Calvine Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America

• Decision Date: 02 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 541,541
• Citation: 79 S.E.2d 181,238 N.C. 719
• Parties: , 24 Lab.Cas. P 68,047 CALVINE COTTON MILLS, Inc. v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 181

79 S.E.2d 181

238 N.C. 719, 24 Lab.Cas. P 68,047

CALVINE COTTON MILLS, Inc. v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA et al.

No. 541

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 2, 1953

Maurice A. Weinstein, Charlotte, for plaintiff appellant.

Carl E. Gaddy, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant appellees.

BARNHILL, Justice.

The only exceptive assignments of error contained in the record are these: (1) 'The plaintiff assigns as error the refusal of the Court to grant the relief prayed for by the plaintiff,' and (2) 'the plaintiff further assigns as error the action of the Court in rendering and signing the judgment appearing in the record.'

These exceptive assignments of error are most general in terms and constitute a broadside attack on the judgment. Vestal v. Moseley Vending Machine Exchange, Inc., 219 N.C. 468, 14 S.E.2d 427. The exception to the judgment in effect asserts that the award and the facts found by the court are insufficient to support the judgment entered. Town of Burnsville v. Boone, 231 N.C. 577, 58 S.E.2d 351; Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128, 168 A.L.R. 1; Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 38 S.E.2d 203; Hoover v. Crotts, 232 N.C. 617, 61 S.E.2d 705. It is doubtful whether it goes behind the award so as to present the question whether the arbitrator acted under a misapprehension of the law as argued by plaintiff. In any event, that is the full extent of the assignments of error. We will resolve the doubt in favor of plaintiff so as to discuss and decide that question. If the arbitrator, under the guise of construction, read into the collective bargaining agreement a material provision no reasonable construction will permit, he acted under a mistake of law as to his authority and the award should be vacated. On the other hand, if the award is bottomed on a permissible construction of the contract, then the judgment should be sustained.

An arbitration is an extrajudicial proceeding and the arbitrator is not bound by the rules of procedure and evidence which prevail in a court of law. When the dispute submitted to him grows out of a written contract, and settlement of the controversy requires an interpretation of that contract, interpretation thereof is within his authority. Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 233 N.C. 46, 62 S.E.2d 535, 24 A.L.R.2d 747. Once made, the award is, ordinarily, conclusive and binding upon the parties. 3 A.J. 938, 951. From it there is no appeal.

Even so, an arbitrator must act within the scope of the authority conferred on him by the arbitration agreement, and his award is subject to attack for that he, acting under a mistake of law, exceeded his authority, Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers, supra, and upon other grounds which are not material here. G.S. §§ 1-559, 1-560.

Here the collective bargaining agreement expressly provides in Section V for the submission of a dispute respecting the proper interpretation of the agreement. Section V of the collective bargaining agreement reads in part as follows:

'(a) Any grievance, disagreement or dispute between the company and the Union, arising from the operation or interpretation of this Agreement or concerning wages, hours of employment * * * shall, at the request of the Company or the Union, be settled by arbitration. * * *

'(b) * * * The arbitrator shall not have the authority to change in any respect any provision of this Agreement nor add to, delete or modify any of its provisions. The arbitrator's award shall be in writing and shall be binding on the Company and the Union and conclusive of the Controversy submitted.'

Vacation pay is part of an employee's wages, and plaintiff's employees had earned a pro rata portion of their vacation pay from 1 June 1951 to the time their employment was terminated. In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14 A.L.R.2d 842. So then, the matter in dispute concerns the wages due the employees--and arbitration of grievances concerning wages, except for general wage increases and decreases, is expressly provided for in the contract.

But plaintiff stressfully contends that the contract, when correctly construed, provides that only those who were employees of plaintiff on 1 June of each year were entitled to vacation pay.

The contract is somewhat ambiguous in this respect. While it is not expressly so provided, there are a number of expressions in the contract which tend to support this contention. Plaintiff relies in particular on the provision that 'termination of any employee's employment for any reason after June 1st shall not affect the employee's right to vacation pay. ' The vacation pay calculation day under the contract was 1 June. No employee...