California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 02 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. S051274,S051274
• Citation: 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671,927 P.2d 1175,14 Cal.4th 627
• Parties: , 927 P.2d 1175, 114 Ed. Law Rep. 1195, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 34, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 73 CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF RIALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 671

59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671

14 Cal.4th 627, 927 P.2d 1175, 114 Ed. Law Rep. 1195,

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 34,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 73

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF RIALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S051274.

Supreme Court of California.

Jan. 2, 1997.

Charles R. Gustafson, Santa Fe Springs, Beverly Tucker, Burlingame, Rosalind D. Wolf and Robert E. Lindquist, Santa Fe Springs, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Sherry G. Gordon, Howard J. Fulfrost, San Bernardino, and Byron C. Smith, Sonora, for Defendants and Respondents.

John L. Bukey, Corona, Abhas Hajela, West Sacramento, Lozano, Smith, Smith, Woliver & Behrens, Michael E. Smith and John C. Valdez, Fresno, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

WERDEGAR, Justice.

We address in this case the proper interpretation of Education Code section 44919, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 44919(b); all statutory references are to the Education

                [927 P.2d 1176] Code unless otherwise stated), which concerns the employment of persons to serve in "limited assignment[s] supervising athletic activities of pupils," i.e., athletic coaches.  Specifically, we must construe the portion of the statute providing that such positions, when vacant, "shall first be made available to teachers presently employed by the district."   We hold the language of section 44919(b) demonstrates the Legislature intended to accord an advantage in the hiring process, as discussed hereafter, to credentialed teachers presently employed by the school district, provided such teachers apply for the position and are otherwise qualified under applicable criteria promulgated by the school district
                

FACTS

The facts are essentially undisputed: ¹ Defendant Rialto Unified School District (hereafter the District) had one high school, Eisenhower High School, and decided to open a second one, Rialto High School, in September 1992. Staffing decisions for the new school began in the spring of 1992. Flyers were circulated advertising an opening for a boys varsity basketball coach at the new high school. Gary Stanley, a tenured, credentialed teacher employed in a district junior high school, applied for the job. He also applied for a subsequent opening for an assistant coach for the boys varsity team. Finally, he applied for an opening to serve as assistant coach on the boys freshman basketball team.

The District filled the boys head coach position by hiring Martin Sipe, who had been head coach for the boys varsity basketball team at Eisenhower High School. Sipe, a credentialed teacher, was also selected to serve as Rialto High School Athletic Director. The District then hired Keith Ellis, who had been Sipe's assistant coach at Eisenhower, to fill the assistant varsity coach position at Rialto. Ellis was a security guard for the District and was therefore a classified (i.e., noncredentialed) employee. Stanley was not interviewed for either position.

Sipe, apparently in his role as athletic director for Rialto High, interviewed three applicants for the position of assistant coach for the freshman team: Stanley, an unidentified teacher, and Dion Downey. Sipe recommended to Rialto High School Principal Anna Rodriguez that the District hire Downey, as Sipe believed he was the most qualified of the three applicants. Rodriguez concurred in the recommendation and referred it to the District's governing board. The District hired Downey to fill the remaining assistant coach position. Downey does not have a teaching credential.

Plaintiff Stanley, joined by two nonprofit employee organizations, the California Teachers Association and the Rialto Education Association (hereafter collectively Stanley), filed a petition for a writ of mandate in superior court, seeking: (i) to require the District to comply with section 44919(b) and (ii) damages. The trial court denied the writ, finding section 44919(b) does not require the District, when hiring to fill an open athletic coaching position, to give credentialed teachers currently employed in the district a hiring preference over noncredentialed employees or nonemployees. The Court of Appeal reversed, and we granted the District's petition for review.

DISCUSSION

Resolution of this case turns on the proper interpretation of section 44919(b), which provides: "Governing boards shall classify as temporary employees persons, other than substitute employees, who are employed to serve in a limited assignment supervising athletic activities of pupils; provided, such assignment shall first be made available to teachers presently employed by the district. Service pursuant to this subdivision shall not be included in computing the service required as a prerequisite to attainment of, or eligibility to, classification as a permanent employee of a school district." (Italics added.)

The District contends the phrase in section 44919(b) emphasized above requires only that As in many past cases, we are called upon to interpret a legislative enactment whose meaning is not as clear as the parties, and the appellate courts, would like. As we explain below, section 44919(b) cannot mean (as argued by the District) that school districts can comply with the statute simply by posting notice of an athletic coach opening so that teachers can learn of the vacancy. On the other hand, we also reject Stanley's rigid interpretation of section 44919(b), which would elevate teachers to a level above that which we believe our Legislature envisioned when it amended section 44919(b) to its present wording.

[927 P.2d 1177] it advertise openings for athletic coach positions to teachers currently employed in the district and allow them to apply for such positions, but the statute does not give such teachers any other advantage in the employment process. By contrast, Stanley argues (and the Court of Appeal held) section 44919(b) grants such teachers a "right of first refusal" for vacant athletic coach positions.

We begin with the touchstone of statutory interpretation, namely, the probable intent of the Legislature. To interpret statutory language, we must "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (hereafter Dyna-Med ).) In undertaking this determination, we are mindful of this court's limited role in the process of interpreting enactments from the political branches of our state government. In interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law, " ' "whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act." ' " (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 843, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380, quoting Woodmansee v. Lowery (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 645, 652, 334 P.2d 991.) "[A]s this court has often recognized, the judicial role in a democratic society is fundamentally to interpret laws, not to write them. The latter power belongs primarily to the people and the political branches of government ...." (Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 675, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248 (conc. opn. by Werdegar, J.).) It cannot be too often repeated that due respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. "This court has no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed." (Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay (1931) 214 Cal. 361, 365, 5 P.2d 882; People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475, 224 P.2d 677; County of Madera v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 665, 668, 114 Cal.Rptr. 283; Woodmansee v. Lowery, supra, 167 Cal.App.2d 645, 652, 334 P.2d 991.)

"Our first step [in determining the Legislature's intent] is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763, 280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)" (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999.) In our case, the actual words comprise a single, critical phrase: "provided, such assignment shall first be made available to teachers presently employed by the district." (§ 44919(b).)

The District contends this language, especially the phrase "made available," merely directs it to "make the application and interview process available to current certificated employees." This proposed interpretation is flawed for several reasons. First, the actual words of section 44919(b) do not mention or even allude to the application and interview process. The statute does not direct school districts to make the application process available to teachers. Had the Legislature intended school districts merely to provide teachers with an opportunity to apply for a vacant coaching position, it could easily have written the statute to state: "provided, teachers presently employed by the district shall be notified of such a job opening." Instead, section 44919(b) plainly provides school districts must make the assignment itself available to such teachers. The "assignment," of course, is the actual position of The District's proposed interpretation is implausible for a second reason. Were we to conclude, as the District urges, that section 44919(b) merely requires it to consider applications from teachers employed in the school district, but that such teachers enjoy no further advantage in the employment process, section 44919(b) would be a nullity, for it would then give teachers no greater rights than they would have in the absence of the statute. In other words, even without a statute, nothing would...