Caldwell v. Fla. Dep't of Elder Affairs
Decision Date | 22 April 2013 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 1D12-163 |
Parties | CLARE CALDWELL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
An appeal from an order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Marie A. Mattox of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Donald L. Bell, General Counsel, and Scott W. Foltz, Assistant General Counsel,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Clare Caldwell appeals the dismissal of her complaint by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) based on its conclusion that it lacked statutory authority under the Whistle-blower's Act to investigate thecomplaint. Caldwell asserts that the Commission was not authorized to dismiss her complaint, but rather was obligated conduct the investigatory and fact-finding functions set forth in the Whistle-blower's Act, sections 112.3187-31895, Florida Statutes. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Commission's dismissal of Caldwell's complaint.
Caldwell was employed by the Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Department). Her employment was terminated on September 2, 2011. On October 18, 2011, Caldwell filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that her termination violated the Whistle-blower's Act. Caldwell asserted that during an investigation of the Department by the Federal Administration on Aging, she "contact[ed] by telephone the Federal Investigator to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within."
On December 2, 2011, by letter issued to Caldwell in care of her attorney, the Commission notified Caldwell that it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate her complaint because she failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the Whistle-blower's Act:
The Commission informed Caldwell that she had the right to seek judicial review of this decision. Caldwell timely filed a notice of appeal.
Our review of the Commission's action begins "with the usual recognition of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged to administer." Big Bend Hospice, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 904 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (quoting Cone v. State, Dep't of Health, 886 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).
The Commission's authority to investigate whistle-blower complaints is set forth in section 112.31895, Florida Statutes. This section provides that the Commission shall receive any allegation of "personnel action prohibited by s. 112.3187 . . . and conduct informal fact finding regarding any allegation under this section . . . ." § 112.31895(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Section 112.3187, Florida Statutes, in turn, prohibits an employer from taking retaliatoryaction against an employee who discloses information of a specified nature and discloses that information in a specified manner. The Act protects information disclosed about "[a]ny act or suspected act of gross mismanagement, malfeasance, gross waste of public funds, suspected or actual Medicaid fraud or abuse, or gross neglect of duty committed by an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor." § 112.3187(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Moreover, a whistle-blower complaint is considered sufficient only if it "is sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the action or practice complained of." Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-5.001(6)(b).
Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, Caldwell's complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements to trigger an investigation. In her complaint, Caldwell alleged that she contacted a federal investigator "to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within." These conclusory allegations fail to describe any act or suspected act of misfeasance or malfeasance; thus, Caldwell failed to plead the prima facie elements necessary to initiate the operation of the Act.1 Stanton v. Fla.Dep't of Health, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D325, D325 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 8, 2013) (the Act). that conclusory allegations of retaliation were insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements
In her Initial Brief, Caldwell twice states that she was never allowed to amend her claim to cure any deficiency. These two isolated references constitute Caldwell's entire argument that she should have been allowed an opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissal. These perfunctory statements are insufficient to present an argument for appellate review. See Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999) ( ); Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997) ( ); Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990) () ; Stanton, 38 Fla. L. Weekly at D325 ( that a perfunctory argument without any supporting argument or authority will not beaddressed on appeal); Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (); Henderson v. State, 569 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (). There mere fact that Caldwell further explained this argument in her Reply Brief does not revive this argument. 2
We, therefore, conclude that the Commission properly exercised its inherent authority to dismiss Caldwell's complaint. See Robinson v. Dep't of Health, 89 So. 3d 1079, 1082-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ( ).
AFFIRMED.
Under governing statutes and rules, the Commission's role is to investigate public sector whistleblowers' complaints and to advocate for public employee whistleblowers who have been subjected to retaliation. In the present case, the Commission failed to fulfill its roles as investigator and advocate, and acted instead as judge, jury and executioner. The express "intent of the Legislature [is] to prevent agencies . . . from taking retaliatory action against any person who discloses information to an appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public official, or employee." § 112.3187(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). Because the court today puts its imprimatur on the Commission's arbitrary halt to the process the Legislature put in place to accomplish its intent, I respectfully dissent.
The Legislature has authorized whistleblowers to sue in circuit court or to seek administrative relief in proceedings at the Public Employer Relations Commission (PERC), and has not given the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission or FCHR) the power to stop them from doing so:
The Whistle-blower's Act provides a statutory cause of action for employees of state agencies, among others, who face adverse personnel action as a result of certain protected activities. §§ 112.3187(8)(a); 112.31895(4)(a). Employees of state agencies may seek the relief provided under the Act through either circuitcourt or the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). §§ 112.3187(8)(a); 112.31895(4)(a). However, the Act provides certain prerequisites to the filing of an action in either circuit court or with PERC. §§ 112.3187; 112.31895.
Robinson v. Dep't of Health, 89 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), review denied, No. SC12-1447, 2012 WL 6757547 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2012). Before a public employee may seek relief in either forum, the Legislature has directed that the FCHR investigate the matter and take appropriate action, including attempting to "conciliate a complaint." § 112.31895(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). The complainant may then elect to pursue judicial remedies or file for relief with PERC.
The Commission's investigation is meant to be but the first step in the process. Only if the complaint is filed out of time or falls outside the Commission's investigatory jurisdiction3 is dismissal by the Commission appropriate. Otherwise, the Legislature has provided that the Commission shall conduct an investigation. "Upon termination of any...
To continue reading
Request your trial