 1-20, R.581.³

The district court disagreed with Caboni's characterization of this excerpt as an express warranty, stating simply that "as a matter of law[,] the statements made in the owner's manual do not constitute an `express warranty' as defined by the Act." The district court did not provide any analysis in support of its conclusion that the statements were not express warranties and our research has failed to uncover any Louisiana cases that have analyzed the exact contours of an express warranty under the LPLA. However, under a clear reading of the statute, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that when GM stated in its manual that "[t]he air bag is designed to inflate in moderate to severe frontal or near-frontal crashes," it created an express warranty. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53(6). A reasonable jury could find that the passage is a "representation" or "statement of alleged fact" about the air bag system that "represents" or "affirms" that the air bag will meet a "specified level of performance," i.e., inflate in moderate to severe frontal or near-frontal crashes. See id. Likewise, a reasonable factfinder could determine that the statement is neither a "general opinion" nor "general praise" about the air bag system. See id. Citing no case law, GM argues that the statement is "general opinion" or "general praise." (emphasis added). Because we believe that a reasonable jury could find that the statement at issue satisfies the LPLA's definition of an express warranty, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue.

The district court granted GM's motion for summary judgment on the alternative grounds that Caboni did "not provide[] adequate evidence to show that the express warranty was untrue and further that [Caboni]'s reliance upon those statements was the proximate cause of his...