California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court

• Citation: 150 Cal.App.4th 826,58 Cal.Rptr.3d 715
• Decision Date: 10 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. D049205.,D049205.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS FOUNDATION et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency et al., Real Parties in Interest.

58 Cal.Rptr.3d 715

150 Cal.App.4th 826

CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS FOUNDATION et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. D049205.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

May 10, 2007.

Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, William J. White and Kevin P. Bundy, San Francisco, for All Petitioners.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, Brian Hembacher, Gary E. Tavetian, Olivia W. Karlin and Helen G. Arens, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner The People of the State of California.

Joel R. Reynolds, Los Angeles, and James Birkelund, Santa Monica, for Petitioner Natural Resources Defense Council.

Michael D. Fitts for Petitioner Endangered Habitats League.

No appearance for Respondent.

Nossaman, Guthner, Knox and Elliott, Robert D. Thornton, John J. Flynn III, Irvine, and Scott N. Yamaguchi, Los Angeles, for Real Parties in Interest.

NARES, Acting P.J.

In an action brought in San Diego County by the People of the State of California and several public interest groups challenging the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for, and the decision approving construction of, a toll road that would traverse portions of both San Diego and Orange Counties, made by the Orange County-based Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency and its board of directors (together the FTCA's), we are presented with the following issue: Does Code of Civil Procedure ¹ section 393, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 393(b)), which allows suits challenging actions taken by public officials to be filed in the county where some or all of the cause of action arises, apply to cases such as this that seek to vindicate public rights, or, as the FTCA contends and the trial court found, only those involving personal rights or property? We conclude, after analyzing the text of section 393(b), case law interpreting that statute, and public policy considerations, that this action to vindicate public rights was properly filed in San Diego County because section 393(b) is not limited to actions involving personal rights or property. We therefore grant the petition for writ of mandate and order that the court set aside its order transferring venue to Orange County.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action, brought by California State Parks Foundation, Endangered Habitats League, Laguna Greenbelt, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Sea and Sage Audubon Society, Sierra Club, Surfrider Foundation, the People of the State of California and the State Parks and Recreation Commission (collectively, petitioners), challenges the FTCA's decision to certify an environmental impact report (EIR) for, and approve construction of, a six-lane toll road (the Toll Road) that would run through both Orange County and the northern reaches of San Diego County, including San Onofre State Beach (San Onofre). Petitioners allege San Onofre is one of California's most-visited state parks and includes both a world famous surfing beach named Trestles and a campground that provides recreation for over 100,000 campers per year. According to petitioners, the Cristianitos Subunit of San Onofre provides valuable and rare upland and wetland habitats, including unique habitat for 11 species of animals listed as threatened or endangered under federal laws, including steelhead trout, arroyo toad, California gnatcatcher, Least Bell's vireo, Southwestern willow flycatcher, Riverside fairy shrimp, San Diego fairy shrimp, snowy plover, Pacific pocket mouse, and tidewater goby. San Onofre also contains nationally recognized historic and archeological sites. Petitioners allege that the Toll Road's impacts on the area will be severe, traversing four miles of the Cristianitos Subunit of San Onofre within 200 feet of one of the park's campgrounds, which receives over 100,000 campers a year, removing 300 acres of San Onofre park land, and fragmenting the remainder. They allege that if the Toll Road is built, the campground must be abandoned, as well the entire Cristianitos Subunit, which represents almost 60 percent of the park's land.

Petitioners allege that the FTCA's adoption of the Toll Road project violates the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because the EIR it adopted failed to fully (1) evaluate impacts to San Onofre's natural, historic, cultural, visual, and recreational resources; (2) consider reasonable alternative routes that would have avoided these impacts; (3) consider and adopt appropriate mitigation measures; and (3) provide substantial evidence in support of the decision.

In March 2006 petitioners filed two separate petitions for writ of mandate (petitions) against the FTCA in the North County Division of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The petitions alleged that venue was proper in San Diego County as the causes of action arose in part in San Diego County because "[a] substantial portion of the [Toll Road] lies within the County of San Diego, including the entirety of that portion of the [Toll Road] that would run through [San Onofre]. Many of the significant environmental impacts of the [Toll Road] that are the subject of this lawsuit would occur in San Diego County, and the [Toll Road] would impact state park property interests in San Diego County." More specifically, petitioners alleged that "while the alleged purpose of the Toll Road Project is to provide traffic benefits to southern Orange County, some of the most significant impacts of the Project would occur in San Diego County to resources that have been set aside for the benefit of all the people of the State." The Toll Road is described as "unprecedented in that it would be the first time in California that an agency comprised entirely of local governments would take designated State Park lands for its own highway purposes."

In April 2006 the FTCA moved to transfer venue of the action to Orange County. The FTCA argued that venue was not proper in San Diego County because (1) the FTCA is not located in that county; (2) section 393(b) did not apply as the petitions did not involve an interference with personal rights or property; and (3) section 392, subdivision (a) was not applicable because the petitions did not seek to litigate any interest in real property or injury thereto.

Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that venue was proper in San Diego County under section 393(b) because (1) some part of the cause of action "arose" in San Diego County; (2) the FTCA is a "public officer"; (3) the FTCA's approval of the Toll Road is an "[a]ct [d]one" within the meaning of section 393(b); (4) section 393(b) is not limited to actions involving an interference with personal rights or property; and (5) because the action sought to prevent injury to real property in San Diego, it was properly filed in that county.

The court granted the motion to transfer venue, finding that section 393(b) did not apply, and the general venue provisions of section 395 did, requiring the action to be filed in the county where one of more of the defendants reside.

This petition for writ of mandate followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

"In interpreting a statute where the language is clear, courts must follow its plain meaning. [Citation.] However, if the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute. [Citation.] In the end, we `"must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences."'" (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57; see also Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1165-1166, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.)

II. General Concepts of Venue

"The term `venue' denotes the particular county within the state where a case is to be heard. [Citations.] Which county constitutes the proper venue in a particular case is determined according to the venue statutes—section 392 et seq. In applying these statutes to determine the county (or counties) where venue is proper, the courts generally look to the main relief sought, as determined from the complaint as it stands at the time of the motion for change of venue. [Citation.] Generally (but with numerous exceptions), when the main relief sought in a case does not relate to rights in real property, `the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.' (§ 395, subd. (a).)" (K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 496-197,15 Cal.Rptr.3d 517.)

"Where a defendant has made a proper showing of nonresidence, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the case comes clearly within one of the statutory exceptions to the general rule that actions are triable in the place of the defendant's residence." (Archer v. Superior Court In and For Humboldt County (1962) 202 Cal. App.2d 417, 420, 21 Cal.Rptr. 48.)

III. Analysis

A. Section 393(b)

Section 393(b) provides an exception to the ordinary venue provisions as to actions against "public officers":

"Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as provided in this title, the county in which the cause, or some part of the cause, arose, is the proper county for the trial of the following actions: [¶] ... [¶] (b) Against a public officer or person especially appointed to execute the duties of a public officer,...