Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission
Decision Date | 08 June 1999 |
Citation | 53 Conn. App. 636,733 A.2d 862 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | JAMES H. RACZKOWSKI v. ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF NAUGATUCK ET AL. |
Spear, Hennessy and Stoughton, JS. Robert A. Fuller, for the appellant (named defendant).
Franklin G. Pilicy, for the appellant (defendant Nichols Realty, LLC).
J. Brendan Sharkey, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendants, Naugatuck Zoning Commission (commission) and Nichols Realty, LLC (Nichols), appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff James H. Raczkowski's appeal from the commission's decision granting Nichols' application for a special permit to excavate sand and gravel in connection with approval of a residential subdivision application. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts. Nichols obtained approval for a thirty-nine lot subdivision on a 50.16 acre tract in an R-15 residential zone1 in Naugatuck. The subdivision lots are oversized and average about one acre each. To develop the site as proposed, Nichols had to obtain a special permit for the excavation of approximately 300,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel from the northeast portion of the tract. The commission held two public hearings and conducted a site inspection.
The commission approved Nichols' request for a special permit, subject to certain conditions. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the trial court from the commission's decision,2 claiming that the commission had acted arbitrarily, capriciously and in abuse of its discretion because, inter alia, it failed to consider all of the zoning regulation requirements for issuing such permits. The trial court found that the plaintiff was aggrieved and sustained the appeal, concluding that the record lacked substantial evidence to support the commission's determination that the defendants had satisfied §§ 31.4.53 and 31.4.74 of the Naugatuck zoning regulations.
The defendants filed separate petitions for certification for review. Following the granting of these petitions on October 8, 1997, the defendants filed separate appeals.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that the special permit was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, (2) substituted its interpretation of § 31.4.7 of the Naugatuck zoning regulations for that of the commission and (3) substituted its judgment for that of the commission regarding whether the special permit complied with the zoning regulations. We agree.
(Citations omitted.) Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 43 Conn. App. 105, 110-11, 682 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 123 (1996).
Before addressing the defendants' claims, we must first review certain legal principles and several of the town's zoning regulations relevant to our decision. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 46 Conn. App. 566, 569, 700 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 935, 702 A.2d 640 (1997). Moreover, Id.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206, 658 A.2d 559 (1995). Furthermore, in reviewing the conclusions of a zoning authority, "[c]ourts must be scrupulous not to hamper the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards by indulging in a microscopic search for technical infirmities in their actions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579, 596, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993).
Section 31.1 of the Naugatuck zoning regulations forbids the alteration of the contours of land by excavation, removal or relocation of earth, gravel, or stone, except by special exception.5 Under § 31.4,6 the zoning commission may grant a special permit after a properly noticed public hearing if an applicant satisfies thirteen specific conditions and requirements of the regulations.7 Section 31.5 provides, in part, that each special permit shall be valid for a period of two years or less, and that after a public hearing on due notice the commission may grant extensions.
With these legal principles and zoning regulations in mind, we now address the merits of the defendants' claims concerning the special permit and whether the commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The defendants contend that the record contains substantial evidence from which the commission could have determined that a special permit allowing the excavation of sand and gravel would not violate § 31.4.5 by adversely affecting property values in the area.8 We agree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 176 Conn. 533, 538, 409 A.2d 1013 (1979). Such evidence exists if "`the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.'" Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 246 Conn. 18, 36, 716 A.2d 78 (1998).
Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support a finding of conformity with § 31.4.5. Robert J. Nocera, a licensed and certified real estate appraiser and civil engineer, provided testimony and a lengthy report to the commission on behalf of Nichols indicating that (1) under Nichols' development plan it would take three years to remove the sand and gravel,9 (2) there would be no negative impact on property values during that time, (3) the additional development of good quality homes would have a positive effect on property values and (4) upon completion of the subdivision, there would be a long-term, positive benefit to the neighborhood, resulting in increased overall property values.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court opined that "[a]fter the expiration of the two year special permit term, together with the possible one year extension, the excavation process at best [would] only be approximately 60 percent finished." The court also stated that
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 513, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994). ...
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