Caldwell v. Amoco Fabrics Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 65235,65235
• Citation: 165 Ga.App. 674,302 S.E.2d 596
• Parties: CALDWELL v. AMOCO FABRICS COMPANY et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 596

302 S.E.2d 596

165 Ga.App. 674

CALDWELL v. AMOCO FABRICS COMPANY et al.

No. 65235.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 8, 1983.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Stubbs II, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Verley J. Spivey, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., John E. Bumgartner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Edward Katze, George B. Smith, Neil H. Wasser, Atlanta, for appellee Ophelia W. Warren.

Gloria A. Einstein, Waycross, William J. Cobb, John L. Cromartie, Jr., Atlanta, amicus curiae.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Ophelia Warren's application for unemployment benefits was granted by a claims examiner of the Georgia Department of Labor, Employment Security Agency, affirmed by an administrative hearing officer and the Board of Review, and thereafter reversed upon appeal to the superior court. The trial court found that the factual determinations of the Board of Review were supported by the record and confined its consideration to the question of applying the law to the facts. This court granted a discretionary appeal.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in reversing the Board of Review on the ground that the policy upon which the Labor Department relied in granting the claimant benefits was not adopted or promulgated pursuant to the specific rule-making procedures provided in § 4 of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (OCGA § 50-13-4; former Code Ann. § 3A-104).

The policy in issue here was stated as follows in the opinion of the administrative hearing officer: "When a person is discharged because of absenteeism, and the absences were caused by illness of the claimant or a family member, reasonably requiring the presence and attention of the claimant, the claimant would be entitled to benefits without disqualification, unless the claimant has without justification failed to notify the employer or is otherwise at fault." This policy was taken from an unpublished consent order entered in the case of Fantroyal v. Caldwell (S.D.Ga. CV579-28, July 24, 1980, as amended August 25, 1980), and inserted and maintained in all claims manuals as an official guideline after that date. The trial court concluded that the Department of Labor must reconsider the claim without placing any reliance on the Fantroyal policy because it was not adopted in accordance with OCGA § 50-13-4 (Code Ann. § 3A-104). We reverse.

Under the APA the adoption of "[r]ules relating to ... benefits by the state or of an agency" is expressly exempted by OCGA § 50-13-2(6)(I) (former Code Ann. § 3A-102(6)(I)) from the strict rule-making procedural requirements of OCGA § 50-13-4 (Code Ann. § 3A-104). This includes the promulgation of policies determining eligibility for entitlement and rules for granting benefits. See, e.g., Dix v. State, 156 Ga.App. 868, 869, 275 S.E.2d 807 (1981); Turner v. Harden, 136 Ga.App. 842(2), 222 S.E.2d 621 (1975); Dept. of Human Resources v. Williams, 130 Ga.App. 149, 151, 202 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

Moreover, the Fantroyal guideline neither promulgates nor adopts a new or different policy. "The unmistakable legislative intent [of the Employment Security Law (OCGA § 34-8-2; former Code Ann. § 54-602) ] is plainly spelled out by the legislature itself...--that intent being to pay unemployment compensation during periods of unemployment to those workers whose unemployment is involuntary and is not the result of their own fault." Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 467, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950). "Unless there is fault (an 'offense') chargeable to the employee there is no disqualification under [OCGA § 34-8-158; former Code Ann. § 54-610]. The Supreme Court so held in [Abercrombie, supra], and there has...