Caldwell v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 08 June 1912 |
| Citation | 136 N.W. 678,156 Iowa 327 |
| Parties | AMELIA CALDWELL, Appellee, v. IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASSOCIATION, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jasper District Court.--HON. BYRON W. PRESTON, JUDGE.
THIS is an action upon a certificate of membership in a mutual accident association. Under the terms and conditions of the certificate, $ 5,000 became payable to the plaintiff, as beneficiary thereunder, in case of the death of the assured by external, violent or accidental means. The defendant answered with a general denial. It also pleaded affirmatively that the death of the assured was the result of bodily infirmity and disease. There was a trial to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount specified in the certificate. The defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Sullivan & Sullivan, and W. O. McElroy, for appellant.
Hager & Parrish, and L. A. Wells, for appellee.
The assured was Walter E. Caldwell. He died on February 25, 1909. At the time of his death, he was a member of the defendant association. The plaintiff is his widow and the beneficiary of his insurance. Full compliance was had with all formal requirements preliminary to the suit. The controversy between the parties is wholly upon the larger merits of the case. The certificate provides for accident insurance only. The question at issue is: Was the death of the assured caused solely by external, violent or accidental means? The contention of the plaintiff is that on or prior to February 16, 1909, the assured received a slight accidental injury on his left cheek, causing a slight abrasion of the skin, and that this injury resulted in "traumatic erysipelas." It is undisputed that the immediate cause of the death of the assured was erysipelas, which was first developed on February 16th. It is the contention of the defendant that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain a finding that any accidental injury was in fact sustained by the assured, or that erysipelas was caused by such alleged injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and this ruling is presented for our first consideration.
I. It must be said that there are weak places in plaintiff's chain of evidence. We think it must be said, also, that it was sufficient to make a prima facie case, and to go to the jury as such. The attending physician of the assured testified to the discovery of the abrasion of the skin. He also testified to his opinion that the disease from which the assured died was wholly infectious, and could not have resulted, except through infection of some wound or abrasion of the skin. He also testified that it made its first appearance at the edges of the alleged wound, and that in his opinion it resulted solely from the infection of such wound. This testimony was corroborated by other medical testimony. This evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the death of the assured was the proximate result of the wound or abrasion referred to. Delaney v. Modern Accident Co., 121 Iowa 528, 97 N.W. 91; French v. Fidelity Insurance Co., 135 Wis. 259 (115 N.W. 869, 17 L. R. A (N. S.) 1011.)
No direct evidence was introduced to show any of the circumstances which caused the wound or abrasion. It was apparently very slight, and would of itself have attracted little attention. Only its existence is shown by direct evidence. How and when it was inflicted does not appear. The burden was at all times upon the plaintiff to show, not only the death of the assured, but that it was caused by violent, accidental, and external means. Taylor v. Pacific Mutual Life, 110 Iowa 621, 82 N.W. 326. The appearance of the wound would clearly support the finding that the cause of the wound was violent and external. Jenkins v. Hawkeye Commercial Association, 147 Iowa 113.
II. The remaining question is: Did the assured receive his wound through accidental means? It has been repeatedly held that, in the absence of direct evidence on the subject, a presumption arises that the wound was not intentionally inflicted either by the assured or by another. This presumption is almost the equivalent of a presumption that the wound was inflicted through accidental means. The authorities, however, stop short of announcing the presumption in this latter form. They do hold, however, that the presumption first stated is available to the plaintiff as affirmative evidence; and that an inference ...
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