Cambodian Buddhist Society of CT., Inc. v. Newtown Planning & Zoning Commission, No. CV-03-0350572S (CT 11/18/2005)
| Decision Date | 18 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-03-0350572S,CV-03-0350572S |
| Parties | Cambodian Buddhist Society of CT., Inc. v. Newtown Planning and Zoning Commission Opinion No.: 91041 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
The plaintiff is the Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. ("society"). The society is the owner of a parcel of land located at 145 Boggs Hill Road in Newtown, Connecticut ("property"). The property is located in an area designated as a farming and residential R-2 zone. On or about August 8, 2002, the society, through its agent, filed an application with the Newtown planning and zoning commission ("commission") for a special exception to construct a place of religious worship on the property. On February 26, 2003, the commission denied the society's application. The society has appealed said denial pursuant to statute.
The society has claimed in its appeal that the decision of the commission: (1) was arbitrary, illegal and an abuse of its discretion; (2) violated General Statutes Conn. §52-571b, the Religious Freedom Act ("RFA"); and (3) violated 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq., the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA").
Joined as defendants pursuant to a motion to intervene (motion #103 granted on June 2, 2003, by the court, Downey, J.) are abutting property owners and property owners within 100 feet of the property.
In 1999 the Society purchased the property Newtown. Its president, Pong Me testified that it did so because the property has all of the qualities needed for a temple. Presently there is no temple available to the society to practice its religion. The society has been renting hall space in various locations to conduct its services.
The court, Downey J., previously ruled that the society is aggrieved for purposes of General Statutes §8-8. Therefore, the issues of aggrievement are not addressed here.
"The terms 'special permit' and 'special exception' have the same legal import and can be used interchangeably." A.P. & W. Holding Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 167 Conn. 182, 185, 355 A.2d 91 (1974). "A special [exception] allows a property owner to use his property in a manner expressly permitted by the local zoning regulations . . . The proposed use, however, must satisfy standards set forth in the zoning regulations themselves as well as the conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience, and property values." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, 53 Conn.App. 636, 639, 733 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 921, 738 A.2d 658 (1999). See also Housatonic Terminal Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 168 Conn. 304, 307, 362 A.2d 1375 (1975).
"When ruling upon an application for a special permit, a planning and zoning board acts in an administrative capacity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627, 711 A.2d 675 (1998). "Acting in this administrative capacity, the [zoning commission's] function is to determine whether the applicant's proposed use is expressly permitted under the regulations, and whether the standards set forth in the regulations and the statute are satisfied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, supra, 53 Conn.App. 639. "Moreover, [i]t is well settled that in granting a special permit, an applicant must satisf[y] all conditions imposed by the regulations . . . The zoning commission has no discretion to deny the special exception if the regulations and statutes are satisfied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 640. See also Housatonic Terminal Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 168 Conn. 307.
"The settled standard of review of questions of fact determined by a zoning authority is that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority as long as it reflects an honest judgment reasonably exercised . . . The court's review is based on the record, which includes the knowledge of the board members gained through personal observation of the site . . . or through their personal knowledge of the area involved." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, supra, 53 Conn.App. 643. "On appeal, a reviewing court reviews the record of the administrative proceedings to determine whether the commission . . . has acted fairly or with proper motives or upon valid reasons." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 152, 543 A.2d 1339 (1988). "Review of zoning commission decisions by the Superior Court is limited to a determination of whether the commission acted arbitrarily, illegally or unreasonably." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, supra, 53 Conn.App. 639.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Protect Hamden/North Haven from Excessive Traffic & Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 527, 542-43, 600 A.2d 757 (1991). See also Middlebury v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 96 0130420 (April 14, 1997, Pellegrino, J.).
"[W]here a zoning commission has formally stated the reasons for its decision the court should not go behind that official collective statement . . . [and] attempt to search out and speculate upon other reasons which might have influenced some or all of the members of the commission to reach the commission's final collective decision." DeMaria v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 534, 541, 271 A.2d 105 (1970). "In situations in which the zoning commission . . . [states] the reasons for its action, the question for the court to pass on is simply whether the reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the commission is required to apply under the zoning regulations . . . The agency's decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 244 Conn. 629. "The burden of proof to demonstrate that the [commission] acted improperly is upon the plaintiffs." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206, 658 A.2d 559 (1995).
Pursuant to General Statutes §8-8(k), the court, Frankel J., by order dated May 25, 2005, allowed the society to present evidence outside of the record. (Order number 140.) The parties had agreed that the society would be able to present evidence on the issue of equal protection. The order allowed the society to present evidence regarding the RLUIPA and RFA.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zahra v. Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995). "[A] violation of equal protection by selective [treatment] arise[s] if: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." LaTrieste Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994), citing LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981).
"[T]he requirement imposed upon [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1995) . . . Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995)." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 672, 757 A.2d 1 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148, 121 S.Ct. 1089, 148 L.Ed.2d 963 (2001). See also Alexander v. Commissioner of Administrative Services, 86 Conn.App. 677, 684, 862 A.2d 851 (2004).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the following evidence was before the court and is relevant to the determination of whether the society had established a prima facie case of an equal protection violation by the defendants.
The society presented three instances of religious institutions being granted special permits in Newtown.
The first is the two applications of Congregation Adath Israel. Prior to 1900 Adath Israel had a synagogue in Newtown. It sought to build a new synagogue a short distance from the old. The first application failed by a vote of three to two due to the size of the building. Its second application was approved because it was determined that the lot was not as small as previously thought, rather than being under two acres it was actually two acres.
The society argued that...
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