Callaway v. Region 10 Educ. Serv. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 29 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14cv719 |
| Parties | MARY CALLAWAY v. REGION 10 EDUCATION SERVICE CENTER |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Now before the Court is Defendant Region 10 Education Service Center's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 21). As set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff was employed by Region 10 Education Service Center, for approximately sixteen (16) years. She began working there on or about August 11, 1997. On or about September 19, 2013, she was discharged. At the time of her discharge, she was a Family Resource Specialist and was assigned to Fred Douglas Early Education Center in Sherman, Texas.
Plaintiff, who is white, alleges that she was discharged in violation of violation of 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e, et seq. (Unlawful Employment Practices), as amended, protecting Plaintiff from discrimination in the workplace based on her race.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's Title VII claim, arguing that: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she was not treated less favorably than similarly situated employees; (2) Region 10 Education Service Center had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish that Region 10 ESC's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination constitute pretext.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 143 L. Ed.2d 731 (1999). The appropriate inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). In sustaining this burden, the movant must identify those portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party, however, "need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant's burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).
In response, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existenceof a genuine issue for trial." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-57, 106 S. Ct. at 2513-14). Once the moving party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must look beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Stults, 76 F.3d at 655. The citations to evidence must be specific, as the district court is not required to "scour the record" to determine whether the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-56(d). Neither "conclusory allegations" nor "unsubstantiated assertions" will satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Stults, 76 F.3d at 655.
In support of its motion, Defendant offers the following evidence: (1) April 23, 2015 Oral Deposition of Mary Callaway; (2) April 21, 2015 Oral Deposition of Sandra Axelrod; (3) Affidavit of Scott Potter and accompanying Business Records (September 18, 2013 Termination memo for Mary Callaway; February 23, 2012 Directive to Mary Callaway; June 18, 2009 Reprimand for Mary Callaway; May 28, 2009 Improvement Plan completion memo; April 29, 2009 Performance Improvement Plan; October 1, 2006 Performance Improvement Plan; April 8, 1998 Professional Growth and Improvement Plan; Annual Summative Report of Employee Performance 2012-2013; July 31, 2013 Head Start/Early Head Start Standards of Conduct; July 31, 2013 Head Start/Early Head Start Confidentiality Training); (4) May 26, 2015 Oral Deposition of Nateenya Spencer; and (5) January 24, 2014 Letter to EEOC from Mary Callaway. See Dkt. 21-1.
In response, Plaintiff submits the following evidence: (1) Excerpts from Oral Deposition of Nateenya Spencer dated May 26, 2015, attached as Exhibit A; (2) Excerpts from Oral Depositionof Sandra Axelrod dated April 21, 2015, attached as Exhibit B; and (3) Affidavit of Mary Callaway, attached as Exhibit C. See Dkts. 26-2 - 26-4.
The modified McDonnell Douglas test is used when analyzing claims for race discrimination under Title VII. Under the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, a plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.2d 668 (1973); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2006). In order to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) an adverse employment action occurred; and (4) she was treated less favorably because of her membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. Wesley v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local, 745 660 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2011). See also St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993); McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007); Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 (5th Cir. 2004). Cases of racial discrimination are fact-specific. Id. at 214 (). As the Southern District of Texas has noted "[a] plaintiff can fulfill the fourth element if she proves that she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances in which an employee of a different race would not have suffered that action, irrespective of the race of her eventualreplacement, if there is one." Hill v. New Alenco Windows, Ltd., 716 F. Supp.2d 582, 595-96 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340-341 (1982)). "[I]n resolving an individual's Title VII claim, the crux of the inquiry is the reason for a particular employment decision" Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (U.S. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Once established, the prima facie case raises a presumption of discrimination which the defendant must rebut by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed.2d 105 (2000); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed.2d 207 (1981). The burden on the employer at this stage is one of production, not persuasion and does not involve any assessment of the employer's credibility. Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007).
Once the defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, "the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case disappears and the plaintiff must meet its ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination." Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that either: (1) the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead designed to serve as pretext for unlawful discrimination; or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Id. at 351-52; Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312 (citation omitted). "[T]he plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason articulated by the employer." McCoyv. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007).
In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must point to summary judgment evidence which creates a genuine issue of material fact as to a prima facie case of discrimination, which, as noted above requires a showing that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) an adverse employment action occurred; and (4) she was treated less favorably because of her membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. Wesley v. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local, 660 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2011). See also McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007); Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 (5th Cir. 2004).
In this case, there does not appear to be any dispute that Plaintiff was qualified for her position or that she suffered an adverse employment action. As to the other two elements...
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