Cain v. Horne
| Decision Date | 25 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-08-0189-PR.,CV-08-0189-PR. |
| Citation | 220 Ariz. 77,202 P.3d 1178 |
| Parties | Virgel CAIN, Sandy Bahr, Scott Holcomb, Arizona Association of School Business Officials, Arizona Education Association, Arizona Federation of Teacher Unions, Arizona Parent Teacher Association, Arizona Rural Schools Association, Arizona School Administrators, Inc., Arizona School Boards Association, American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona, and People for the American Way, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Tom HORNE, in his capacity as Superintendent of Public Instruction, Defendant/Appellee, and Jessica Geroux, Andrea Weck, Kristina Peterson, Kimberly Wuestenberg, Edwin Rivera, and Mike and Shirley Okamura, Intervenors/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
¶ 1 Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution provides that "[n]o public money . . . shall be appropriated to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment." Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution states that "[n]o tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation." The issue before us is whether two state-funded programs violate these provisions of our constitution.
¶ 2 In 2006, the Legislature enacted two programs that, in part, appropriated state monies to allow students to attend a private school of their choice instead of the public school in the district in which they live. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 340, §§ 1-2 (2d Reg.Sess.) ("Arizona Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities"); id., ch. 358, §§ 1-4 (2d Reg.Sess.) ("The Displaced Pupils Grant Program"). The Legislature appropriated $2.5 million for each program. 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 340, § 2 (2d Reg.Sess.); id., ch. 358, § 3 (2d Reg.Sess.).
¶ 3 The Arizona Scholarships for Pupils with Disabilities Program, codified at Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") §§ 15-891 to 15-891.06 (Supp.2008), offers "pupils with disabilities . . . the option of attending any public school of the pupil's choice or receiving a scholarship to any qualified school of the pupil's choice." A.R.S. § 15-891(A).1 Under this program, a public-school student with a disability may transfer to a private primary or secondary school, with the State paying a scholarship up to the amount of basic state aid the student would generate for a public school district. Id. §§ 15-891, 15-891.04. A parent of a disabled student may apply for a scholarship if the pupil attended a public school during the prior school year, the parent "is dissatisfied with the pupil's progress," and "[t]he parent has obtained acceptance for admission of the pupil to a qualified school." Id. § 15-891(B)(1) & (2). A "`[q]ualified school' means a nongovernmental primary or secondary school or a preschool for handicapped students that is located in this state and that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status or national origin." Id. § 15-891(F)(2). The program also requires school districts to notify parents of their options, including enrolling in another school in the district. Id. § 15-891.01(A).
¶ 4 The Arizona Displaced Pupils Choice Grant Program, codified at A.R.S. §§ 15-817 to 15-817.07 (Supp.2008) and 43-1032 (Supp. 2008), allows the State to pay $5,000 or the cost of tuition and fees, whichever is less, for children in foster care to attend the private primary or secondary school of their choice.2 Id. §§ 15-817.02, 15-817.04. The program is limited to 500 pupils. Id. § 15-817.02(C). A grant school is "a nongovernmental primary school or secondary school or a preschool . . . that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status or national origin, that maintains one or more grade levels from kindergarten through grade twelve . . . ." Id. § 15-817(3).
¶ 5 Sectarian and nonsectarian schools may participate in both programs; schools are not required to alter their "creed, practices or curriculum" in order to receive funding. Id. §§ 15-817.07(B), 15-891.02, 15-891.05(B). Under both programs, (collectively "the voucher programs") parents or legal guardians select the private or sectarian school their child will attend. Id. §§ 15-817.01(D), 15-891(B). The State then disburses a check or warrant to the parent or guardian, who must "restrictively endorse" the instrument for payment to the selected school. Id. §§ 15-817.05, 15-891.03(F).
¶ 6 Virgel Cain and others ("Cain") filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking to enjoin implementation of the voucher programs. Cain named Tom Horne, the superintendent of schools, as the defendant. Cain alleged that the voucher programs were facially unconstitutional under Article 2, Section 12, and Article 9, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution. Horne and various intervenors moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the superior court granted, dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
¶ 7 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the voucher programs did not violate Article 2, Section 12. Cain v. Horne, 218 Ariz. 301, 306, ¶ 11, 183 P.3d 1269, 1274 (App.2008). The court concluded, however, that the voucher programs violated Article 9, Section 10. Id. at 310, ¶ 23, 183 P.3d at 1278.
¶ 8 Horne and the intervenors petitioned for review, contending that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the voucher programs violated Article 9, Section 10. Cain cross-petitioned for review, arguing that the court erred in holding that the voucher programs did not violate Article 2, Section 12.
¶ 9 We granted review of both petitions because this is a matter of first impression and of statewide importance. We exercise jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5.3 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003).
¶ 10 In interpreting a constitutional provision, "[o]ur primary purpose is to effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision." Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994). In doing so, "we first examine the plain language of the provision." Id. (citation omitted). We do not depart from the language unless the framers' intent is unclear. Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 151, 214 P. 319, 321 (1923). "Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial." City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 72, 208 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1949). When a provision is not clear, we can consider "the history behind the provision, the purpose sought to be accomplished by its enactment, and the evil sought to be remedied." McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 290, 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982) (citation omitted). "The provisions of [our] constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 32.
¶ 11 The court of appeals referred to Article 2, Section 12 as the "Religion Clause." Cain, 218 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 6, 183 P.3d at 1273. The court reasoned that our decisions in Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 287, ¶ 46, 972 P.2d 606, 620 (1999), and Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 451-52, 432 P.2d 460, 463-64 (1967), suggest that Arizona's Religion Clause is "virtually indistinguishable from the United...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.
...is consistent with Americans United .23 ¶ 88 We are unpersuaded by the out-of-state cases on which the dissent relies, Cain v. Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.3d 1178 (2009) ; Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004), aff'd on other grounds, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla.2006) ; and Witters v. ......
-
Saban Rent-A-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue
...id. In giving effect to the words chosen, we start with the words' plain meaning. See id. ; Cain v. Horne , 220 Ariz. 77, 80 ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1178, 1181 (2009). All agree that the term "relating to" is quite broad; from that we can only properly infer that the framers intended a broad scope. ......
-
Adams v. McMaster
...(characterizing federal grant money as "public funds" under the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act); see also Cain v. Horne , 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.3d 1178, 1183 (2009) (noting the parties did not dispute the funds at issue constituted "public funds" within the meaning of the state con......
-
Brewer v. Burns
...constitutional clause requires interpretation, we often look to the records of the constitutional convention for guidance. E.g., Cain v. Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, 82, ¶ 20, 202 P.3d 1178, 1183 (2009). Those records show that the provision compelling transmittal of a bill "when finally passed" or......
-
THE EMERGING POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS CHARTER SCHOOLS: A CASE STUDY OF ARIZONA AND MASSACHUSETTS.
...(129) ARIZ. CONST, art. II, [section] 12 (Religion Clause); id. art. IX, [section] 10 (Aid Clause). (130) See Cain v. Home, 202 P.3d 1178, 1183-84 (Ariz. 2009); Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983, 987-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. (131) Cain, 202 P.3d at 1181. (132) Id. at 1182-84. (133) Id. at 1184.......
-
Sb 47: Eligibility Expansion for the Georgia Special Needs Scholarship Program
...Program, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-891 to -891.06 (2020) (amended 2014) (Westlaw through 2021 Special Sess.).77. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-891(A) (2008), invalidated by Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc))......
-
Reality over Ideology: A Practical View of Special Needs Voucher Programs
...is considerably lower than tuition at other secular private schools.”); see also RYAN, supra note 240, at 228–29. 257 Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009). 258 Id. at 1182. 259 Id. at 1180 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 10). 260 Id. at 1184 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 10). 2......