Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America
| Decision Date | 13 December 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 666,666 |
| Citation | 24 A.L.R.2d 747,233 N.C. 46,62 S.E.2d 535 |
| Parties | , 24 A.L.R.2d 747, 19 Lab.Cas. P 66,092 THOMASVILLE CHAIR CO. v. UNITED FURNITURE WORKERS OF AMERICA. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Brooks, McLendon, Brim & Holderness, Greensboro, Don A. Walser, Lexington, B. G. Gentry, Thomasville, for plaintiff appellant.
Weinstock & Tauber, New York City, Ford Meyers, Thomasville, for defendant appellee.
No procedural question is raised. No facts are in dispute. The only ground upon which the award of the arbitrators is attacked by plaintiff's motion or action is that the award is not within the scope of the agreement and that the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
The arbitration in this case was not instituted under the provisions of the statute, G.S. § 1-544 et seq., but it was said in Copney v. Parks, 212 N.C. 217, 193 S.E. 21, 22, 'that the statutory methods of arbitration are to be regarded merely as constituting an enlargement on the commonlaw rule, and that the provisions of the statute are cumulative and concurrent rather than exclusive. ' In any event an award is always open to attack on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. It is from the agreement that the arbitrators derived their authority. Farmer v. Town of Wilson, 202 N.C. 775, 164 S.E. 356.
The power and authority of the arbitrators here was limited by the terms of the agreement and the grievance submitted, and the scope of the inquiry and decision must be determined in accord with that standard. The question is not whether the arbitrators decided wisely but whether they went beyond the limits established by the agreement between the Company and the Union. The agreement specifically provides that any dispute as to the interpretation or application of its terms may be submitted to arbitration, and that the arbitrators selected in the manner prescribed shall be governed by the terms of the agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union enumerates among the holidays to be observed 'two days at Christmas.' Under the contract, when no work is performed on a holiday, the eight hours of that day nevertheless are counted in computing the 40-hour workweek, and if when added to the hours of work on other days of the workweek they exceed 40 hours the employee is entitled to time and one-half pay for all hours over 40. Ordinarily the workweek observed by the Company extended from Monday through Friday.
In 1949 Christmas Day fell on Sunday. It appears that at the factory of the Company for the calendar week beginning December 25 no work was performed on...
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