Calatayud v. State of California

• Decision Date: 06 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. S062627,S062627
• Citation: 18 Cal.4th 1057,77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202,959 P.2d 360
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 959 P.2d 360, 63 Cal. Comp. Cases 926, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6187, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8527 Eduardo CALATAYUD III et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants

Page 202

77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202

18 Cal.4th 1057, 959 P.2d 360, 63 Cal. Comp. Cases 926,

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6187,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8527

Eduardo CALATAYUD III et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S062627.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 6, 1998.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Robert L. Mukai, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Margaret A. Rodda, Assistant Attorney General, Richard J. Rojo, Barbara A. Noble and Raymond L. Fitzgerald, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants.

Solomon, Saltsman & Jamieson, Robert B. Saltsman, Stephen Allen Jamieson and Stephen Warren Solomon, Playa Del Rey, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

BROWN, Justice.

Under the common law doctrine known as the firefighter's rule, the public's liability is limited. One who negligently causes the event to which a police officer responds owes no duty of care with respect to the initial negligent act. (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 202, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609.) Thus, the officer may not sue for injury proximately caused by that original negligence. By statute, however, this limitation on liability does not extend "[w]here the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or should have known of the presence of" the officer. ¹ (Civ.Code, § 1714.9, subd. (a)(1).)

This case involves injury to a police officer caused by a fellow officer while the two were attempting to subdue and arrest a criminal suspect. The officers were employed by

                different public safety agencies.  The question we must resolve is whether the firefighter's rule or the statutory exception should govern the negligent officer's, and his employer's, liability. 2  We conclude the Legislature did not intend Civil Code section 1714.9, subdivision (a), to apply in these circumstances and therefore reverse the contrary determination of the Court of Appeal. 3
                

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of February 9, 1990, California Highway Patrol Officer Michael Byrd and his partner received a report of shots fired in a nearby parking structure. When they arrived at the location, they observed a highly agitated Jimmy Ray Wilkes, a professional football lineman, causing a disturbance. The two officers went to detain Wilkes and keep him out of the parking structure. Highway Patrol Officer Charles DeVille joined the effort. Both Byrd and DeVille carried shotguns. Plaintiff Eduardo Calatayud III (plaintiff), a Pasadena police officer, had received an "officer needs assistance" call and proceeded to the scene. He observed Byrd and DeVille, both still holding their shotguns, attempting to control and detain Wilkes, who appeared to be violently resisting them.

Plaintiff approached the highway patrol officers to assist them in subduing and arresting Wilkes. As plaintiff placed a partial control hold on Wilkes's right hand, Byrd pushed Wilkes's body down to keep him from standing up. In the process Byrd fell, accidentally causing his shotgun to discharge and injure plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants the State of California and Officer Byrd (defendants). ⁴ Defendants unsuccessfully sought to interpose the firefighter's rule as a bar to liability. Following a three-week trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in excess of $700,000. It apportioned 50 percent fault to Wilkes, 30 percent to Byrd (and the state for his conduct), [18 Cal.4th 1061] and 20 percent to the state (for DeVille's conduct). The total judgment against defendants amounted to $440,000 plus costs. ⁵

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The court found the firefighter's rule applicable based on "evidence establish[ing] that Officer Calatayud's immediate presence at the scene of the struggle with Mr. Wilkes was necessitated by Mr. Wilkes's resistance, and by the conduct of the [Highway Patrol] officers in attempting to subdue Mr. Wilkes while holding their shotguns." Nevertheless, it determined the circumstances came within the exception set forth in Civil Code section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1). We granted defendants' petition for review to determine the scope of the statute.

DISCUSSION

Stated in its most traditional terms, the firefighter's rule "is that which negates liability to firemen by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of the fireman." (Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 355, 357, 72 Cal.Rptr. 119.) Although the doctrine first gained currency in American common law more than a century ago (see, e.g., Gibson v. Leonard (1892) 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182, overruled on other grounds in Dini v. Naiditch (1960) 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 886), it was not adopted in California until 1968. (Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 355, 72 Cal.Rptr. 119.) Subsequently, in Walters v. Sloan, supra, 20 Cal.3d 199, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609 (Walters ) The undergirding legal principle of the rule is assumption of the risk, i.e., the "legal conclusion that the person who starts a fire owes no duty of care to the firefighter who is called to respond to the fire. [Citations.]" (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 541, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347 (Neighbarger ); Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 309-310, fn. 5, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696; see Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 204, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609.) " 'In terms of duty, it may be said there is none owed the fireman to exercise care so as not to require the special services for which he is trained and paid.' " (Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 205, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609, quoting Krauth v. Geller (1960) 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129, 131.) ⁶

this court not only gave its imprimatur but extended the rule to police officers. (Id. at p. 202, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609.)

The rule is equally grounded in considerations of public policy " 'distilled from the relevant factors involved upon an inquiry into what is fair and just.... [p] [I]t is the fireman's business to deal with that very hazard [the fire] and hence, perhaps by analogy to the contractor engaged as an expert to remedy dangerous situations, he cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for his engagement.' " (Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 205, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609; Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 539, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347.) Moreover, "public safety employees receive special public compensation for confronting the dangers posed by the defendants' negligence." (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 540, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347.) "Firemen and policemen are paid for the work they perform including preparation for facing the hazards of their professions and dealing with perils when they arise. When injury occurs, liberal compensation is provided. In addition to the usual medical and disability benefits ordinarily provided all employees covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, firemen and policemen are provided special benefits [including special statutory presumptions of industrial causation, special death benefits, optional paid leaves of absence, and fully paid disability benefits despite retirement]." (Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 205, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609; Hubbard v. Boelt (1980) 28 Cal.3d 480, 484, 169 Cal.Rptr. 706, 620 P.2d 156 (Hubbard ).)

"Thus, the fireman's rule is based upon a public policy decision to meet the public's obligation to its officers collectively through tax-supported compensation rather than through individual tort recoveries. This spreads the costs of injuries to public officers among the whole community, making the public in essence a self-insurer against those wrongs that any of its members may commit." (Comment, The Fireman's Rule: Defining Its Scope Using the Cost-Spreading Rationale (1983) 71 Cal.L.Rev. 218, 235-236, fns. omitted (Comment); see Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 205-206, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609.) "[T]he public, having secured the services of the firefighter by taxing itself, stands in the shoes of the person who hires a contractor to cure a dangerous condition. In effect, the public has purchased exoneration from the duty of care and should not have to pay twice, through taxation and through individual liability, for that service. [Citations.]" (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 542-543, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347; see Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 204-206, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609.) Accordingly, the rule functions as a cost-spreading mechanism "allow[ing] the public to insure against the injuries that its officers will inevitably Additionally, the firefighter's rule serves the policy of efficient judicial administration by eliminating claims that would simply "burden our courts with litigation among the employer public agency, the retirement system, and the negligence insurer. Whether the employee is ultimately compensated with money derived from taxes or from insurance, the public pays the bill." (Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 206, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609; Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 543, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347.) Complex determinations of causation would also present "difficult problems requiring lengthy trials." (Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 360, 72 Cal.Rptr. 119; Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 543, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347; cf. Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1190, 1195-1196, 91 Cal.Rptr. 232.) ⁷

sustain in the performance of their duties." (Comment, supra, at p. 235; see Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 360, 72 Cal.Rptr. 119.)

Like most legal principles, the firefighter's rule is not without its exceptions. "The firefighter does not assume every risk of his or her occupation. [Citation.] The rule...