Haines v. State Insurance Fund, 7110

• Decision Date: 03 February 1944
• Docket Number: 7110
• Citation: 65 Idaho 450,145 P.2d 833
• Parties: HOWARD HAINES, Employee, and J. F. KONEN, Employer, Respondents, v. STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

145 P.2d 833

65 Idaho 450

HOWARD HAINES, Employee, and J. F. KONEN, Employer, Respondents, v. STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellant

No. 7110

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 3, 1944

1. Workmen's compensation

Statute providing for enforcement of compensation award by judgment of district court and that there shall be no appeal from such judgment applies only where no appeal has been taken from decision of Industrial Accident Board, and is only intended to confer power on district court to enforce award where aggrieved party has failed to avail himself of right of appeal under other sections of the act. (I.C.A sec. 43-1408.)

2. Appeal and error

Courts

Courts have inherent power to determine their jurisdiction, and such determination, whether right or wrong, is subject to appellate review.

3. Appeal and error

Appeals are purely statutory, and Legislature may provide or deny right of appeal. (Const., art. 5, sec. 13.)

4. Appeal and error

If Legislature does not provide any method of appeal, or provides that appeals shall not be had, legislative decision is final. (Const., art. 5, sec. 13.)

5. Workmen's compensation

The Workmen's Compensation Act provision making judgment of district court respecting enforcement of workmen's compensation award final and prohibiting appeal therefrom cannot be evaded by indirect method of appealing from order denying motion to set aside the nonappealable judgment. (I.C.A., secs. 43-1408, 43-1410, 43-1413, as amended by Sess Laws 1937, chap. 175, secs. 1, 3.)

6. Workmen's compensation

The statute denying right of appeal from judgment of district court to enforce workmen's compensation award does not foreclose adverse party from protecting or correcting judgment as entered. (I.C.A., sec. 43-1410.)

7. Workmen's compensation

If question of district court's jurisdiction to enter judgment enforcing workmen's compensation award is involved, application may be made for writ of review. (I.C.A., secs. 43-1408, 43-1410, 43-1413, as amended by Sess Laws 1937, chap. 175, secs. 1, 3.)

8. Workmen's compensation

Where State Insurance Fund alleges fraud in procurement of compensation award, such fund, as surety, and employer may apply to Industrial Accident Board for correction and modification of award, because award does not become final even after statutory time of appeal has expired, if obtained by fraud. (I.C.A., secs. 43-1408, 43-1414 and 43-1413, as amended by Sess. Laws 1937, chap. 175, secs. 1, 3.)

9. Workmen's compensation

An appeal does not lie from district court order denying motion of State Insurance Fund, as surety, to set aside judgment of district court to enforce compensation award where no appeal was taken from award and statutory time therefor has expired remedy being by application to Industrial Accident Board for correction of award allegedly procured by fraud. (I.C.A., secs. 43-1408, 43-1410, 43-1414, and 43-1413, as amended by Sess. Laws 1937, chap. 175, secs. 1, 3.)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, for Valley County. Hon. A. O. Sutton, District Judge.

Appeal dismissed.

Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, and J. R. Smead, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Oscar W. Worthwine and E. B. Smith for respondent Howard Haines; Carey H. Nixon for respondent J. F. Konen.

Dunlap, J. Holden, C.J., and Ailshie, Budge, and Givens, JJ., concur.

OPINION

Dunlap, J.

On July 31, 1935, respondent Howard Haines, then in the employ of respondent J. F. Konen, sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with said Konen. A claim was filed with the Industrial Accident Board and thereafter, on proceedings had from time to time before the board, the claimant Haines and Konen, the employer, and his surety, the State Insurance Fund, entered into a compensation agreement on March 6, 1941, providing for payment to the plaintiff of certain sums. This agreement was approved by the Industrial Accident Board on March 22, 1941, and thereby became, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the award of the board.

No appeal was taken therefrom and said agreement was not modified, although on February 18, 1942, Konen and the State Insurance Fund filed with the board a petition entitled "Application for Hearing," and on May 1, 1942, said parties filed with the board an "Amended Application for Hearing and Petition," wherein it is alleged, among other things, that claimant was not then, and had not been since the spring of 1936, totally disabled for work, and since March 6, 1941, and until the said date of the amended application, had not been disabled on account of said injury, and had been able to be gainfully employed, and was not then disabled for work and was able to follow a gainful occupation, except for a temporary injury to his hand, and that he had been paid compensation for continuous total disability over a period in excess of any period of any disability which the claimant actually had suffered on account of said injury; that on March 6, 1941, and until on or after July 1, 1941, the petitioners did not know that Haines was not totally disabled, nor that he had been gainfully employed since March 6, 1941; that the agreement of March 6, 1941, was procured by claimant in part by fraud, in that he had represented to the State Insurance Fund, its officers and employees, that he was wholly and totally unable to work at a gainful occupation; then follow allegations with reference to claimant's particular employments during various periods of time, and they ask that the agreement of March 6, 1941, so approved by the board on March 22, 1941, be set aside and vacated.

The matter is apparently still pending before the board.

Thereafter, and on March 17, 1942, the claimant filed his petition in the District Court of Valley County, to which was attached a certified copy of the agreement for compensation as approved by the board, and in which he prayed for judgment in his favor against Konen and State Insurance Fund, and each of them, for compensation so fixed by the said approved agreement, as provided by sec. 43-1410, I.C.A., together with statutory interest.

Thereafter, and on the same day, the said court, pursuant to the provisions of the section immediately above referred to, entered its judgment for the enforcement of the award against Konen and State Insurance Fund, in favor of the employee Haines, as provided in said section.

Thereafter, and on March 23, 1942, State Insurance Fund filed with the said court in said cause its motion to vacate and set aside said judgment, to which motion the employee Haines, on March 4, 1942, filed in said court and cause his motion for order denying the motion to set aside said judgment. On May 1, 1942, State Insurance Fund filed in the said court and cause an amended motion to vacate and set aside said judgment, and on December 29, 1942, the trial court made its order denying this motion, which order was filed January 8, 1943.

An appeal from this order was duly taken by the State Insurance Fund and the matter is now before us on a motion filed in this court and cause by the employee Haines, to dismiss this appeal.

The motion to dismiss the appeal presents the question as to whether an appeal lies from an order of the District Court denying a motion by an appellant to vacate and set the judgment of that court rendered, entered and based on an award of the Industrial Accident Board, under the provisions of sec. 43-1410, I.C.A., ^[1] no appeal having been taken from the award. The constitutionality of this section (43-1410, I.C.A.) was apparently upheld by this court in State Insurance Fund v. Hunt, 52 Ida. 639, 17 P.2d 354.

Sec. 43-1413, I.C.A., as amended by sec. 3, chap. 175, 1937 Session Laws, p. 290, provides that all questions arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, if not settled by agreement or stipulation of the parties interested therein, with the approval of the board, shall, except as otherwise provided in the act, be determined by the board, and that the decisions of the board are enforcible by the District Court under the provisions of said sec. 43-1410, I.C.A., and that there is a right of appeal from decisions of the board to the Supreme Court under the provisions of sec. 43-1408, I.C.A.

Sec. 43-1408, I.C.A., as amended by sec. 1, chap. 175, 1937 Session Laws, p. 288, provides that an award of the board in the absence of fraud is final and conclusive between the parties, except as provided in sec. 43-1407, I.C.A., (providing for modification of the award and agreement within four years from the date of the accident causing the injury, on application to the board by any party), unless, within thirty days an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.

It will be noted from the provisions of sec. 43-1410, I.C.A that no appeal lies from the judgment of the District Court made and entered thereunder. This legislative provision was enacted for the purpose of enforcing awards made by the board. In the case of Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Ida. 361, 371, 228 P. 227, in discussing and interpreting said sec. 43-1410, I.C.A., this court said: "It will be observed from a reading thereof, and in connection with other provisions of the law relating to appeals from the board to the District Court, that...