California School Emp. Ass'n v. Personnel Commission of Pajaro Val. Unified School Dist. of Santa Cruz County

• Decision Date: 12 March 1970
• Citation: 5 Cal.App.3d 266,85 Cal.Rptr. 246
• Parties: CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The PERSONNEL COMMISSION OF the PAJARO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, and Pajaro Valley Unified School District of Santa Cruz County, a State agency, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 26130.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 246

85 Cal.Rptr. 246

5 Cal.App.3d 266

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The PERSONNEL COMMISSION OF the PAJARO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, and Pajaro Valley Unified School District of Santa Cruz County, a State agency, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 26130.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 12, 1970.

For Opinion on Hearing, see 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 474 P.2d 436

Richard H. Perry, Burlingame, for plaintiff and appellant.

Henry J. Faitz, County Counsel, James L. Rankin, Asst. County Counsel, Santa Cruz, for defendants and respondents.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by petitioner, the California School Employees Association, a nonprofit corporation, from a judgment discharging an alternate writ of mandate and denying a peremptory writ of mandate in an action in which petitioner sought a peremptory writ (1) commanding the respondent personnel commission to annul, vacate and set aside its 'judgment' of May 11, 1967 dismissing one Mrs. Virginia Keidel, not a party to these proceedings, (2) commanding respondent district to rescind, annul and set aside its action of May 2, 1967, dismissing that employee, (3) commanding both respondents to reinstate the employee, and (4) awarding damages to the employee for lost compensation.

Petitioner contends that the employee was not lawfully dismissed, that no lawful appellate jurisdiction vested in the respondent personnel commission, and that its proceedings and 'judgment' were therefore wholly void. Alternatively, it asserts that if the personnel commission did have jurisdiction its 'judgment' dismissing the employee is contrary to law and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

It is concluded that the proceedings seeking review are irregular because of a failure to join the employee as a party, but that since the employee's rights might have been jeopardized by the failure of respondents to present this objection, which could have been cured by her joinder and might be so cured in the event of remand, the merits of petitioner's contentions must be reviewed. On the merits it is determined that the rules and procedures followed by the respondents were not drafted or conducted strictly as authorized by law; that the errors were procedural and not jurisdictional; that the proceedings leading to the dismissal of the employee furnished her a fair and complete hearing; that her dismissal was not contrary to law and was not an abuse of discretion; and that the judgment of the superior court must be affirmed.

Standing

The petition was filed by California School Employees Association, a nonprofit corporation, in its own name. The employee for whom it seeks relief is not a party to the action. Petitioner's standing as an employee organization (see, Ed.Code, §§ 13080-13088) was set forth in the first paragraph of its petition ¹ and was not denied. In the second paragraph petitioner alleged, 'that said Virginia Keidel was and is a member in good standing of Petitioner; that at all times pertinent hereto Petitioner represented said Virginia Keidel in her controversy arising out of charges for dismissal made and filed against her in a matter more particularly hereinafter specified, and does now represent her said controversy.' These allegations were also admitted by failure to deny.

In the third paragraph petitioner alleged, 'That Petitioner, as representative of said Virginia Keidel, and Respondents are the parties beneficially interested herein; that this action is maintained by Petitioner solely on behalf of said Virginia Keidel at her instance request and under her authority, has exhausted all administrative remedies available to it before Respondent Commission and before Respondent District.' These allegations were denied. In the third cause of action the petitioner complains because it was not served notice of the charges against the employee. (No such requirement is found in the statutes or rules.) It also complains that the personnel director conferred with the commissioner 'out of the presence of Petitioner's representative and' the employee. The petition concludes, 'That by reason of her unlawful depravation of her employment in her classified position as above averred, Mrs. Virginia Keidel has sustained damage by way of loss of salary, leave rights, retirements rights, vacation rights, and other rights, benefits, and perquisites incident to such employment.' The prayer seeks no relief for petitioner by way of a declaration of the rights of its members in general. It is solely directed to annulling, vacating and setting aside the May 11, 1967 judgment of the personnel commission, and the May 2, 1967 action of the board, to securing the reinstatement of the employee, and to recovering damages on her behalf, for her wrongful discharge, and costs of suit.

Several cases have upheld the capacity of an employee organization representing public employees to sue on its own behalf. (Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 283-285, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 [Lab.Code, §§ 1960-1963; and see, Gov.Code, §§ 3500-3509]; International Ass'n. of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto (1963) 60 Cal.2d 295, 298, 32 Cal.Rptr. 842, 384 P.2d 170 [id.]; East Bay Mun. Employees Union v. County of Alameda (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 578, 579, fn. 1, 83 S.Ct. 503; California Sch. Employees Assoc. v. Sequoia etc. School Dist. (1969) 272 A.C.A. 118, 122-124, 77 Cal.Rptr. 187; California Sch. Employees Ass'n. v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 776, 779-780, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765.) In the first Fire Fighters' case the 'local and Wheatley brought this action (the latter suing on his own behalf as an employee, and in his representative capacity on behalf of his fellow employees who are members of the local) for the purpose of determining and enforcing the rights and obligations of the respective parties in respect to the provisions of Labor Code sections 1960 through 1963, inclusive. [Fn. omitted.] In their first cause of action plaintiffs alleged that defendant city discriminated against those employees of the fire department who are members of Local 748 (as more particularly set forth in the pleading), in violation of the sections of the Labor Code, and threatens to continue such conduct unless permanently restrained by injunction. The second cause of action seeks declaratory relief on the basis of an existing pleaded controversy between the parties, in which defendant city contends that the specified code sections are not applicable to it by virtue of its status as a chartered city.' (60 Cal.2d at pp. 279-280, 32 Cal.Rptr. at pp. 831-832, 384 P.2d at pp. 159-160.) The court ruled, 'the plain meaning of both the Labor Code and the Government Code provisions heerinabove alluded to is that unions such as plaintiff may be organized for the sole purpose of representing their members. An action at law on behalf of such members is one form of such representation. Plaintiff is incorporated. Its members are all employees of the fire department and as such have a clear beneficial interest in the subject matter of the complaint. Its interest is joint with theirs. The entire action is one such as is contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure, section 382 and (if injunction be equated with mandate) under section 1086 as well.' (Id., p. 284, 32 Cal.Rptr. at pp. 834-835, 384 P.2d at pp. 162-163.)

The issues in the second Fire Fighters' case were stated as follows: 'Defendants have appealed from a judgment ordering issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate and dismissing their cross-complaint for declaratory relief. [Fn. omitted.] By that judgment the trial court ordered defendants (a chartered city, and its mayor, city manager, council members and fire chief) to grant plaintiffs (an unincorporated union--all of the members of which are employees of defendant city's fire department--and its duly appointed representative) the right of self-organization and the right to 'present grievances and recommendations regarding wages, salaries, hours and working conditions to the governing body of the Fire Department and to discuss the same with such governing body through such organizations.' Defendants were further ordered to vacate and set aside certain policies, rules and regulations that will hereafter be mentioned.' (60 Cal.2d at pp. 297-298, 32 Cal.Rptr. at p. 843, 384 P.2d at p. 171.)

It is obvious that in each case the employee organization was suing to establish and vindicate rights claimed on behalf of each and all of its members. In the East Bay Mun. Employees Union case the union sought the reinstatement of over 300 named employees without discrimination or loss of benefit. (3 Cal.App.3d at p. 580, 83 S.Ct. 503.) In the Sequoia Union High School District case the association appealed from an order denying a preliminary injunction which was sought 'to restrain respondent district from contracting for vending machines to dispense foodstuffs prepared off the school premises to pupils within the district.' (272 A.C.A. at p. 120, 77 Cal.Rptr. at p. 188.) The question of relief for the particular displaced employees was not discussed. It is again obvious that all member employees who were displaced were equally affected. In the Willits Unified School District case the association sought and secured general relief against an allegedly ultra vires contract for janitorial services, and reinstatement and damages for the displaced employees. (243 Cal.App.2d at p. 779, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765.) On appeal, the court found that the employees who had in fact been reinstated, were not permanent employees and set aside the award of damages for the period they had been displaced. (Id., at pp. 785-787, 52 Cal.Rptr. 765.) The court did observe, 'Equally lacking in substance is the district's contention that individual actions should have been brought because the...