West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 May 1986
• Citation: 718 P.2d 119,226 Cal.Rptr. 132,41 Cal.3d 846
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 718 P.2d 119, 60 A.L.R.4th 1257, 54 USLW 2636 WEST COVINA HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Terry Jo TYUS et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 32083.

Page 132

226 Cal.Rptr. 132

41 Cal.3d 846, 718 P.2d 119, 60 A.L.R.4th 1257, 54 USLW 2636

WEST COVINA HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Terry Jo TYUS et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L.A. 32083.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 29, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 21, 1986.

Hagenbaugh & Murphy, Horvitz & Levy, Ellis J. Horvitz, David M. Axelrad, Barry R. Levy and David S. Ettinger, Encino, for petitioner.

Hassard, Bonnington, Rogers & Huber, David E. Willet and Catherine I. Hanson as Amici Curiae on behalf of petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Shan K. Thever, Torrance, Law Offices of David M. Harney, Arthur E. Schwimmer, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

The issue presented in this writ proceeding is whether Evidence Code section 1157 precludes a hospital medical review staff committee member from testifying voluntarily about proceedings of the committee.

Plaintiff in her individual capacity and as guardian ad litem for her minor daughter brought a medical malpractice action alleging negligence by a surgeon. ¹ Plaintiff also alleged negligence by the West Covina Hospital in granting surgical privileges and retaining the surgeon on its medical staff. Plaintiff proposes to call as a witness at trial a physician, Dr. Anwar, who served on a medical staff committee of the hospital when the committee was evaluating the allegedly negligent surgeon. Dr. Anwar is to testify about specific details of the evaluation. The record does not show whether the testimony will relate to evaluations before or after the operation or both. Over objections by the hospital, the court ruled that Dr. Anwar could testify so long as he does so voluntarily. The court stated that a committee member may waive the exclusion of section 1157 and may testify to the entire proceeding of a medical staff committee provided patients' names were not disclosed. ²

The hospital then sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the hospital's motion to exclude the testimony. The Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two granted the writ, and we granted review.

In Elam v. College Park Hospital (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 332, 183 Cal.Rptr. 156, it was held that a hospital may be liable in damages to a patient in a malpractice case for negligent selection or retention of medical staff.

Evidence Code section 1157 provides in part that neither the proceedings nor the records of hospital medical staff committees shall be subject to discovery, and under subdivision (b) "no person in attendance at a meeting of any of those committees shall be required to testify as to what transpired at that meeting." (Italics added.) Exceptions to the prohibition are made for statements made by parties to litigation when the subject matter of the litigation is reviewed at the meeting, for any person requesting hospital staff privileges, and for bad faith actions against insurers for refusal to settle. ³ The section has been repeatedly amended in recent years to expand its applicability to committees other than hospital medical staff committees, but the amendments have not changed the language involved here. (Stats.1975, ch. 674, § 2; Stats.1983, ch. 289, § 3; Stats.1983, ch. 1081, § 2.5; Stats.1985, ch. 725, § 1.) In 1985, the section was divided into subdivisions.

We give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it. (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148.) A provision that a member of a hospital medical staff committee may not be "required" to testify is not the same as either providing that he may not testify or that the hospital or committee shall have a privilege to preclude testimony.

In other sections of the Evidence Code, in the same chapter as section 1157, the Legislature has shown that it is well aware of the distinctions relating to discovery, privileges, and admissibility of evidence. Thus, certain evidence is made inadmissible for certain purposes but there is no limitation on discovery, and other evidence is subject to discovery and admissible subject to privileges. (See Evid.Code, § 1150 et seq.) The care in drafting the provisions in the chapter entitled "Other Evidence Affected or Excluded by Extrinsic Policies" with reference to privilege, discovery, and admissibility reinforces the ordinary conclusion that the Legislature, in providing that a hospital staff committee member may not be "required" to testify, " 'knew what it was saying and meant what it said.' " (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764, 150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227.)

The conclusion that section 1157 excludes involuntary testimony but not voluntary testimony is also supported by the principle that privileges should be narrowly construed since they prevent the admission of relevant and otherwise admissible evidence and may obstruct the attainment of justice. (See e.g., United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039; People v. McGraw (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 618, 622, 190 Cal.Rptr. 461; but compare Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan (1983) 33 Cal.3d 766, 769, 190 Cal.Rptr. 919, 661 P.2d 1073 [privilege may be implied from a statute].)

The hospital relies upon the language of subdivision (c) of section 1157, the "prohibition relating to discovery or testimony" in urging that there is an ambiguity in the section. However, there is no ambiguity. The prohibition relating to testimony is obviously the prohibition against requiring testimony.

Because the critical language of the statute, "required to testify," is clear, we will decline to follow it only when it would inevitably frustrate the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or would lead to absurd results. (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503 598 P.2d 473; Younger v. Superior Court (Mack) (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014; Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845, 48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 409 P.2d 689.)

Thus, the burden on the hospital, in claiming that the quoted phrase should be read to make voluntary testimony inadmissible, is a heavy one. The hospital has not met the burden.

To the contrary, prohibiting involuntary testimony serves a fundamental legislative purpose. The obvious general purpose of section 1157 is to improve the quality of medical care in the hospitals by the use of peer review committees. Accomplishment of the purpose requires that doctors be recruited to serve on the committees. If doctors who serve on such committees were subject in malpractice cases to the burdens of discovery and involuntary testimony on the basis of their committee work, the evidentiary burdens could consume large portions of the doctors' time to the prejudice of their medical practices or personal endeavors and could cause many doctors to refuse to serve on the committees. It is certainly reasonable for the Legislature to conclude that to encourage doctors to serve on peer review committees they should be exempt from compelled discovery and required testimony as to their committee work. On the other hand, when a doctor volunteers to testify, he has concluded that he is willing to bear the time burdens; and the Legislature could properly conclude that exclusion of voluntary testimony was not necessary to encourage participation in the peer review program.

Several legislative policies and concerns are involved in determining the availability of the records and proceedings of peer review committees in judicial proceedings. These policies and concerns were described by Justice Friedman in Matchett v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 628-630, 115 Cal.Rptr. 317. The language has been quoted in full and in part or referred to in numerous cases involving discovery. (Brown v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 489, 498, 214 Cal.Rptr. 266 et seq.; Mt. Diablo Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 344, 347, 204 Cal.Rptr. 626; Saddleback Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 206, 208, 204 Cal.Rptr. 598; Snell v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 44, 49, 204 Cal.Rptr. 200; West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 134, 138-139, 200 Cal.Rptr. 162; Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, fn. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 542; Roseville Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 809, 813-814, 139 Cal.Rptr. 170; Schulz v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 440, 444-445, 136 Cal.Rptr. 67.)

The discussion in Matchett and the subsequent cases takes on added importance because of the well-established rule that when, as here, the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the provision that have been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of and acquiesced in the prior judicial construction. (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

In Matchett, the court stated: "In an accredited hospital, the organized medical staff is responsible to the hospital governing body for the quality of in-hospital medical care; it evaluates the qualifications of applicants and holders of staff privileges; it recommends appointment, reappointment, curtailment and exclusion from staff privileges; it provides peer group methods for reviewing basic medical, surgical and obstetrical functions. [Citations.] When medical staff committees bear delegated responsibility for the...