Cady v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 54106,54106,2
• Citation: 439 S.W.2d 483
• Parties: Elwyn L. CADY, Jr., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 483

439 S.W.2d 483

Elwyn L. CADY, Jr., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.

No. 54106.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

April 14, 1969.

Elwyn L. Cady, Jr., Independence, pro se.

Parks G. Carpenter and Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary & Jaeckel, St. Louis, for respondent.

STOCKARD, Commissioner.

Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment dismissing his second amended petition wherein he sought actual and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000. We shall summarize the allegations of the petition except in those instances where quotation of the allegations is believed appropriate, and we shall insert in brackets certain answers to interrogatories made by plaintiff and placed in the transcript by agreement of the parties.

On September 13, 1956 plaintiff's automobile was involved in a collision in Kansas City, Missouri, with an automobile 'operated by one Wesselman' (presumably insured by defendant) by reason of Wesselman's negligence, and plaintiff's automobile was damaged 'in the sum of $1,000.' Thereafter, plaintiff entered into 'a valid contract' (with Kincaid-Webber Motor Company) for 'full repair of all damage proximately caused by the collision,' but in 'wanton, reckless and heedless disregard for the rights of plaintiff, and for his safety of life and limb, defendant proceeded to interfere with the above-mentioned contract of repair by directing its employee (Timothy D. O'Leary) to make contact with the party obligated to make repair under the said contract and influence said party or parties to perform less than a full and complete repair of said automobile.' ('The principal defect in repair involved the right front end in which less than a first-class repair was made, involving second-rate materials and insufficient testing of the structure thereof; a proper repair of that particular portion of the auto would embrace structurally sound parts and appropriate testing thereof.'). In this manner defendant 'procured and prevailed upon the party or parties performing repair under the said contract to accomplish less than a complete and safe repair of said automobile.' ('Mr. O'Leary secured an estimate of repair from Kincaid-Webber, total $359.23. He then 'had the Auto Damage Appraisers go out on this case, and they got an agreed price with the Kincaid-Webber Motor Company in the amount of $297.40 for repairs "). This was done 'in a planned and deliberate effort with that legal malice of a wrongful action intentionally done to profit by a reduction of repair costs for damage sustained in the collision set out above for which defendant was likely to be responsible in law.' As a proximate result of 'such inadequate repair of such automobile caused by defendant' plaintiff 'was placed in a position of danger, fear, and apprehension for his safety, in that suddenly and without warning, while plaintiff was driving said automobile on a public street in the City of Austin, Texas, the right front repaired side of the vehicle collapsed.' Plaintiff sought '$10,000 compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages, and costs.'

In determining the sufficiency of the petition to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the averments are to be given a liberal construction and the petition accorded those reasonable inferences fairly indulged from the facts stated. Zuber v. Clarkson Const. Co., 363 Mo. 352, 251 S.W.2d 52, 54; Royster v. Baker, Mo., 365 S.W.2d 496. However, Civil Rule 55.06, V.A.M.R., provides that a pleading which purports to set forth a claim for relief shall contain 'a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' (Emphasis added). Where a petition is attacked for failure to state a claim the conclusions of the pleader are not admitted. Tolliver v. Standard Oil Company, Mo., 431 S.W.2d 159.

Plaintiff has attempted to allege a cause of action for wrongful interference by defendant with a contract between plaintiff and Kincaid-Webber Motor Company for the repair of plaintiff's automobile. It appears that plaintiff has studiously avoided alleging specifically the relation of defendant to Wesselman, and he does not allege that defendant was a stranger to the incident giving rise to his claim. However, from the allegations pertaining to Wesselman's negligence and to defendant's intention to profit by a reduction of repair costs for which defendant was likely to be responsible, it is a fair and reasonable inference that defendant was the public liability insurance carrier for Wesselman. What then were the essential allegations necessary to state a claim?

In Downey v. United Weather Proofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976, this court recognized that 'one who maliciously or without justifiable cause induces a person to breach his contract with another may be held responsible to the latter for the damages resulting from such breach.' It was further held that allegations of the use of fraud, deceit or coercion as a means of inducing a breach of an existing contract are not essential, but that it is sufficient to allege facts which when accepted as true demonstrate that the defendant 'maliciously, that is, with knowledge of the contract and without justifiable cause, induced the breach.' The absence of justification is an essential element of the...