City of Phoenix v. Yates, 5009

• Decision Date: 02 May 1949
• Docket Number: 5009
• Citation: 208 P.2d 1147,69 Ariz. 68
• Parties: CITY OF PHOENIX v. YATES et al
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

208 P.2d 1147

69 Ariz. 68

CITY OF PHOENIX v. YATES et al

No. 5009

Supreme Court of Arizona

May 2, 1949

Rehearing Denied May 31, 1949.

Appeal from Superior Court, Maricopa County; Thomas J. Croaff Judge.

Judgment reversed.

Jack Choisser, City Atty., and Howard W. Gibbons, Asst. City Atty., both of Phoenix, for appellant.

Laney &amp Laney, of Phoenix, for appellee.

De Concini, Justice. Udall, Stanford, and Phelps, JJ., concur. La Prade, C. J., not participating.

OPINION

De Concini, Justice.

Eighty-six employees, including one assistant chief, one deputy chief, five alarm operators, 24 captains, 21 engineers, and 34 hosemen, of the Fire Department of the City of Phoenix filed suit against the latter for overtime or additional compensation for the year May 1, 1944, to April 30, 1945, both inclusive. Each employee had received a certain monthly salary from the defendant, depending upon his classification under the Civil Service System of the City of Phoenix. Each was required to work what was called the "double platoon" system, consisting of 24 hours on duty and 24 hours off duty. In addition, because of the status of war and consequent man-power shortage, each employee worked certain extra shifts of 12 hours each, called "Victory" shifts, for which each employee was paid a proportionate additional amount to his salary. The firemen in their complaints alleged that each was entitled to extra pay on the basis of eight hours constituting a day's work, plus overtime pay for each hour in excess of eight hours a day. The rate of payment for the overtime was asked alternatively (1) at time and one-half on excess of regular monthly work over eight hours per day and on the whole of the Victory shifts; (2) at time and one-half on excess of regular monthly work over eight hours per day and on excess of Victory shifts over eight hours per day; (3) at straight time for all time over eight hours per day on both monthly work and Victory shifts; or (4) according to minimum monthly wage of $ 180 per month, plus straight time at same rate for time over eight hours per day.

The firemen based their claims on Art. 18, Sec. 1 of the Arizona Constitution as implemented by Sec. 56-101, A.C.A.1939, which provides that:

"Eight (8) hours, and no more, shall constitute a lawful day's work for any person doing manual or mechanical labor, employed by or on behalf of the state or any political subdivision thereof, except in an extraordinary emergency, in time of war, or for the protection of property or human life, in which case every person working in excess of eight (8) hours in any day shall be paid time and one-half for all time in excess of eight (8) hours."

By an amendment to their complaint on the date of the trial plaintiffs added Sec. 5 of Chapter XIX of the Charter of the City of Phoenix.

The case was heard by the court sitting without a jury. The record recites that evidence was taken and witnesses heard, but no transcript of the evidence was sent up to this court.

The court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, allowing recovery according to alternative (3) above, finding that the firemen were governed by the provisions of the city charter. It found that each of the plaintiffs, with the exception of the alarm operators, had worked the number of hours per day and the number of shifts as alleged in their amended complaints. It was further found that the excess of work above eight hours per day was due to an emergency within the meaning of the charter provision, and that the plaintiffs had not received payment for this overtime, but had been paid only one day's pay for each 12 hours of work. The court found the alarm operators had worked but eight hours per day and had been fully paid at the straight time rate.

Defendant city appealed from the judgment and from the denial of its motion for a new trial. Appellant made three assignments of error, one of which is controlling here. That assignment was that the "Court erred in finding that appellees were entitled to judgment under the provisions of Section 5 of Chapter XIX of the Charter of the City of Phoenix reading as follows:

"That eight (8) hours and no more shall constitute a lawful day's work for all laborers, workmen, mechanics or other persons employed by or in behalf of the city, except in cases of emergency where it may be necessary to work more than eight (8) hours each calendar day for the protection of property or human life, provided that in all such cases the laborers, workmen, mechanics or other persons so employed in working to exceed eight (8) hours each calendar day shall be paid on the basis of eight (8) hours constituting a day's work; provided, further, that the minimum daily wage to be paid by the city for work done by its employes shall be at the rate of two (2) dollars; provided, further, that all contracts made by or on behalf of the city with any person, association or corporation for the performance of any work or the furnishing of any materials to the city, shall be deemed and considered as made upon the basis of eight (8) hours constituting a day's work; and provided, further, that no person not a citizen or a ward of the United States who has not declared his intention to become a citizen shall be employed upon or in connection with any city works or employment."

The defendant contends that city firemen do not come within the phrase "laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other persons" because neither the language nor the intent of the provision was calculated to include firemen. As an indication of intent the city quotes from two ordinances of the City of Phoenix. The first, Ordinance No. 714, passed in June 1924, provided that city firemen work the "double platoon" system. The second, Ordinance No. 715, passed April 4, 1933 as a referred measure, is the Civil Service law for the City of Phoenix. The latter ordinance provides, among other things, that employees may not be discharged or reduced in rank or compensation without cause or without an opportunity for a public hearing. Sec. 1092(12) of the Phoenix Municipal Code, 1939, page 116. While these two ordinances may cast light upon the intent of the charter provision, they must fall if they conflict with the charter. Paddock v. Brisbois, 35 Ariz. 214, 276 P. 325.

In the interpretation of a statute, ordinance, constitution, or charter, the cardinal principle is to give full effect to the intent of the lawmaker. Mahoney v. Maricopa County, 49 Ariz. 479, 68 P.2d 694; State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757, 115 A.L.R. 254; Garrison v. Luke, 52 Ariz. 50, 78 P.2d 1120; Webb v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 128, 79 P.2d 510; In re Stark's Estate, 52 Ariz. 416, 82 P.2d 894; Millett v. Frohmiller, 66 Ariz. 339, 188 P.2d 457. In the absence of ambiguities the entire statute must be given its complete import with the presumption that the lawmaker had a definite purpose in mind in promulgating this particular statute. Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial. In the words of Chancellor Kent:

"It is an established rule in the exposition of statutes, that the intention of the lawgiver is to be deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of a statute, taken and compared together. The real intention, when accurately ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of the terms. When the expression in a statute is special or particular, but the reason is general, the expression should be deemed general. Scire leges, non hoc est verba earum tenere sed vim ac potestam, and the reason and intention of the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law, when the latter would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction, and absurdity. This was the doctrine of Modestinus, Scaevola, Paulus, and Ulpianus, the most illustrious commentators on the Roman law. When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the objects and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. These rules, by which the sages of the law, according to Plowden, have ever been guided in seeking for the intention of the legislature, are maxims of sound interpretation, which have been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approbation of the ages." 1 Kent's Commentaries, 14th Edition, 622.

The restriction of the hours of labor to eight hours a day except in cases of emergency has been found by numerous legislative bodies to be a salutary principle. Such a provision is found in our Constitution, Art. 18, Sec. 1. Sec. 56-101, A.C.A.1939, quoted supra, applies the principle to "any person doing manual or mechanical labor" and the city charter, supra, to "laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other persons employed by or on behalf of the city." To have given the broadest coverage to the constitutional provision, both the statute and the charter should have read "all persons" for the Constitution says:

"Eight hours and no more, shall constitute a lawful day's work in all employment by, or on behalf of, the state or any political subdivision of the state. The legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary to put this provision into effect, and shall prescribe proper penalties for any violations of said laws."

It will be noted that this constitutional provision is not self-executing and that neither the legislature nor the framers of the charter enacted laws which are as broad as this constitutional provision. In Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. Matthews, 20 Ariz. 282, 180 P. 159, 163, 7 A.L.R. 1149, we said:

"While the Legislature may not extend the constitutional provision so...