California School Emp. Ass'n v. Sequoia Union High School Dist.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1969
• Citation: 77 Cal.Rptr. 187,272 Cal.App.2d 98
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3013 CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a state agency, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 25397.

Page 187

77 Cal.Rptr. 187

272 Cal.App.2d 98, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3013

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a state agency, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 25397.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 21, 1969.

Hearing Denied June 18, 1969.

Richard H. Perry, San Francisco, for appellant.

Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., Howard E. Gawthorp, Deputy Dist. Atty., Redwood City, for respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

The California School Employees Association has appealed from an order denying a preliminary injunction against the Sequoia Union High School District. (Code Civ.Proc. former § 963, subd. 2; now § 904.1, subd. f.) The injunction was sought to restrain respondent district from contracting for vending machines to dispense foodstuffs prepared off the school premises to pupils within the district.

The facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant is an employee representative organization representing employees in the public school system in the classified form of noncertified service. Respondent is a school district within the County of San Mateo.

During April of 1967, the district employed 35 persons in connection with its cafeteria service. On May 8, 1967, the governing board of the district decided to discontinue cafeteria services in its schools for the school year 1967--1968. The board at that time gave no indication that any substitute form of food service was being considered. The 35 food service employees were discharged as of July 1, 1967, by action of the board.

Prior to the above action of the board, a vending machine program had been operating for several years within respondent district. The machines served ice cream, noncarbonated drinks, and some prepackaged snack items to the students of respondent district. On October 2, 1967, at the request of some student's and parent's groups a proposal was received by the district board from the Pen-Pac Automatic Co. to install vending machines on campus which would serve hot and cold food items and contain a manual snack bar. The proposal was considered by the board at its regular meeting on October 4, 1967. At that time the board approved a motion by one of its members 'that the Superintendent (of schools) be authorized to work with any vendor he chooses an arrangement for the supply of a more balanced diet at Menlo Atherton High School on a temporary basis, and that the Superintendent is free to do this as he sees fit, so long as it is clear to the vendor involved that the District may have to change the arrangement in the near future.'

The district then negotiated with the Pen-Pac Automatic Co. with the intent of granting a concession to that or some similar company for the sale of food on campus through vending machines. The district required that the food to be sold in the machines be prepared and packaged off campus. The district would not pay any money to the company for supplying the machines, or receive any money from the company for granting the concession.

On October 13, 1967, the association filed a complaint for an injunction to restrain the district's 'performance of an illegal contract and illegal expenditure of public monies by a state agency.' On November 6, 1967, the trial court found (1) that the association had standing to bring the action for the injunction; (2) that the association showed no grounds for a preliminary injunction; and (3) that 'the proposes agreement for the furnishing of vending machines and the supply of food and beverages to be dispensed through such machines is not invalid.' The request for a preliminary injunction was thereafter denied. This appeal followed.

The association contends that the district does not have authority to contract for the furnishing of food services through the sale of foods prepared off the school premises in vending machines, and that the privileges granted the supplier render the arrangement unconstitutional. The district renews its objection to the association's standing to sue. (See Thomas v. Joplin (1910) 14 Cal.App. 662, 664--666, 112 P. 729.) ¹ It is determined that although the association has standing to sue because of the interests of its members past, present and potential, its objections are not well taken. The judgment must be affirmed.

Standing

Plaintiff association alleged that it is a California nonprofit corporation and a taxpayer of the State of California; that it is an employee-representative organization representing public school employees in the classified service and has members in good standing employed by the defendant school district; that its membership is entirely composed of residents and taxpayers of this state; that members of the association were employed in the classified service as employees for the food services connected with cafeterias operated in various schools of the district until on or about May 1, 1967, when the cafeteria operation was discontinued and the employees were dismissed; that the district has agreed to and threatens to permit others to purvey foodstuffs to various schools through vending machines; that the law requires that the purchasing, preparation and distribution of foodstuffs be done by employees in the classified service; and that the proposed arrangement is not authorized by law. The association sought the following relief: 'For Judgment permanently enjoining Defendant District, its officers, agents, employeesd, and any and all persons acting for, with, or on behalf of said Defendant from performing any agreement or contract for the furnishing of food services or cafeteria services, including but not limited to the purchasing, preparation, sale or dispensing of edibles and potables to pupils or employees in or about any school within said Defendant District by any means whatever, directly or by indirection, save and except only as such contract be with persons employed by the governing board in the classified service in accordance with the laws applicable thereto.'

The association's representative capacity was established by the declaration filed on its behalf, and the trial court found that it had capacity to sue.

In California Sch. Employees Assn. v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 776, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765, it was established that the association had standing to sue in its own name to enforce the employment rights of its members. (243 Cal.App.2d at pp. 779--780, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765; and see Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 283--285, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158; and International Assn. of Fire Fighters, etc. v. City of Palo Alto (1963) 60 Cal.2d 295, 298--299, 32 Cal.Rptr. 842, 384 P.2d 170.)

The district asserts that the foregoing principle cannot apply, because the program of food service, through school cafeterias employing persons for food service positions as part of the classified service, has been terminated. The case is unlike that arising in the Willits district. There the janitorial services for which the district had contracted would have to be performed by someone in any event. If the contract, allegedly unauthorized, was found to be beyond the power of the school district, someone else would have to be employed to perform the services. In this case, however, the establishment of a cafeteria, or any provision for food service is optional. (See Ed.Code, §§ 17001 and 17002.) ² If the method proposed by the district is unauthorized or unconstitutional, no one will have a right to employment, there merely will be no food service at all.

Nevertheless, it appears that the association has a justiciable interest in the case. In the Willits case the court ultimately ruled that the two members of the association who were involved had no contractual rights to employment for the period during which they were displaced by the services rendered under the illegal contract. (243 Cal.App.2d at pp. 785--787, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765.) They were denied back salary or damages for diminished income. Apparently no issue was raised with respect to that portion of the judgment of the lower court which ordered the reinstatement of those employeesd (who had in fact already been rehired) despite the determination that they had no right to the renewal of their contracts of employment. The court had no hesitancy, however, in upholding the injunction against the school district insofar as it prohibited the district from contracting with nonclassified employees for the performance of janitorial services.

It is not a great leap to recognize that the association has an interest in establishing that if food services are furnished in any form, classified employees must be employed to perform the labor and services attendant to that operation. The fact that any operation may be discontinued if the proposed form is found illegal should not be determinative. In the Willits case the court observed: 'The discussion below on the substantive issues of the case demonstrates that the question is not only of common interest (as might be the case where relatively few parties in private litigation would have a common problem), but is of public interest, for the issues relate to interpretation of important statutes.' (243 Cal.App.2d at p. 780, 52 Cal.Rptr. at p. 767.) A 'court will not undertake to decide abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial right that can be affected by a decision either way.' (Streator v. Linscott (1908) 153 Cal. 285, 288, 95 P. 42, 43.) One factor to be considered is whether the plaintiff has 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions * * *.' (Baker v. Carr (1954) 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, as...