Cabrera v. Outdoor Empire Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D13–5235.,1D13–5235. |
| Citation | 134 So.3d 573 |
| Parties | Domingo A. CABRERA, Appellant, v. OUTDOOR EMPIRE INC. and FCCI Insurance Company, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Domingo A. Cabrera, pro se, Appellant.
No appearance for Appellees.
In this workers' compensation appeal, Claimant, appearing pro se, challenges three orders of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that conclude Claimant has fully settled his two workers' compensation claims with the Employer/Carrier (E/C) and is, therefore, entitled to no further benefits under chapter 440 for these accidents and injuries. Because the record evidence supports the JCC's finding that Claimant indeed settled his claims, we affirm.We deny Claimant's constitutional challenges for reasons explained below.
This is the second time this workers' compensation matter—which comprises two distinct dates of accidents (allegedly) suffered by Claimant while employed with the Employer herein—has come before this court. In Cabrera v. Outdoor Empire ( Cabrera I ), 108 So.3d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), we concluded that the parties' first putative settlement agreement, reached when Claimant was not represented by counsel, was neither binding nor enforceable, because Claimant permissibly withdrew from the settlement before it was approved by the JCC as required by section 440.20(11)(a), Florida Statutes—which applies to workers' compensation settlement agreements involving unrepresented claimants. See108 So.3d. at 694. After this court's reversal in Cabrera I, the parties attended a six hour mediation, at which Claimant was represented by counsel. An interpreter was present at the mediation to assist Claimant, whose primary language is Spanish. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby Claimant was to receive a total sum of $165,000, payable by the E/C, out of which he was to pay his attorney $10,000 for attorney's fees and costs. This settlement agreement was memorialized by written documents, each of which bears Claimant's signature. Shortly after this second settlement agreement was reached, and after the documents memorializing same were signed, Claimant expressed displeasure with, inter alia, the amount of the settlement, the manner in which it was negotiated, and the means by which the settlement checks would be processed.
Several evidentiary hearings were held regarding Claimant's multiple post-settlement grievances, resulting in the orders on appeal. Significantly, at the evidentiary hearing held to determine whether Claimant in fact settled his workers' compensation claims, the mediator, the interpreter, and Claimant's counsel (who had by then withdrawn from representation of Claimant) testified. Each of the foregoing witnesses testified (with all relevant privileges being waived on the record) that the negotiations at mediation and the resulting settlement included both dates of accidents; according to these witnesses, this fact was discussed with Claimant repeatedly. The E/C introduced the settlement documents into evidence, which show an agreement whereby the E/C promised to pay Claimant $165,000 (out of which Claimant was to pay his attorney $10,000 for fees and costs) to completely settle and extinguish “all” and “any” workers' compensation claims based on accidents and injuries suffered by Claimant while working for the Employer. Claimant testified that he signed these documents, and this fact was verified by Claimant's counsel and the interpreter. Nevertheless, Claimant alleged that he was a victim of a “dirty trick,” because he did not intend to settle both dates of his accident.
After considering the testimony and the documentary evidence introduced at hearing, the JCC entered an order that concludes Claimant fully and completely settled his January 30, 2007, accident (involving an alleged vision injury), his February 12, 2010, accident (involving “multiple injuries”), and “any and all” dates of accidents Claimant suffered while employed by the Employer, in exchange for $165,000, payable by the E/C. The JCC further found no indicia of overreaching or fraud committed against Claimant, as was inferentially argued by Claimant. After the JCC issued the order finding a full and complete settlement of all dates of accident, Claimant then alleged—for the first time—that the signatures appearing on the operative settlement documents were not his own. The JCC advised Claimant that the time to have raised this issue was during the evidentiary hearing on the issue of settlement. This appeal followed.
In his brief, Claimant asserts that his constitutional rights have been violated and that he did not settle both dates of accident, only the February 12, 2010, date of accident. Upon receipt of Claimant's brief, this court entered an order advising the parties that this appeal is being considered for summary affirmance under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a). Accordingly, the parties were directed to refrain from further briefing.
Summary affirmance is appropriate where the initial brief fails to present a “preliminary basis for reversal,” regardless of the good-faith intentions and beliefs of the filing party. See Spencer v. Fla. Power Light, ––– So.3d ––––, 2013 WL 5848468, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2270 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 31, 2013). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this case is appropriate for disposition by summary affirmance.
Relative to the issue of settlement, Claimant argues, in essence, that evidence supports his argument that he did not intend to settle both dates of accident with the E/C. This court has stated on many occasions that we will never reverse an order of lower tribunal merely because evidence supports the losing party's view of the case. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Manning, 685 So.2d 64, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) . Rather, the relevant inquiry pertaining to issues of fact challenged on appeal is whether competent substantial evidence supports the findings reached by the JCC. See Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Here, an abundance of evidence, including the testimony of the interpreter and the mediator, which was accepted as credible by...
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