Callen v. Pennsylvania Co
Decision Date | 12 January 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 331,331 |
Citation | 332 U.S. 625,68 S.Ct. 296,92 L.Ed. 242 |
Parties | CALLEN v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. B. Nathaniel Richter, of Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner pro hac vice by special leave of Court.
Mr. Philip Price, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Plaintiff, a railroad brakeman, brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. He recovered a jury verdict of $24,990, but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because of errors in the charge by the District Judge and ordered a new trial, 3 Cir., 162 F.2d 832. The plaintiff's claim as submitted to the jury was negligence on the part of an engineer in effecting a coupling operation at a speed which plaintiff thought would jolt him off the stirrup of the car he was riding. In jumping for safety, he claimed to have received a severe and permanent back injury. The defendant denied the occurrence, offered testimony that plaintiff did not work at the time in question and also evidence of his admission that he did not work on that day but instead shoveled snow to get his car out of the garage. It also was testified that he had told his conductor he hurt his back on a different occasion. But if the injury was sustained at the time and place alleged, the defendant denied negligence, claimed contributory negligence and pleaded a general release. The controversy here concerns the release.
It was proved and not denied that for a consideration of $250 the plaintiff executed a general release of 'all claims and demands which I have or can or may have against the said Pennsylvania Railroad Co. for or by reason of personal injuries sustained by me' at the time and place involved in the suit. It also released claims for loss of time and expens, and recited that the payment was in compromise and not an admission of liability, that plaintiff read and understood the agreement and that the sum of money stated therein is all that he was to receive.
On the trial, the plaintiff testified that he read and understood the release, knew what he was doing and intended to waive any further claim, and that when he began talking settlement he said he should have between $300 and $350. No fraud was alleged, but the plaintiff testified that he executed the release in reliance on the claim agent's assurance that 'there was nothing wrong' and that he 'could get back to the job.'
At the trial, plaintiff offered evidence from which the jury might well find that he had a permanent and serious injury. The claim agent admitted that at the time of settlement he did not know the plaintiff was suffering the injury which the doctors at the trial described. The plaintiff had gone to a family physician who taped his back and to a chiropractor whose report plaintiff took with him to the claim agent. It did not diagnose permanent injury but did suggest a weakness making him more susceptible to recurrence. The Railroad procured no medical examination of plaintiff. The claim agent's testimony was that he determined the amount of the settlement on the basis of his belief that there was no liability.
Instructing the jury, the trial court stated:
'Anyhow, they settled to the extent of $250.00 and the release has been offered in evidence and admitted, and both sides agree that the release was not in contemplation of any sort of permanent injury.
'The release, a I have told the attorneys for both sides, I do not consider binding insofar as it applies to his permanent injuries, because the Pennsylvania Railroad certainly didn't know he was permanently injured * * *.'
The Circuit Court of Appeals, quite rightly we think, construed the charge of the District Judge as withdrawing the question of validity of the release from the jury and said (162 F.2d 832, 834): 'This was palpable error under the facts relating to the release and entirely aside from the Court's incorrect assumption that there was no dispute about the permanency of the injuries.'
An examination of the record at the trial makes it clear that the issue was raised and sharply litigated as to whether the injury, if received by plaintiff in the manner alleged, was permanent in character. Only when and if this issue was resolved in favor of one party or the other could it be known whether there was a...
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