Styner v. England
| Decision Date | 23 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 6254-III-6,6254-III-6 |
| Citation | 40 Wn.App. 386,699 P.2d 234 |
| Parties | Warren A. STYNER, Jr., and Kent McLachlan, a partnership, d/b/a Stymac, Respondents, v. G. James ENGLAND and Suzanne England, husband and wife, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Ronald F. Whitaker, Walters, Whitaker, Finney & Falk, Yakima, for appellants.
Alan A. McDonald, Halverson, Applegate & McDonald, Yakima, for respondents.
Warren Styner and Kent McLachlin, d/b/a STYMAC, a partnership, commenced this action against the marital community of C. James and Suzanne England to recover damages for Mr. England's failure to pay for shares of stock he ordered through a broker. The court granted STYMAC summary judgment and awarded $23,968.75. This appeal challenges STYMAC'S standing to sue and whether a broker's violation of federal margin regulations precludes this claim. We affirm.
On December 1, 1981, Mr. England placed an order with Shearson, Loeb, Rhodes, Inc. (hereinafter Shearson) stockbroker Ward Styner 1 to purchase 59,000 shares of Hingeline Overthrust Oil and Gas, then valued at $75,593.75. Ward Styner placed the order with Shearson, which performed the necessary transactions and subsequently notified Mr. England he should deposit the purchase price by 10 a.m. December 10, 1981. Mr. England knew his failure to purchase the stock would not discharge him from any losses sustained by reason of a decline in the market value of the stock while in Shearson's possession. For the next several days the market value of the Hingeline stock plummeted and by December 10, 1981, fell to $51,695. Mr. England has not paid for the stock.
Mr. England's refusal to pay placed Ward Styner in a precarious financial position because Shearson placed all losses resulting from unpurchased securities upon its agents. Since Ward Styner was apparently unable to sustain the loss arising out of Mr. England's unpurchased order, STYMAC purchased the stock at the price to which Mr. England agreed, knowing the true market value of the stock was substantially less. Shearson subsequently assigned STYMAC its chose in action against Mr. England.
We first address whether STYMAC has standing to sue the Englands for breach of contract. The Englands principally contend STYMAC lacks standing because it purchased the stock from Shearson, which did not sustain loss and therefore had no chose in action to assign.
In reviewing an order for summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Yeats v. Estate of Yeats, 90 Wash.2d 201, 203, 580 P.2d 617 (1978); Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Wash.App. 297, 304, 654 P.2d 1215 (1982). An agency relationship exists between a stockbroker and the brokerage house for which he works. See, e.g., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir.1975); Verrecchia v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 563 F.Supp. 360, 365 (D.C.P.R.1982); Cf. 1 W. Black, Stock Exchanges, Stockbrokers & Customers § 7, 21-36 (1940). Generally, a principal is entitled to maintain a claim on a contract made by his agent with a third party if: (1) the principal is named as the contracting party, (2) the third party is bound by the contract; and (3) the third party is liable to the principal to the same extent as if he had contracted with the principal in person. Taub v. Colonial Coated Textile Corp., 54 App.Div.2d 660, 387 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (1976); Sumner v. Flowers, 130 Cal.App.2d 672, 279 P.2d 772, 774 (1955); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 292 (1958); P. Mechem, Outline of the Law of Agency § 294-96 (4th ed. 1952).
Here, Ward Styner, as agent for Shearson, contracted to sell 59,000 shares to Mr. England. Shearson provided Mr. England written confirmation of the order and sent a mailgram informing Mr. England that his failure to pay for the stock would require Shearson to liquidate the securities in satisfaction of losses sustained. This evidence establishes the Shearson-Styner agency relationship and also that Shearson was entitled to maintain any claim Ward Styner would have had against Mr. England.
The next question, then, is whether Shearson had a chose in action against Mr. England for his default in the payment of the stock ordered. Where a customer defaults in the payment of stock purchased for him or refuses to accept and pay for such stock, "the broker may sell the stock and hold the customer responsible for any deficit." Herron Northwest, Inc. v. Danskin, 78 Wash.2d 500, 503, 476 P.2d 702 (1970); Mass v. Gordon, 101 So.2d 836, 837 (Fla.App.1958). If the customer refuses to complete the transaction, the damages are the difference between the authorized purchase price and the amount realized upon a subsequent sale. Herron, 78 Wash.2d at 503, 476 P.2d 702; Mass, at 837-38. As stated in Herron
In dealings between a stockbroker and a customer, when an authorized purchase of stock is made by a broker, and the customer defaults by refusing to accept and pay for the stock, the broker has an election of remedies. He may treat the stock as the property of the customer, and sue for the full purchase price upon a tender of the stock; or, he may sell the stock promptly or within a reasonable time, and recover the difference between the purchase price and the amount received on such sale. If the broker chooses to retain the stock and treats it as his own, as was done in this instance, the second of those remedies is applicable, and the measure of his damages is the difference between the purchase price and the amount for which the stock could have been sold on the date of default or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Herron, 78 Wash.2d at 503-04, 476 P.2d 702 (quoting Mass, at 837-38).
When Mr. England refused to pay for his stock, Shearson sustained losses because the stock declined in value. By December 10, 1981, the stock value had decreased $23,968.75. Then STYMAC purchased the stock at the price to which Mr. England had agreed, knowing the actual value of the stock was much less. By paying an extra $23,968.75, STYMAC chose to "retain the stock" and intended to claim the difference against Mr. England. In short, STYMAC paid the extra amount to obtain Shearson's chose in action against Mr. England; Shearson formally assigned its chose in action September 27, 1982. Since a right to damages for breach of contract is assignable, we conclude STYMAC may assert Shearson's claim against the Englands. See Portland Elec. & Plumbing Co. v. Vancouver, 29 Wash.App. 292, 294, 627 P.2d 1350 (1981); 3 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 412, at 46-47 (3d ed. 1960).
We next address the Englands' contention that Ward Styner's violations of federal margin provisions preclude recovery for losses sustained from the unpurchased stock. Since this case involves federal securities laws, state court jurisdiction must be examined. Claims based on federal securities law must be brought in federal court under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa, 2 but that law may be asserted as a defense to a claim brought in state court. Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 438-39, 628 P.2d 1336 (1981); Shareholders Mgmt. Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir.1971); Buckley v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 109 Ill.App.3d 462, 65 Ill.Dec. 59, 62, 440 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1982); Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., 555 S.W.2d 513, 514-15 (Tex.Civ.App.1977). 3 Mr. England's defense rests entirely upon the scope of the implied private remedies for violations of section 7 of the Securities and Exchange Act and Regulation T promulgated thereunder.
Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to regulate margin transactions and forbids violations of the Board's regulations. Regulation T, promulgated under authority of section 7, generally establishes the margin rate for security purchases at 50 percent, meaning that a purchaser generally must advance half of the purchase price of securities acquired "on margin." Regulation T also provided, in pertinent part:
In case a customer purchases a security (other than an exempted security) in the special cash account and does not make full cash payment for the security within 7 days after the date on which the security is so purchased, the creditor 4 shall, except as provided in paragraphs (c)(3) through (7) of this section, promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction or the unsettled portion thereof.
12 C.F.R. Part 220.4(c)(2) (1983). 5
Prior to Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), numerous courts had recognized a private right of action under section 7 and its regulations, yet none is explicitly granted by the act. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 445-46 (6th Cir.1972) (Regulation U); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1139 (2d Cir.1970) (Regulation T), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013, 91 S.Ct. 1250, 28 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971). 6 In Cort, the Court set forth criteria for determining whether a statute implies a private right of action. The first Cort factor identifies whether the plaintiff is one "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"; the second, and most important, is whether there is any indication of Congressional intent to create a private remedy; the third is whether a private remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme; and the fourth is whether it would be inappropriate to infer a federal claim in an area traditionally relegated to state law. Cort, at 95 S.Ct. 2087; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S.Ct. 683, 686-90, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-78, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1837, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982).
Since Cort, every circuit court of appeals considering this issue has denied investors a private remedy under section 7 and its regulations. 7 We agree.
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