Calnan v. Hurley
| Docket Number | Civil Action CV-22-188 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 2023 |
| Parties | CHRIS CALNAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAM HURLEY, in his official role as Maine Emergency Medical Services Director, v. And v. MAINE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, Defendants. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiffs Calnan et al. (collectively "Plaintiffs") have filed this declaratory judgment action against Defendant Sam Hurley, in his official capacity as Director of Maine Emergency Medical Services, as well as Maine Emergency Medical Services (collectively, "Defendants"). For relief, Plaintiffs seek to invalidate a rule promulgated by the Maine Emergency Medical Services Board ("MEMS Board") imposing certain vaccination requirements on EMS workers. Before the court are two dispositive motions: (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss and (2) Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Also pending are Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their statement of material facts and Plaintiffs' motion to exempt the parties from the ADR process.
The challenged immunization rule was promulgated in the wake of the Department of Health and Human Services' ("DHHS") vaccination rule for healthcare workers which excluded EMS and dental personnel from its scope. See Pls.' Compl. ¶¶ 13-23. On August 26, 2021, MEMS issued an emergency immunization rule. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 24. Simultaneously, MEMS began the process of promulgating a permanent immunization rule for its workers. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 25. The permanent immunization rule-titled "Chapter 21 Immunization Requirements"-was ultimately adopted and went into effect on August 7, 2022. See Pls.' Compl. Ex A. The immunization rule essentially requires all EMS workers who provide "direct patient care"[1] to provide proof of vaccination against CO VID-19 and to obtain an annual flu shot. See id. EMS workers are considered vaccinated against COVID-19 when they have received all the recommended doses in the primary series. Id. For statutory authority supporting the rule's promulgation, MEMS cited 32 M.R.S. § 84(1)(A). Id.
This lawsuit was initiated in December 2022 by "individuals who lost employment as EMS workers as a result of the implementation of the Immunization Rule." Pls.' Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs characterize this matter as "an action to determine the validity of the [immunization rule]" pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 8058 ), although they reference M.R. Civ. P. 80C in a number of places as well. E.g., Pls.' Compl. ¶ 7. As grounds for challenging the rule, Plaintiffs assert that MEMS (1) lacked statutory authority to promulgate the rule; (2) "may have also violated the rule-making procedures required under the Administrative Procedures Act"; and (3) increased EMS worker shortages in violation of its duties under the Emergency Medical Services Act ("EMS Act"). See Pls.' Compl. ¶¶ 33-37, 54-55. Plaintiffs ask the court to invalidate the immunization rule; award "compensation for lost wages and lost benefits under M.R. Civ. P. 80(C)(i) and 14 M.R.S. § 5960"; and award "compensation for other costs incurred under 14 M.R.S. § 5962."
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was followed by Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Several additional motions are also pending, as noted below.
Defendants seek to dismiss the complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6).
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). To the extent Defendants challenge this court's subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, that presents a question of law. Tomer v. Me. Human Rights Comm'n, 2008 ME 190, ¶ 9, 962 A.2d 335. "When a motion to dismiss is based on the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] make[s] no favorable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id.
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). With respect to rule 12(b)(2) motions challenging personal jurisdiction, the court is not confined to the four corners of the complaint. Dorf v. Complastik Corp., 1999 ME 133, ¶ 12, 735 A.2d 984 ("'Facts regarding jurisdictional questions may be determined by reference to affidavits, by a pretrial evidentiary hearing, or at trial when the jurisdictional issue is dependent upon a decision on the merits.'"). "When the court proceeds only upon the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists, and the plaintiffs written allegations of jurisdictional facts should be construed in its favor." Id. ¶ 14 (quotation marks omitted).
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Finally, a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Livonia v. Town of Rome, 1998 ME 39, ¶ 5, 707 A.2d 83. "For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the material allegations of the complaint must be taken as admitted." Id. "In reviewing a dismissal, [the court] will examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Id. "A dismissal should occur when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claims." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The general rule is that only the facts alleged in the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 8, 843 A.2d 43. However, "official public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint may be properly considered on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for a summary judgment when the authenticity of such documents is not challenged." Id. ¶ 11.
"A summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, referred to in the statements [of material fact] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Platz Assocs. v. Finley, 2009 ME 55, ¶ 10, 973 A.2d 743 (quoting M.R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In assessing whether this standard has been met, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME 24, ¶ 6, 816 A.2d 63.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on three grounds. First, they seek dismissal under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), arguing that Plaintiffs failed to name the proper party. Second, they ask the court to dismiss any Rule 80C claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). And finally, Defendants argue that dismissal is required under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs' Section 8058 challenge to the immunization rule fails as a matter of law. These contentions are addressed below.
Plaintiffs name Maine Emergency Medical Services and Sam Hurley, in his official capacity as EMS Director, as defendants in this action. Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) because Plaintiffs failed to name the proper defendant. According to Defendants, the EMS Board is the proper party because it is the entity that has been vested with the authority to promulgate rules. The named defendants, by contrast, "lack rulemaking authority" and "did not promulgate the rule" challenged in this action. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 8.
"When a party seeks to sue an agency of the State, the proper party defendant is any officer, office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, or institution against whom the plaintiff has alleged a right to final relief." Me. State Empl. Ass'n SEIU Local 1989 v. Dep't of Corr., 682 A.2d 686, 689 (Me. 1996). Moreover, the Law Court has held that "[t]he mere misidentification of an agency of the State does not necessitate the dismissal of the complaint." Id. at 690. Rather, upon learning of the misidentification, the court "should simply change the title of the case to reflect correctly the adversary parties involved." Id.
To place Defendants' contention in context, it is helpful to review the Maine Emergency Medical Services Act. The Act defines "Maine Emergency Medical Services" to include "the board, the emergency medical services director and staff within the Department of Public Safety responsible for carrying out the purposes of this chapter." 32 M.R.S. § 83(16-A). The board is primarily responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Act and has been vested with rulemaking authority. See 32 M.R.S. §§ 84, 88. The director is charged with "administering] Maine Emergency Medical Services." 32 M.R.S. § 88-A. The board, director, and Maine EMS staff are "all under the auspices of the Department of Public Safety." Berard v. McKinnis, 1997 ME 186, ¶ 7 n.6, 699 A.2d 1148.
Here, Plaintiffs have appropriately named MEMS, a statutorily defined entity of which the Board is a part. Plaintiffs also seek compensation for lost wages and benefits- relief that if granted, would seemingly be enforceable against the director as head administrator. See SEIU Local 1989, 682 A.2d at 689 (). Moreover, even if either party was misnamed, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy. Rather, the court should simply recaption the matter to reflect the Board as the proper defendant. See id. 690.
Although Plaintiffs'...
To continue reading
Request your trial