California Eye Institute v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 22 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. F011372,F011372
• Citation: 264 Cal.Rptr. 83,215 Cal.App.3d 1477
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA EYE INSTITUTE et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Fresno County, Respondent; David B. KAYE, M.D., et al., Real Party in Interest.

Page 83

264 Cal.Rptr. 83

215 Cal.App.3d 1477

CALIFORNIA EYE INSTITUTE et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Fresno County, Respondent David B. KAYE, M.D., et al., Real Party in Interest.

No. F011372.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Nov. 22, 1989.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Review Denied Feb. 21, 1990.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, Lawrence E. Wayte, David H. Bent and Matthew K. Hawkins, Fresno, for petitioners

Horvitz & Levy, David Axelrad and David Ettinger, Encino, as amicus curiae, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Charles O. Morgan, Jr., and Paul Kleven, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

OPINION

ARDAIZ, Associate Justice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dr. David B. Kaye is an ophthalmologist with an emphasis on refractive and cataract surgery. He began practicing in Fresno in 1980. Between October 1982 and April 1984 Saint Agnes Medical Center monitored all Dr. Kaye's cases, preoperatively, intraoperatively, and postoperatively. Saint Agnes Medical Center informed Dr. Kaye that the restriction of his staff privileges was instituted by the Board of Trustees Executive Committee on the recommendation of the Medical Staff Executive Committee. In April 1984, Saint Agnes ceased monitoring Dr. Kaye and restored him to full staff privileges.

In 1987 Dr. Kaye filed suit against California Eye Institute, California Eye Institute Management Corporation, Saint Agnes Medical Center, Saint Agnes Hospital and several doctors, individually. He alleged several causes of action based in part on the claim his hospital staff privileges wrongfully had been restricted at the named medical center.

Dr. Kaye sought discovery of certain documents relating to the restriction of his privileges. Saint Agnes claimed the documents were privileged under Evidence Code section 1157. Dr. Kaye claimed he fell within an exception to the bar of section 1157. The trial court agreed and granted Dr. Kaye's motion to compel production of documents.

On December 2, 1988, California Eye Institute, Saint Agnes Medical Center and Dr. Frederick Richburg filed in this court a petition for a writ of mandate and a request for a temporary stay. A temporary stay was issued on December 2, 1988. On March 17, 1989, this court issued an order to show cause.

DISCUSSION

I

EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1157¹ provides the records of a hospital staff committee are immune from discovery when the committee has "the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered in the hospital...." Subdivision (c) of this section provides a narrow exception to the "prohibition relating to discovery" to "any person requesting hospital staff privileges." ² On June 19, 1989, this court gave the California Association of Hospital and Health Systems (CAHHS) permission to file a brief as amicus curiae. Amicus contends the exception contained in section 1157, subdivision (c) is inapplicable because Dr. Kaye is not a person "requesting hospital staff privileges." For the reasons discussed herein, we agree. Dr. Kaye had been reinstated to full hospital staff privileges approximately three years before this damage action was commenced. Under the plain meaning of the language of the narrow exception to section 1157, a physician may obtain access to such records only if he/she is "requesting hospital staff privileges." Dr. Kaye's action is one for damages rather that an action for administrative mandamus (Code of Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) seeking to currently become or remain a hospital staff member. Accordingly, Dr. Kaye does not fall within the plain and unambiguous terms of the exception to section 1157 applicable only where a person is "requesting hospital staff privileges." ³

Courts must construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.

"In determining such intent '[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] 'If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation.]" (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.)

The plain meaning of a statute should be followed where its language is clear and unambiguous. (Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.)

"We give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it. [Citations.]" (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850, 226 Cal.Rptr. 132, 718 P.2d 119.)

Conversely, a literal interpretation of the statute need not be given where to do so would sacrifice "the manifest reason and the obvious design of the law...." (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 639, 122 P.2d 526.) Here, the "manifest reason and the obvious design of the law" is served by following the statute's plain language.

Dr. Kaye relies on Roseville Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 809, 139 Cal.Rptr. 170 in support of his argument that the exception applies in a damage action by a physician who currently enjoys full staff privileges. There, the controversy arose out of the hospital's dismissal of a partnership of pathologists as the exclusive clinical pathologists for the hospital. The pathologists sought a declaration of their rights and duties under an arbitration award and money damages. The trial court permitted discovery of the hospital peer committee's minutes and tape recordings. The hospital sought mandate to review that order. The appellate court denied the writ, thereby approving discovery under the staff privileges exception to section 1157. The court in substance interpreted the termination of the contract as a termination of staff privileges.

The nonapplicability of the exception to the privilege in a damage action was not before the court. Because the issue was not considered, Roseville is not authority for the proposition that the exception to the privilege is applicable to damage actions. Cases are not authority for propositions not considered. " 'Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.' " (Canales v. City of Alviso (1970) 3 Cal.3d 118, 127-128, fn. 2, 89 Cal.Rptr. 601, 474 P.2d 417; see also Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 707, 190 Cal.Rptr. 494, 660 P.2d 1168.)

Following the plain meaning of the statute is supported by the strong public policy frequently expressed favoring confidentiality of peer review committee proceedings. The establishment of peer review committees is required by Health and Safety Code section 32128. This section requires that the hospital governing body implement committees composed of its medical staff. The committees' responsibilities include the assessment of physicians applying for staff privileges and the ongoing review of performance and competence of those physicians currently on the staff. The code section further requires that these committees perform reviews in accordance with minimum standards promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The author of a law review article in Comment (1984) 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 661, 670, accurately describes the purpose of the peer review system:

"As these requirements indicate, the underlying purpose of the peer review system is to promote an elevated standard of patient care. These committees perform investigations of physicians applying for staff privileges, establish standards and procedures for patient care, audit each surgery performed, and investigate discrepancies between preoperative and postoperative diagnoses. The committees compile records and evaluations and engage in frank discussions about the performance and competence of their peers. Should the committee find a peer to be incompetent, a report and recommendation is made to administrators, who may then take action to revoke, limit, or deny medical staff privileges." (Fns. omitted.)

"There is a strong public interest in supporting, encouraging and protecting effective medical peer review programs and activities." (Clarke v. Hoek (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 208, 220, 219 Cal.Rptr. 845.) As was observed in Matchett v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, 115 Cal.Rptr. 317:

"When medical staff committees bear delegated responsibility for the competence of staff practitioners, the quality of in-hospital medical care depends heavily upon the committee members' frankness in evaluating their associates' medical skills and their objectivity in regulating staff privileges." (See also Brown v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 489, 501, 214 Cal.Rptr. 266.)

Moreover, the legislative purpose of section 1157 is effectuated by protecting from discovery medical staff committee records and proceedings in damage actions such as the present one. Section 1157 was enacted in 1968 in response to the decision in Kenney v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 106, 63 Cal.Rptr. 84. (See West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 853, 226 Cal.Rptr. 132, 718 P.2d 119, citing Matchett v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 115 Cal.Rptr. 317.) In Kenney the court upheld the trial court's order of production of hospital committee records either concerning any disciplinary proceedings or pertaining to the hospital staff privileges of a particular physician who was the defendant in a malpractice action. (Kenney v. Superior Court, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 109, 63 Cal.Rptr. 84.) Section 1157,...