Lawrence v. State, S94A1756

• Decision Date: 27 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. S94A1756,S94A1756
• Citation: 454 S.E.2d 446,265 Ga. 310
• Parties: LAWRENCE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 446

454 S.E.2d 446

265 Ga. 310

LAWRENCE v. The STATE.

No. S94A1756.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 27, 1995.

Reconsideration Denied March 30, 1995.

Michael C. Garrett, Augusta, for Lawrence.

Daniel J. Craig, Dist. Atty., Charles R. Sheppard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Marla-Deen Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for State.

Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Stephen James Lawrence was found guilty but mentally ill of felony murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of crimes. He appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial. ¹

1. The evidence was uncontroverted that appellant killed Elizabeth Van Alstine and seriously injured four others with a shotgun. The sole issue before the jury was whether appellant was guilty but mentally ill or not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-3 (delusional compulsion).

The evidence at trial established that appellant had been diagnosed as having atypical psychosis with delusions in 1984, and chronic forms of schizophrenia in 1987, 1988, and 1990. In 1988 he shot and wounded his mother under the delusion that the medication she was administering to him contained poison. At the time of the crimes, appellant was receiving a low dosage of the antipsychotic drug Haldol, which was given in monthly injections at the Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) in Richmond County. On the morning of the day he had an appointment to receive an injection, appellant drove to his father's home (a one and one-half hour drive) and took his father's shotgun and 15 to 20 buckshot shells (leaving behind the birdshot). He then drove to the CMHC and began firing at random at people and vehicles in the parking lot and shot out the car windshield of a psychiatric nurse who was driving through the parking lot. He shot the first three people who unsuspectingly exited the main building at the CMHC, fatally wounding Van Alstine. Appellant entered the main building by shooting out the glass in the front door; fired on one person sitting just inside the door and another as he fled down the hallway; continued to fire the shotgun as police arrived at the front door; and ceased his assault minutes before the police converged on him. A CMHC counselor who talked with appellant before the police arrived testified that appellant spoke coherently, gave his correct name, ² knew where he was, and told CMHC personnel to contact the police. With the exception of the psychiatric nurse in the parking lot, none of the other victims had ever been involved in any manner in the administration of the injections to appellant. From the evidence as to the sequence and timing of the crimes, the jury was authorized to conclude that appellant did not attempt to ascertain the identity of his victims before he assaulted them.

The forensic psychologist appointed by the court testified that appellant had the capacity to distinguish right and wrong but was suffering from a delusional compulsion which he could not resist. The psychologist also testified that "there was no doubt that [appellant] knew what he did was wrong" when he hurt and killed the people at the CMHC.

The defense presented witnesses who testified that appellant was suffering under an extremely complex delusion, the relevant content of which was that hostile Canadian spies and saboteurs had entered the United States and that many of them had infiltrated the CMHC and were intent on poisoning him, by means of the monthly injections because they recognized that he was actually John F. Kennedy. In his testimony, appellant gave these delusional beliefs as facts. The defense expert witness testified that at the time of the crimes, appellant was compelled under his delusion to take actions appellant believed were in self-defense. Appellant testified that the people at the CMHC were trying to brainwash him or damage his brain and that he felt at the time of the crimes that his actions were justified, but acknowledged he no longer felt that way because "some innocent people got hurt."

The appropriate standard of appellate review ... is whether the evidence, when construed most favorably for the State, would be sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was insane at the time of the [crimes.] [Cit.]

Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58(1), 455 S.E.2d 579 (1995). See also Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982). This Court concludes, under the foregoing evidence, that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that a preponderance of the evidence did not show that the criminal acts committed by appellant occurred as a result of a delusional compulsion that overmastered appellant's will, were connected with the delusion he was laboring under, and were justified by the delusion. Eason v. State, 256 Ga. 701, 704(1), 353 S.E.2d 188 (1987); Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215(2), 184 S.E.2d 655 (1971). Compare Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986).

Moreover, having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty but mentally ill. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 341(1), 381 S.E.2d 41 (1989); Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10, 11(1), 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987).

2. Appellant contends the trial court violated his due process and equal protection rights by charging the jury that in order for mental delusion to constitute a defense to the acts charged, it had to appear not only that the accused was actually laboring under a delusion at the time the acts were committed

but that the alleged criminal acts themselves were connected with the particular delusion under which the accused was then laboring, and that the delusion was as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the alleged acts by the accused.

(Emphasis supplied.) See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal Cases (2nd ed.) Pt. 3(EE)(3) (Delusional Insanity). This charge reflects the requirements for a delusional compulsion insanity defense recognized by Georgia case law since 1898. Taylor v. State, 105 Ga. 746(1), 31 S.E. 764 (1898). See, e.g., Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. supra at 442, 350 S.E.2d 21; Bailey v. State, 249 Ga. 535, 537, 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982); Brown v. State, 228 Ga., supra at 217, 184 S.E.2d 655.

Appellant argues that the "justification" language in the charge unconstitutionally differentiates between those defendants who are subject to a delusion that justifies a criminal act and those defendants, like appellant, who are subject to a delusion that does not justify a criminal act, notwithstanding that both types of defendants are powerless to resist their respective delusional compulsions.

Legal insanity is not established by a medical diagnosis that an individual suffers from a mental illness such as a psychosis. Nelms v. State, 255 Ga. 473, 475, 340 S.E.2d 1 (1986); Dennis v. State, 170 Ga.App. 630(2), 317 S.E.2d 874 (1984). Under Georgia law, insanity is established when an individual proves, by a preponderance of evidence, that at the time the criminal act was committed, he "did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong" in relation to the criminal act. OCGA § 16-3-2. See also Brown v. State, 250 Ga., supra at 71-72(2)(c), 295 S.E.2d 727. However, an individual can establish insanity, even where he possesses the ability to distinguish right and wrong, when he proves by a preponderance of evidence that at the time the criminal act was committed, he suffered from a "delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime." OCGA § 16-3-3. It is only in those instances where an individual, who is able to distinguish right from wrong, commits a criminal act while suffering under a delusional compulsion which leads him to believe his action is right, i.e., "justified," that Georgia law accepts insanity as a defense. Hence, "if the delusion is as to a fact which would not excuse the act with which the prisoner is charged, the delusion does not authorize an acquittal of the defendant." Mars v. State, 163 Ga. 43, 60(4), 135 S.E. 410 (1926).

In Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 726(16)(c), 352 S.E.2d 762 (1987), an appellant unable to assert either OCGA § 16-3-2 or OCGA § 16-3-3 challenged Georgia's failure to recognize an impulse-control-disorder insanity defense. Relying on federal authority that " 'society must be protected from individuals who may be unable to conform their conduct to the law....' [cit.]," Hicks, supra at 726-727, 352 S.E.2d 762, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia insanity laws. Hicks thus stands for the position that a defendant who can distinguish between right and wrong and who commits a criminal act he recognizes is wrong but which he is compelled to commit by an uncontrollable impulse or compulsion, has no insanity defense under Georgia law. Similarly, we find in the case at bar that society must be protected from individuals who can distinguish between right and wrong but who cannot conform their conduct to the law because they suffer from delusional compulsions which compel them to commit criminal acts which are not justified by the delusions under which they suffer.

The "justification" requirement reflects a decision to allow the insanity defense only in those instances where the factfinder concludes from a preponderance of evidence that the defendant, although suffering under delusions of an absurd and unfounded nature, was compelled by that delusion to act in a manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts had been as the defendant imagined them to be. ³ Georgia constitutionally could decline to recognize an...