California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles, AFL-CIO

Decision Date12 October 1977
Docket NumberAFL-CIO
Citation141 Cal.Rptr. 290,74 Cal.App.3d 38
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesCALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, etc., et al., v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents and Appellants. LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, SEIU, LOCAL 660,, etc., et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents and Appellants. Civ. 50062.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, Peter R. Krichman, Div. Chief, Gregory Houle, Deputy County Counsel, Philip S. Miller, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents and appellants.

Lemaire, Faunce & Katznelson, by Edward L. Faunce, Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, by Joel N. Klevens, Los Angeles, for petitioners and respondents.

ROTH, Presiding Justice.

The Charter for the County of Los Angeles Article XII, Section 53 provides "Wherever any person in the service of the County is compelled to travel in the performance of his duty, he shall, in addition to his regular compensation, be reimbursed for his actual necessary expenditures for transportation, the hire of conveyances, and for lodging and meals. An itemized account of such expenditures shall be filed with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and be approved by the Auditor before being paid. The Board of Supervisors shall fix a maximum price to be paid for such lodging and meals, which shall be uniform and be made applicable to all persons alike, including members of the Board of Supervisors."

Respondents California Association of Professional Employees ("CAPE") and Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers' Association ("PPOA") contended successfully before the trial court that appellant County of Los Angeles' ("County") method of per-mile compensation 1 does not constitute reimbursement of the "actual necessary expenditures" arising from the operation of a car.

The trial court found the following preliminary facts:

"8. The transportation cost reimbursement provided in Los Angeles County administrative Code Section 60.4 (see note 1) adopted recommendations set forth in a Memorandum of Understanding entered into between various County labor organizations, including CAPE but excluding PPOA, and representatives of * * * County * * * on November 16, 1971. The term of the Memorandum of Understanding was from December 31, 1971 through December 31, 1973. On December 31, 1973, the Memorandum of Understanding expired and no new Memorandum of Understanding has been entered into between the various County labor organizations, including CAPE and PPOA, and * * * County * * *.

"9. During 1973, representatives of the County entered into negotiations with representatives of CAPE, PPOA, and other organizations representing County permittees, for purposes of agreeing upon a formula for reimbursement of the costs of transportation for County employees, effective January 1, 1974. Negotiations failed to produce an agreement.

"10. On or about December 13, 1973, CAPE, PPOA, and other labor organizations representing County permittees filed a Notice of Impasse and a Request For Fact Finding with the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, pursuant to Section 13 of the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Ordinance.

"11. Representatives of the County and of the petitioning organizations selected a fact finder, and hearings were held on January 28 and 29, 1974. CAPE, PPOA, and the other petitioning organizations, as well as the County of Los Angeles, were represented at the hearings, presented witnesses and exhibits, and cross-examined opposition witnesses. On or about April 12, 1974, the fact finder issued his Report and Recommendations of Fact-Finder, which was rejected by Respondent County of Los Angeles."

County continues to compensate its employees in accordance with section 60.4 of its Administrative Code.

The judgment appealed from directs County to develop a formula for reimbursement of the actual necessary expenditures for transportation by employees required to use their automobiles on County business as a condition of their employment, and to reimburse County employees represented by respondents for their "actual necessary expenditures" for transportation on County business, retroactive to January 1, 1974, with interest thereon at the legal rate.

Based on evidence presented in the course of a two-day trial, 2 the court found:

"13. The costs of transportation associated with the ownership and operation of an automobile consist of the variable costs and the fixed costs. The fixed costs include the costs of annual depreciation, registration, fire and theft insurance, collision insurance, property damage and public liability insurance, medical insurance, uninsured motorist insurance, and interest on capital investment. The variable costs include the cost of gasoline and oil, maintenance, and tires.

"14. The reimbursement method applied by respondents from and after Dec. 31, 1971, sought to reimburse both the fixed and the variable costs of transportation on a per-mile basis, and reimbursement amounts were based on a new intermediate size automobile having a projected useful life of five years, with an eight cylinder engine, power steering, power brakes, automatic transmission, radio, and heater.

"15. The respondents, in calculating the fixed costs, failed to include a cost factor for property damage and public liability insurance and interest on capital investment.

"16. The respondents' reimbursement method of reimbursing both the fixed and the variable transportation costs on a per-mile basis necessarily leads to the under-reimbursement of substantial numbers of County employee drivers.

"17. One reimbursement method which would avoid such under-reimbursement is the method of apportioning fixed costs on the basis of the time during which the automobile is required to be available for use in County business rather than apportioning fixed costs on a mileage basis."

Where a County Charter requires that a Board of Supervisors carry out a particular act, and pursuant to that Charter provision the Board enacts an implementing ordinance, the Board's act is a legislative action. (Collins v. City and County of San Francisco (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 729, 730, 247 P.2d 362; Anderson v. Board of Supervisors (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 796, 798, 40 Cal.Rptr. 541; City Council v. Superior Court (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 389, 393, 3 Cal.Rptr. 796.)

Once exercised, legislative discretion is, absent special circumstances, not subject to judicial control and supervision.

"It should be kept in mind that the board of supervisors, as the legislative branch of government in the county, is entitled to the exercise of discretion in judging facts which constitute the basis of its resolutions and ordinances. . . ." (Cosgrove v. County of Sacramento (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 45, 50, 59 Cal.Rptr. 919, 923.)

"Any decision made in the exercise of that (wage-setting, i.e., legislative) authority would involve the use of discretion. As a consequence, the steps to be undertaken, the method selected, and the decision reached in the course thereof, in the absence of fraudulent...

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    • August 18, 1989
    ...absent special circumstances, it is not subject to judicial control and supervision. (California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 38, 43, 141 Cal.Rptr. 290.) While reasonable minds may differ as to appropriate levels of aid and care, I cannot say......
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    ...861, 240 P.2d 691; Almassy v. L. A. County Civil Service Com., 34 Cal.2d 387, 210 P.2d 503; California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App.3d 38, 141 Cal.Rptr. 290). Here, by adopting the Ordinance, the City arbitrarily assigned a new and arbitrary meaning t......
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    • May 24, 1989
    ...is, absent special circumstances, not subject to judicial control and supervision. (California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 38, 43, 141 Cal.Rptr. 290.) "Any decision made in the exercise of that [legislative] authority would involve the use o......
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 2002
    ...on November 8, 2001. In support of its application for injunctive relief, the Union cited California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 38, 141 Cal.Rptr. 290, for the proposition that section 53 of the Charter means the County cannot compel an empl......

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