Caldwell v. State, 44165

Decision Date08 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 44165,44165
Citation354 S.E.2d 124,257 Ga. 10
PartiesCALDWELL v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

James W. Bradley, Jonesboro, for Glenda Sue Caldwell.

Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., David C. Marshall, Albert B. Collier, Asst. Dist. Attys., Jonesboro, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Eddie Snelling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUNT, Justice.

Glenda Sue Caldwell was tried for the murder of her son and the aggravated assault of her daughter, was found guilty but mentally ill, and was sentenced to life in prison on the murder charge and ten years to serve concurrently on the aggravated assault charge. 1 She appeals, raising as error the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the Georgia statutes regarding verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill.

The evening of July 7, 1985, the defendant shot and killed her son when he returned home from work and then unsuccessfully attempted to shoot her daughter, using two guns which failed to go off when she pulled the trigger. Prior to the shooting, the defendant had instructed her son only to use the front door when returning home late at night, had bolted all the doors closed, and had cleaned the house thoroughly, disposing of certain books containing accounts of well-publicized murders. When she failed in her attempt to shoot her daughter, the defendant told her "I've killed [her son]. I'll just kill myself. You've got to let me do this or I'll go to jail." The defendant told a police officer who arrived at the residence shortly after the shooting that she was going through a divorce and had planned to kill her children and then herself.

Her defense at trial was insanity brought about by her fear of contracting Huntington Chorea disease, an heredity degenerative disease, and by the stress of her separation from her husband who had recently moved out of the house. Her contention was not supported by the evidence. A psychiatrist who testified for the defendant stated that she was under stress and exhibited a borderline personality, but was not psychotic. The state's psychologist stated his opinion that at the time of the shooting the defendant was not suffering from a delusional compulsion and that she could distinguish right from wrong. He further opined that the defendant's actions toward her children were an attempt to hurt her husband. This view was supported by the testimony of the defendant's daughter who also stated that the defendant appeared sane at the time of the shooting.

1. In reviewing a verdict of guilty but mentally ill in a case where the defense is not guilty by reason of insanity, this court determines whether, construing the evidence in favor of the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime. Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 701(1), 334 S.E.2d 175 (1985). The only two situations authorizing a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity are where the defendant does not have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the crime, OCGA § 16-3-2, and where at the time of the crime the defendant acted under a delusional compulsion which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime, OCGA § 16-3-3. We conclude that under the foregoing evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was legally insane at the time of the crimes. See Eason v. State, 353 Ga. 188, 353 S.E.2d 188 (1987); Keener, supra, ...

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10 cases
  • Com. v. Trill
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • July 8, 1988
    ...have mounted challenges to its viability predicated upon state and federal constitutional precepts of due process, see Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10, 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987); People v. Fierer, 151 Ill.App.3d 649, 503 N.E.2d 594 (1987); People v. Furman, 158 Mich.App. 302, 404 N.W.2d 246 (1987......
  • Lawrence v. State, S94A1756
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 27, 1995
    ...443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 341(1), 381 S.E.2d 41 (1989); Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10, 11(1), 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987). 2. Appellant contends the trial court violated his due process and equal protection rights by charging the jury that......
  • Rodriguez v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1999
    ...observation that defendant appeared to be "rational" was sufficient to allow jury to reject insanity defense); Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10(1), 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66(2), 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982); Appling v. State, 222 Ga. App. 327, 329(3), 474 S.E.2d 237 (1996). Co......
  • Anthony v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 4, 2012
    ...acted under a delusional compulsion which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime, OCGA § 16–3–3. Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10, 11(1), 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987). 3. Unlike in Waldrop v. State, 300 Ga.App. 281, 285(3), 684 S.E.2d 417 (2009), and Hiley v. State, 245 Ga.App. 900, 901......
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