Callagy v. Town of Aquinnah
| Decision Date | 27 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–11716–MBB. |
| Citation | 880 F.Supp.2d 244 |
| Parties | John M. CALLAGY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF AQUINNAH, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Andrew P. Botti, Michael J. Kenison, McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., Woburn, MA, John Callagy, Kelley Drye & Warren, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Michael A. Goldsmith, Reynolds Rappaport & Kaplan LLP, Edgartown, MA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY # 24); DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY # 25)
Pending before this court is a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule 56”), filed by plaintiff John M. Callagy (“plaintiff”). (Docket Entry # 24). Also pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Town of Aquinnah.1 (Docket Entry # 25). After conducting a hearing on January 3, 2012, this court took the motions (Docket Entry 24 & 25) under advisement.
As set forth in the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant unlawfully denied him a parking permit for a parking lot located at Philbin Beach in the Town of Aquinnah on the island of Martha's Vineyard.2 The amended complaint sets out three causes of action: (1) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“ section 1983”) (Count One); 3 (2) a violation of section 2(a) of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A (“chapter 93A”) (Count Two); and (3) a declaratory judgment against defendant (Count Three). (Docket Entry # 19). Count Three seeks a declaration that:
the deed restrictions contained in the deed are unenforceable for various reasons, including, but not limited to, the fact that the defendant's selective enforcement of the deed restrictions amounts to inequitable conduct, and/or defendant by virtue of its conduct has waived entitlement to rely upon the restrictions.
(Docket Entry # 19). In Count Three, plaintiff also seeks a declaration that the deed prevents defendant from providing parking permits to renters. (Docket Entry # 19).
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on counts one and three.4 (Docket Entry # 24). He submits that defendant has no rational basis to deny him a parking permit and that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment that defendant has waived the deed restrictions by its own actions. (Docket Entry 24 & 35).
Defendant opposes plaintiff's summary judgment motion and, in turn, moves for summary judgment on all counts. (Docket Entry 25, 26 & 31). Regarding Count One, defendant argues that plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of his equal protection claim. (Docket Entry # 26). Defendant maintains that plaintiff is not being treated differently from similarly situated persons. (Docket Entry 26 & 36). Additionally, defendant asserts that it has a rational basis to deny plaintiff the parking permit. (Docket Entry 26 & 36).
As to Count Two, defendant contends that plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of a chapter 93A violation. (Docket Entry # 26). Defendant also asserts that it is not engaging in trade or commerce by furnishing parking permits and as such chapter 93A does not apply. (Docket Entry # 26)
Regarding Count Three, defendant submits that plaintiff lacks standing to obtain the declaratory judgment. (Docket Entry 25 & 36). Defendant argues that plaintiff is trying to enforce the deed when he seeks a declaration to prohibit defendant from issuing permits to renters and accordingly section 3(10) of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 214 (“chapter 214”), which requires ten taxpayers to bring a suit, is the governing procedure. (Docket Entry 26 & 36). Defendant also argues that it does not have the right to unilaterally waive the deed restrictions. (Docket Entry # 36). Furthermore, defendant contends that if there is a finding in its favor for the Count One equal protection claim, counts two and three are subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).5 (Docket Entry # 26).
Summary judgment is designed “ ‘to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.’ ” Davila v. Corporacion De Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 498 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” American Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir.2008). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Id.Facts are viewed in favor of the nonmovant. See Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2009).
Where, as here, the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, the court must “determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir.2004). “The court does not weigh the evidence, but instead determines ‘whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Norotos, Inc. v. Ops–Core, Inc., 2011 WL 3157201, at *4 (D.Mass. July 25, 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Each summary judgment motion is reviewed separately and factual disputes are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Saenger Organization, Inc. v. Nationwide Insurance Licensing Associates, 119 F.3d 55, 56 (1st Cir.1997).
Local Rule 56.1 provides that summary judgment motions and oppositions thereto are to be accompanied by statements of material facts of record, with page references to affidavits, depositions and other documentation. Any facts set forth in a moving party's Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts are deemed admitted if they are not otherwise contested. Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2003); see also Stonkus v. City of Brockton School Department, 322 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir.2003) ().
The Town of Aquinnah, formerly known as Gay Head, is a municipality located on Martha's Vineyard. (Docket Entry # 27, ¶ 1; Docket Entry # 33, ¶ 1). In its 2011 “At a Glance Report for Aquinnah,” the town had a population of 311 in 2010 and contained 381 single family parcels in 2011. (Docket Entry # 24, Ex. 6, pp. 1–2).
On or about February 16, 1968, J. Holladay Philbin (“Philbin”) executed a deed conveying ocean front property to the Town of Gay Head. (Docket Entry # 27 ¶ 2; Docket Entry # 33, ¶ 2). The pertinent provisions of the deed are as follows:
I, J. Holladay Philbin of Boca Grande, Lee County, Florida for consideration paid for, grant to The Inhabitants of the Town of Gay Head, in trust for the purposes hereinafter set forth, ... the land in said Gay Head consisting of Lots 501 and 502 ... together with that portion of Lot 700 on said plan lying to the southwest of a public highway known as Moshup Trail.... Said property shall be held in trust for the use by all permanent and seasonal residents of Gay Head and their accompanied guests for swimming, sun-bathing, fishing and related recreational activities. It ... is to be maintained in a condition which will not detract from the pleasure of its use for said purposes. Accordingly, the trustee, the said Inhabitants of the Town of Gay Head, shall not permit on said property any buildings or structures, except as hereinafter provided, nor any use other than as above prescribed. The said trustee may, however, in furtherance of the said purposes, construct and maintain any one or more of the following facilities, and no others: a parking lot to accommodate not more than forty (40) vehicles for the use of persons properly using said Beach, a roadway to said parking lot, a pathway to said Beach.... No commercial activity or establishment may be undertaken or permitted on the granted premises at any time, except that the said trustee may make a reasonable charge for parking to defray some or all of the cost of maintaining, policing and improving the granted premises.(Docket Entry # 24, Ex. 1; Docket Entry # 27, Ex. C) (emphasis added).
Defendant recorded the Philbin deed on April 2, 1968. (Docket Entry # 27, ¶ 6; Docket Entry # 33, ¶ 7). On May 21, 1968, the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Aquinnah sent Philbin a letter thanking him for the gift and requesting permission to change the name of the beach from Moshup Beach to Philbin Beach. (Docket Entry # 27, ¶ 7, Ex. E; Docket Entry # 33, ¶ 7). The beach has a parking lot that contains 40 spaces in accordance with the deed. (Docket Entry # 27, ¶ 8; Docket Entry # 33, ¶ 8).
For each season, defendant requires permanent and seasonal residents to apply for a beach parking permit by filing an application and submitting a fee to defendant's beach administrator.6 . There are two different applications for parking permits, one for those who own homes in the town and one for those who rent ones. (Docket Entry # 27, Ex. A, p. 2). Both applications for residents and renters require the applicant to list the homeowner's name. (Docket Entry # 27, Ex. A, p. 2). A renter must also include his or her name and the duration of the lease so that only one renter is given a parking permit for a given time. (Docket Entry # 27, Ex. A, pp. 2–3). The cost of the parking pass varies dependent upon whether the applicant owns a home in the town or rents one and upon the duration of the permit. (Docket Entry # 27, ...
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