Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer

• Citation: 723 P.2d 1195,45 Wn.App. 29
• Decision Date: 20 August 1986
• Docket Number: POST-INTELLIGENCER and S,No. 15814-7-I,15814-7-I
• Parties: , 13 Media L. Rep. 1481 Dorothy CAMER and Margaret Coughlin, Appellants, v. SEATTLEusan Goldberg, Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington

Page 29

45 Wn.App. 29

723 P.2d 1195, 13 Media L. Rep. 1481

Dorothy CAMER and Margaret Coughlin, Appellants, v. SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER and Susan Goldberg, Respondents.

No. 15814-7-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 20, 1986.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 18, 1986.

Dorothy Camer, Margaret Coughlin, pro se.

David Utevsky, Camden M. Hall, Lewis Taylor Egan, Seattle, for Seattle Post-Intelligencer and Susan Goldberg.

PEKELIS, Judge.

Dorothy Camer and Margaret Coughlin appeal the trial court's order of summary judgment dismissing their libel complaint against The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (The Seattle P.I.) and reporter Susan Goldberg. Camer and Coughlin allege that the court erred in dismissing their complaint because they have established a prima facie case of defamation with convincing clarity. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS

The lawsuit arises out of an article written by Susan Goldberg published on June 20, 1982 in The Seattle P.I. The article is entitled " 'Nuisance' suits clog the courts," and discusses the effects and implications of pro se litigants on the court system. Several attorneys are quoted: Mike Redman, executive secretary of the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys; Michael Hoge, attorney for the Seattle School District (District), Richard Mann, an assistant city attorney; and Malachy Murphy, an assistant attorney general.

The article first discusses Redman's comments regarding the "constant battle" in the "legal libraries and law offices of the state attorney general, city hall and Seattle School District" against " 'nuisance suers.' " Redman referred specifically to a personal restraint petitioner and generally to other prisoners who Redman predicted would file meritless personal restraint petitions. The article continues:

But Redman has other reasons to worry about nuisance suits, and not just those filed by prisoners.

There are also the suits brought by "constitutional crazies," he says. Those are the people who think "flouridated [sic ] water is a communist plot to enslave us" or insist the only legal tender is gold and battle in court over the use of paper money.

Then there are suits by those "who are just not operating with a level bubble," Redman says. Those are the people who keep overworked county prosecutors busy responding to charges he says are preposterous on their face.

In all, Redman estimates that state's county prosecutors spend about $750,000 each year, not counting court costs and outside attorneys' fees, to fend off the myriad of frivolous charges brought by constant litigants.

Similar charges are leveled, correctly or not, at Seattle citizens like Dorothy Camer and Margaret Coughlin, who together have filed nearly two dozen separate legal actions against the state, city and Seattle School District.

The article also notes that both women frequently appear pro se, that Camer has never won a case, and that when contacted by Goldberg for comment on their actions, both Camer and Coughlin said they were too busy with their legal work to be interviewed.

Also quoted are estimates by Hoge and Mann as to the cost of these types of cases and a statement by Murphy that: " 'Most of these cases are not legitimate.... The claims are so off the wall they have to represent themselves.' " The article then avers that nuisance suits contribute to court congestion, a major problem at all three levels of the court system in this state. Finally, Hoge comments on nuisance suits: " 'They are time-consuming, expensive and frustrating for me and others involved,' ... 'but that's the price we pay for a legal system where each citizen has the right to be heard in the courts.' "

On July 20, 1982, Camer and Coughlin filed a complaint for libel, alleging that the article defamed them. On April 20, 1984, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the article did not include statements concerning Camer and Coughlin which were both false and defamatory, that some of the statements complained of were not " 'of and concerning' " them, and that the statements complained of were privileged opinion and/ or fair comment. The defendants also alleged that Camer and Coughlin were limited public figures and had not shown that the article was published with actual malice. On May 7, 1984, the trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

The record before the court at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment contained the following facts: Dorothy Camer has been very interested in school district issues. Related to this interest, she has been involved in approximately 10 legal actions regarding public education, usually appearing pro se. Her claims are generally based on contentions that the education provided to her children was deficient. For example, in 1980 she filed a complaint for "educational malpractice," in which she alleged, inter alia, that the District and the State did not provide her children with their constitutional right to a basic education. The complaint also alleged that her son's civil liberties were violated when he was temporarily denied the freedom to play ball on the playground with female classmates. In another suit, she claimed that her son was denied his constitutional rights because he was not given penmanship instruction, he was not informed of an honors math program, and he was not instructed in the complete curriculum for a required Washington State history course. Three times she attempted to intervene in suits already pending between the District and the State. In addition, Camer filed four complaints against school officials with the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education. In every case, Camer's claims were dismissed.

Camer admits that she has called both print and television reporters to discuss her cases. She has been quoted in the newspaper on various District-related issues and has written "letters to the editor" criticizing the District. On one occasion, she mailed a press release regarding her thoughts on deficiencies in the school system and inadequate press coverage thereof.

Margaret Coughlin has been a long-time community activist in the Magnolia area of Seattle. In 1937, she was a member of the State Legislature and in 1971 ran for a position on the Seattle City Council. More recently, she has been active in environmental, land use, and school-related issues. Her work has been mentioned in many newspaper articles, especially her involvement in calling for an environmental impact statement (EIS) as a prerequisite to the development of Discovery Park. She has regularly written "letters to the editor" and to City and District officials, and she has drafted and circulated petitions on various issues.

From 1974 to 1982, Coughlin filed approximately nine lawsuits involving land use and environmental issues against the City of Seattle (City), the District, and others. An example of one of her suits was an action filed against the City in 1975, alleging that the Board of Adjustment acted arbitrarily and capricious1y in reversing a decision denying a variance to a Magnolia-area rest home. Her complaint was dismissed, and the decision was affirmed on appeal. In 1981, she filed complaints against the District regarding its decision to close certain Magnolia-area elementary schools. These complaints were also dismissed. However, Coughlin's 1974 suit against the City regarding the development of Discovery Park was successful in that the City voluntarily agreed to issue an EIS. Coughlin has brought suits both pro se and with counsel.

At the time she wrote the article, Susan Goldberg was an education reporter for The Seattle P.I. As part of her daily routine, Goldberg would call various District offices to inquire about District activities. Over a period of months, Goldberg learned that there were a number of people, like Camer, who frequently filed cases against the District or other government entities. She thought that it would be interesting to develop a story about this phenomenon.

In researching the article, Goldberg spoke with people on the District's legal staff, as well as lawyers from the State Attorney General's office and the City Attorney's office. Michael Hoge gave Goldberg a large number of files of the cases brought against the District by Camer and Coughlin. In addition to interviewing Hoge, she talked to Dave Burman who also handled cases for the District, Mike Redman, Richard Mann, and Malachy Murphy.

Camer recalls that about 6 p.m. on Thursday, June 17, 1982, Goldberg called her about the article. Camer told Goldberg that she was too busy to talk and would not be able to speak with her for at least a week. Goldberg did not give her the impression the article had anything in particular to do with her. Goldberg states that when she told Camer about the article and asked her opinion as to why she felt she needed to file so many lawsuits, Camer told her she was too busy to talk.

Coughlin recalls that on June 17, Goldberg called to ask her why she was filing lawsuits and told her that she had a deadline for the Sunday paper. Coughlin stated that she was typing "an important legal paper" and would have to get back to her later. Coughlin did not want to be quoted because she was hesitant to comment on a pending case.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as did the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982); Styner v. England, 40 Wash.App. 386, 388, 699 P.2d 234 (1985). In defamation cases, as in other cases, a motion for summary judgment under CR 56(c) should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence must be considered in the...